IMMEDIATE SETTLEMENT OR ENDURING A STRIKE: THE CHOICE OF SIGNALS

Some labour contract negotiations involve strikes while most conclude with immediate settlement. This article offers a model of union‐firm negotiation with private information to show that either strikes or immediate settlement will take place in the equilibrium. Different from most signalling literature where the signals are exogenously given, this article endogenizes the choice of signals. We compare two signals, the employment level and the strategic delay. We show that the low‐revenue firm will choose the signal which gives it higher payoff while separating itself from the high‐revenue firm.     

Earnings Instability and Tenure

We study the effect of tenure on earnings instability in Italy using the reforms of temporary employment contracts, which affected the average tenure of workers differentially across cohorts. We develop a model of earnings dynamics, and we exploit the variation of tenure and instability over time and across birth cohorts to estimate policy‐relevant parameters. Our results indicate that each year of tenure on the job reduces earnings instability by 11 percent; the drop is faster in the first three years of the match. Workers on a temporary contract have an earnings instability up to 100 percent higher than workers on a permanent contract.     

Job Search and the Measurement of Unemployment in South Africa

We interrogate the distinction between searching and non‐searching unemployment in South Africa using data from the first national panel survey that tracks the individual. In particular, we test whether the non‐searching unemployed display a weaker commitment to the labour market than the searching unemployed, and we investigate what counts as search activity. We find that over the panel, the search status of the unemployed does not predict their subsequent employment status, a result that is robust also for subsamples that vary by age cohort, gender and location. Moreover, social networks are the most important job‐finding strategy of the employed. These findings challenge the exclusion of the non‐searching unemployed from the measure of “genuine” work seekers.     

Subjective Performance Evaluations and Reciprocity in Principal–Agent Relations

We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on, and principals benefiting from, a real effort task in which the agents' performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents, and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. In contrast to existing models of reciprocity, we find that agents tend to sanction whenever the feedback of principals is below their subjective self‐evaluations even if agents' pay‐offs are independent of it. In turn, principals provide more positive feedback (relative to their actual performance assessment of the agent) if this does not affect their pay‐off.     

China's One‐Child Policy: Some Unintended Consequences

This paper gives a brief overview of China's family planning policy which, although recently relaxed, still controls a large swath of the population. Unofficially known as the ‘one‐child policy’, it resulted from the social strife of the 1970s coupled with a Malthusian pessimism concerning the capability of the still largely closed and isolated Chinese economy to care for itself. We discuss the motivations for the policy, the unfortunate demographic future that it will create, and some policy reforms that can be undertaken today.     

Inclusive wealth with a changing but aging population

We consider the effect of population age distribution in inclusive wealth accounting. Numerical results demonstrate that the wealth of nations with an aging demographic structure, as well as those with a rapidly increasing working-age generation, may have been overestimated.     

Remittances and the human capital of children: New evidence from Kyrgyzstan during revolution and financial crisis, 2005–2009

We analyze the effect of the receipt of remittances on the education and health of children in Kyrgyzstan during a volatile period of their recent history, 2005–2009. The country experienced revolution in 2005 and the global financial crisis beginning in 2008. Both events impact human capital investment, and the changes vary by region of the country. We use fixed effects estimation and fixed effects, instrumental variables estimation to isolate the effects of remittances and other events on human capital. We find that boys aged 14–18 in remittances’ receiving households are less likely to be enrolled in school than other children. We also find that girls in remittances’ receiving households are more likely to be malnourished (thin). Both effects are relatively small. Remittances do not improve the human capital of children left behind. However, we do find an overall positive improvement in school enrollment among young children between 2005 and 2009 but a negative trend in enrollment among older boys and girls. Nutrition improves over time. Regional differences are apparent in these trends in nutrition and education.     

Intergenerational Correlations of Extreme Right‐Wing Party Preferences and Attitudes toward Immigration

In this paper, we analyze the importance of parental socialization on the development of children's far right‐wing preferences and attitudes toward immigration. Using longitudinal data from Germany, our intergenerational estimates suggest that the strongest and most important predictor for young people's right‐wing extremism are their parents' right‐wing extremist attitudes. While intergenerational associations in attitudes toward immigration are equally high for sons and daughters, we find a positive intergenerational transmission of right‐wing extremist party affinity for sons, but not for daughters. Compared to the intergenerational correlation of other party affinities, the high association between fathers' and sons' right‐wing extremist attitudes is particularly striking.     

Parameter estimates comparison of earnings functions in the PSID and CPS data, 1976–2007

Comparing earnings equations in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Current Population Survey, we find that the PSID considerably underestimates the returns to education during the 1992–2007 period. Non-random selection in the PSID sample appears to be the reason.