The causal effect of board size in the performance of small and medium-sized firms

Empirical studies of large publicly traded firms have shown a robust negative relationship between board size and firm performance. The evidence on small and medium-sized firms is less clear; we show that existing work has been incomplete in analyzing the causal relationship due to weak identification strategies. Using a rich data set of almost 7000 closely held corporations we provide a causal analysis of board size effects on firm performance: We use a novel instrument given by the number of children of the chief executive officer (CEO) of the firms. First, we find a strong positive correlation between family size and board size and show this correlation to be driven by firms where the CEO’s relatives serve on the board. Second, we find empirical evidence of a small adverse board size effect driven by the minority of small and medium-sized firms that are characterized by having comparatively large boards of six or more members.     

Financing patterns around the world: Are small firms different?

Using a firm-level survey database covering 48 countries, we investigate how financial and institutional development affects financing of large and small firms. Our database is not limited to large firms but includes small and medium-size firms and data on a broad spectrum of financing sources, including leasing, supplier, development, and informal finance. Small firms and firms in countries with poor institutions use less external finance, especially bank finance. Protection of property rights increases external financing of small firms significantly more than of large firms, mainly due to its effect on bank finance. Small firms do not use disproportionately more leasing or trade finance compared with larger firms, so these financing sources do not compensate for lower access to bank financing of small firms. We also find that larger firms more easily expand external financing when they are constrained than small firms. Finally, we find suggestive evidence that the pecking order holds across countries.     

In Defense of Usury Laws

Usury law is often criticized by economists for curtailing lending and thus creating deadweight costs. This paper shows that if moral hazard leads to credit rationing, a just-binding usury law creates a deadweight gain.  This property also holds in most market-clearing equilibria. Independent of social insurance benefits, or curbing present-biased preferences, interest rate caps have merit.     

卫星通信新技术现状与展望

卫星通信技术已成为陆海空天一体化信息网络系统的重要组成部分。介绍了卫星通信新技术中星上载荷、物理层传输、卫星通信天线和更高频段卫星通信等技术的现状,深入分析了它们的发展趋势,提出了有待进一步研究的关键技术,为我国卫星通信系统设计提供借鉴和思路。     

数学在建筑监察领域的运用

对于在建建筑的规划管控,是一个城市规划管理局的重要职能,由于在建建筑众多,尤其对于一些大型城市,对于在建建筑的规划管控主要是从建筑物的尺寸角度来进行的,包括是否超宽、超高等。如何引入计算机数学思想,构建一个在建建筑的智能化规划监察管控系统,并杜绝人情因素,成为提升规划监察工作效率和质量,体现科学发展观的重要技术手段。     

Labor‐Market Institutions and Long‐Term Effects of Youth Unemployment

Graduating from a school during a time of adverse economic conditions has a persistent, harmful effect on workers’ subsequent employment opportunities. An analysis of panel data from OECD countries during the 1960–2010 periods reveals that a worker who experiences a 1 percentage point higher unemployment rate while the worker is 16–24 years old has a 0.14 percentage point higher unemployment rate at ages 25–29 years and 0.03 percentage points higher at ages 30–34 years. The persistence of this negative effect is stronger in countries with stricter employment protection legislation. A composite index for labor‐market rigidity is constructed and the index is shown to have positive correlation with the persistence. Moderating macroeconomic fluctuations is more important in countries that have more persistent labor‐market entry effects on subsequent outcomes.     

Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation

We examine which independent directors are held accountable when investors sue firms for financial and disclosure-related fraud. Investors can name independent directors as defendants in lawsuits, and they can vote against their reelection to express displeasure over the directors’ ineffectiveness at monitoring managers. In a sample of securities class action lawsuits from 1996 to 2010, about 11% of independent directors are named as defendants. The likelihood of being named is greater for audit committee members and directors who sell stock during the class period. Named directors receive more negative recommendations from Institutional Shareholder Services, a proxy advisory firm, and significantly more negative votes from shareholders than directors in a benchmark sample. They are also more likely than other independent directors to leave sued firms. Overall, shareholders use litigation along with director elections and director retention to hold some independent directors more accountable than others when firms experience financial fraud.     

岩屑图像录井技术在海拉尔盆地的应用

为提高海拉尔盆地油气水层识别和岩性识别能力,进行了岩屑图像录井技术现场试验。阐述了岩屑图像录井技术的技术原理和特点,并对试验过程中的技术应用效果进行了总结分析,同时进行了经济效益初步评价,为岩屑图像录井技术在海拉尔盆地的推广应用提供可靠依据。     

苏里格气田苏54区块气水分布特征分析

在地层水化学分析、气水层的识别的基础上,对苏里格气田苏54区块气水的分布特征及分布规律开展深入研究。区块东部基本不产水,其余区域均有地层水的存在,并且在一定程度上具有连片分布的特征。2012年在东部筛选不产水的区域集中,Ⅰ+Ⅱ类井比例达到72.0%,平均无阻流量10.6×104m3/d,2口水平井试气均达百万方,开发效果良好。