SME performance in transition economies: The financial regulation and firm-level corruption nexus

Using a general equilibrium endogenous growth model we explain underperformance in the small and medium enterprise sector as an effect of corruption and non-competitive banking. Limited competition in the banking sector causes a high loan-deposit spread, worsens the initial effect of corruption, and depresses growth. Fostering bank competition, for instance, by allowing foreign bank entry, would be a simple solution to this problem, but frequently, authorities choose to hamper bank competition. Therefore, we explain the persistence of non-competitive banking as a result of governments’ regulatory choice. If the government has a stake in the banking sector there exists a trade-off between current benefits from bank profits and future growth. Firm-level corruption affects intertemporal optimization and distorts the government’s choice towards more restrictive regulation, i.e., less bank competition, even if the deciding institution itself is not corrupt. These results show that the two prominent problems for small and medium enterprises, corruption and finance, are mutually reinforcing.     

Growth effects of environmental policy when pollution affects health

In this paper, we develop a R&D-based growth model with a pollution externality and a health production sector. We study how health-impairing pollution affects long term growth, and the effect of an emissions' reduction policy (tax). We show that a tighter environmental tax has positive effects on growth via two channels. On the one hand, it improves workers' health and, thereby, productivity; on the other hand, it induces a reallocation of resources towards R&D and, thereby, higher research intensity. The size of the growth effect of a tighter environmental tax, and the level of the optimal environmental tax, are both positively correlated with the weight individuals place on health relative to consumption. As for welfare, a tighter environmental tax brings about utility gains in the long run and, potentially, also in the short run.     

Regional and sectoral dynamics of the Dutch staffing labor cycle

This study analyzes the dynamic characteristics of staffing employment across different business sectors and across different geographical regions in The Netherlands. We analyze a micro data set of the market leader of the Dutch staffing employment market, i.e. Randstad. We apply the dynamic factor model to extract common information out of a large data set and to isolate business cycle frequencies with the aim of forecasting staffing and total employment. We identify regions and sectors whose cyclical developments lead the staffing labor cycle at the country level. The dynamic factor model exploits these leading characteristics at the disaggregate level to forecast the country aggregate. Finally, both dynamic and static factors turn out to be predictive summary statistics of the micro data set when employed to forecast total employment at the country level.     

A study on the role of guanxi in entrepreneurship and employment

This paper examines the role of guanxi in influencing the decision of an individual to be an entrepreneur facing a risky technology or to become a worker facing an unemployment rate. Individuals are assumed to vary in terms of the strength of their established guanxi that could be utilized either to lower the set-up cost as entrepreneurs or to secure jobs as workers. Compared with the case where guanxi can only be used to reduce the individual's set-up cost to become an entrepreneur, it is shown that if guanxi can also help a worker find a job, then whether the employment rate might be improved or worsened will depend on the absolute risk aversion that is increasing or decreasing in income.     

What does it mean to find the face of the franchise? Physical attractiveness and the evaluation of athletic performance

We show that attractiveness, as measured by facial symmetry, leads to greater rewards in professional sports. National Football League quarterbacks who are more attractive are paid greater salaries and this premium persists after controlling for player performance.     

Are there pre-programme effects of active placement efforts? Evidence from a social experiment

This note estimates pre-programme effects of active placement programmes. Estimation is based on a social experiment conducted in three Swedish counties in 2004. I find that placement programmes could substantially increase transitions both to jobs and other exits before programme start.     

On the role of social wage comparisons in gift-exchange experiments

This study extends a bilateral gift-exchange experiment by Clark et al. (2010). We investigate how the provision of either quantitative or qualitative information on the average wage paid in all worker-employer relationships impacts the wage set by employers and worker performance. We find that information on the average wage reduces (increases) both wage offers and effort levels in one-shot (repeated) relationships.     

The condition of the Turking class: Are online employers fair and honest?

Critics of online labor markets claim that employer abuses are endemic in these markets. Surveying a sample of workers, I find that, on average, workers perceive online employers to be slightly fairer and more honest than offline employers.     

The effects of environmental taxes and quotas on the optimal timing of emission reductions under Choquet–Brownian uncertainty

The effects of two environmental policy options for the reduction of pollution emissions, i.e. taxes and non-tradable quotas, are analyzed. In contrast to the prior literature this work endogenously takes into account the level of emissions before and after the adoption of the new environmental policy. The level of emissions is determined by solving the firm's profit maximization problem under taxes and fixed quotas. We find that the optimal adoption threshold under taxes is always larger than the adoption threshold under fixed quota, even in a setting characterized by ecological uncertainty and ambiguity – in the form of Choquet–Brownian motions – on future costs and benefits over adopting environmental policies.     

Bidding for brains: Intellectual property rights and the international migration of knowledge workers

We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from a global welfare perspective. These incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth, thus allowing them to prevent the ‘poaching’ of their ‘brains’ by larger, wealthier markets.