Entry deterrence and innovation in durable-goods monopoly

This paper investigates the efficiency of innovation investments in a durable-goods monopoly when a potential entrant threatens to innovate as well. We show that the durability of the good endows the monopolist with the power to discourage rival innovation since current sales alter the demand for a new generation of the good. The equilibrium is therefore determined not only by the incentive for intertemporal price discrimination in durable-goods monopoly, but also by the incumbent's concern for maintaining the technological leadership. We demonstrate that entry deterrence followed by no innovation always implies underinvestment in innovation.     

Innovation timing games: a general framework with applications

We offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games. Its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable. We use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems. We find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second-mover advantage either for any level of R&D costs (process innovation) or for high R&D costs (product innovation). Moreover, both models predict that the second-mover advantage is monotonically increasing in the costs of R&D.     

Tariffs, licensing and market structure

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that exclusive owners of an advanced technology are always better off when producing as a monopolist than when competing against another firm. Competition against a less-efficient firm weakens the power that a host country can exert on the incumbent in the form of its tariff policy. We show that this gives a motive for a monopolist to license its technology to another foreign firm. A host country gains more from increased competition if it can induce the foreign incumbent to transfer technology to the host country firm. We show that the host country can do so by tariff commitment. We also discuss the implications of bargaining under licensing and Bertrand competition in the product market. Hence, this paper qualifies and extends the recent work of Kabiraj and Marjit [Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer. European Economic Review 47, 113-124].     

Assessing the impact of patent infringement on new product sales

In order to assess the impact of patent infringement on the growth of a new product, a model is developed through the intervention model development processes of Box-Jenkins and Box-Tiao. Physical interpretations of model parameters and determination of associated damages suggest that the model can provide a sound basis for analyzing patent infringement disputes.     

银行信用证议付及其追索权的法学解读

在法学视角下，信用证议付实质上是议付银行向信用证受益人（出口商）给付价值后买入信用证项下的汇票和整套单据的法律行为。议付不同于出口押汇。议付是一种买卖汇票和单据的行为，而出口押汇是一种以单据为质押的融资行为。议付单据遭到开证银行拒付，议付银行有权对信用证受益人（出口商）行使追索权。议付银行的这种追索权既可以来自于合同条款的约定，也可以来自于票据法所赋予的请求权。     

应用电法新装置勘探二维与三维地电体

本文通过对新装置条件下位场特征的分析,应用边界单元法及解析法的计算结果,发现当二维或三维电性不均匀体与测量电极位于背景场同一等位面时,视电阻率异常反映最明显。从而提出了圆弧交会法确定二维或三维地电体中心理深的方法,并给出了若干计算实例。结果表明,此方法简便有效且精度较高。     

物流管理信息系统体系结构的分析设计

对企业内部物流管理信息系统的应用体系结构特点进行了分析和研究,剖析了J2EE标准架构的特点与优点。在此基础上,给出了基于J2EE的物流信息系统的总体设计理念。     

B2C电子商务模式下的物流配送研究

物流配送是电子商务运作的一个重要环节,在整个商务活动中起着举足轻重的作用.目前,在线交易中的信息流已通过互联网基本实现,资金流的安全也在一定程度上得到了解决,但物流仍是电子商务开展的一大瓶颈.B2C作为电子商务的运作模式之一,存在着配送不及时、配送成本高、无法送货等问题.不解决物流配送的问题,B2C模式就难以快速发展.本文针对B2C模式的特点和对物流配送的要求,提出了B2C电子商务模式下建立物流配送系统的解决思路。     

Assessing French nursing home efficiency: An indirect approach via budget-constrained DEA models

In this paper, data envelopment analysis (DEA) techniques are applied to the French nursing home industry in order to address two policy issues. The first involves nursing home size and returns to scale, while the second deals with the potential effects of a change in nursing home reimbursement from a flat rate to one based on the severity of case-mix. To accomplish this, our analysis expands on the existing nursing home literature to analyze technical and allocative efficiency along with budget-constrained models rather than the more common direct input-based distance function. Technical efficiency is evaluated via an indirect output distance function while allocative output efficiency is computed with a cost indirect revenue function. The findings suggest that system-wide efficiency and equity may result from coming reforms since payments would more accurately reflect resource use.