Culture and the capital–performance nexus in dual banking systems

While recent surveys have taken a special interest in culture to explain the failure of existing regulation, empirical evidence on the role of culture in influencing the bank capital-performance link is still largely unexplored. In this paper, we ask the following: Should regulators and policy makers make room for culture as an effective tool for a successful bank regulatory environment? We identify three proxies for cultural values derived from Hofstede (1980, 2001) and the World Values Survey and investigate to what extent individualism, masculinity, and trust can enhance or impede the capital-performance link for conventional and Islamic banks. Analyzing a panel of 729 banks operating in 33 countries from 1999 to 2013, our findings provide empirical evidence that cultural values enhance the capital-performance link for the two bank types. Our results have important policy implications: our paper represents a first initiative and provides evidence that culture has merits and can be used as an additional tool to implement regulatory guidelines in a successful way.     

The Headmaster Ritual: The Importance of Management for School Outcomes

We estimate the impact of individual principals on school outcomes by using panel data that allow us to track principals over time. We find that individual principals have a substantive impact on school policies, working conditions, and student outcomes. In particular, students who attend a school that has a one standard deviation better principal improve their achievement by between 0.05 and 0.1 standard deviations. Despite rich background information on principals, it is difficult to characterize successful management, suggesting that innate skills are central. We find that the scope for discretion is larger among voucher schools and in areas with school competition.     

Is There a Causal Effect of Working Part‐Time on Current and Future Wages?

In this paper, I study the causal effects of part‐time work on current and future wages. To estimate these effects, I use a random effects model with a wage equation capturing the employment history and a dynamic multinomial probit component for the choice of employment status. Exclusion restrictions from the institutional context are exploited to support identification. The results suggest that working part‐time with few hours has a large causal effect on current wages, but more extensive part‐time work does not reduce current wages. However, both types of part‐time work lead to negative long‐term wage effects.     

Do ESOPs enhance firm performance? Evidence from China’s reform experiment

China introduced employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) in 1992 purely as an employee incentive scheme. The government initiated the policy experiment on ESOPs as part of China’s reform of its state-owned enterprises, and it was abruptly terminated 2 years after initiation. This policy experiment resulted in an exogenous sample of ESOPs that allows us to provide the first evidence from Chinese firms on the performance-ESOP relation. After examining a variety of performance measures, including ROA, ROE, Tobin’s q, and productivity, we find little difference in performance between ESOP firms and non-ESOP firms.     

IMMEDIATE SETTLEMENT OR ENDURING A STRIKE: THE CHOICE OF SIGNALS

Some labour contract negotiations involve strikes while most conclude with immediate settlement. This article offers a model of union‐firm negotiation with private information to show that either strikes or immediate settlement will take place in the equilibrium. Different from most signalling literature where the signals are exogenously given, this article endogenizes the choice of signals. We compare two signals, the employment level and the strategic delay. We show that the low‐revenue firm will choose the signal which gives it higher payoff while separating itself from the high‐revenue firm.     

Earnings Instability and Tenure

We study the effect of tenure on earnings instability in Italy using the reforms of temporary employment contracts, which affected the average tenure of workers differentially across cohorts. We develop a model of earnings dynamics, and we exploit the variation of tenure and instability over time and across birth cohorts to estimate policy‐relevant parameters. Our results indicate that each year of tenure on the job reduces earnings instability by 11 percent; the drop is faster in the first three years of the match. Workers on a temporary contract have an earnings instability up to 100 percent higher than workers on a permanent contract.     

Market Discipline and Deposit Guarantee: Evidence from Australian Banks

This study examines depositor market discipline of Australian banks and its interaction with the 2008 deposit and wholesale funding guarantee. Prior to 2008 market discipline is found for Australian‐incorporated banks. Depositors did not distinguish between major and small banks, but some differences in the degree of market discipline were found for foreign bank subsidiaries. Following the introduction of the 2008 guarantees, market discipline was reduced except for nonhousehold depositors at banks that did not access the wholesale guarantee. Market discipline is also evidenced at foreign bank branches, but weaker for those accessing the wholesale guarantee.     

Job Search and the Measurement of Unemployment in South Africa

We interrogate the distinction between searching and non‐searching unemployment in South Africa using data from the first national panel survey that tracks the individual. In particular, we test whether the non‐searching unemployed display a weaker commitment to the labour market than the searching unemployed, and we investigate what counts as search activity. We find that over the panel, the search status of the unemployed does not predict their subsequent employment status, a result that is robust also for subsamples that vary by age cohort, gender and location. Moreover, social networks are the most important job‐finding strategy of the employed. These findings challenge the exclusion of the non‐searching unemployed from the measure of “genuine” work seekers.     

Subjective Performance Evaluations and Reciprocity in Principal–Agent Relations

We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on, and principals benefiting from, a real effort task in which the agents' performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents, and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. In contrast to existing models of reciprocity, we find that agents tend to sanction whenever the feedback of principals is below their subjective self‐evaluations even if agents' pay‐offs are independent of it. In turn, principals provide more positive feedback (relative to their actual performance assessment of the agent) if this does not affect their pay‐off.