基于协议代理模式下IT外包项目博弈研究

互联网经济的出现致使全球信息化水平向更高级的智能化延伸。IT外包项目对现代企业的作用毋需置疑。本文通过建立了IT外包公司与地方系统集成商间单委托—代理博弈模型,分析了双方间的IT外包项目分包费率和努力程度取值范围,并讨论了IT外包公司和地方系统集成商的行为选择。对IT外包项目的博弈分析结果对于信息化建设企业未来在外包决策时进行风险控制具有一定的借鉴意义。     

Ratio-based design hour determination for airport passenger terminal facilities

To avoid both over-design and under-sizing of airport passenger terminal facilities such as security checkpoints, the infrastructure is designed for a specifically determined design load. As such, the design load is considered for a short period of time, usually an hour of operation, during which peak, though not necessarily maximum, demand occurs. For strategic planning applications, future design loads can be determined by either fictitious flight schedules or ratio-based models which forecast the relationship between design load and annual demand. This study presents two ratio-based methods which allow the direct determination of design hour loads (DHL) for passenger terminal facilities. The unsaturated DHL model considers the relationship between observed passenger flows in the terminal and aggregated annual demand data. The saturated DHL model includes several operational constraints which limit the actual DHL, such as limitations in the runway system or the fleet mix operating at an airport. Both models are applied to two real-world airports, for which the DHL of the security checkpoint facilities is estimated from large datasets covering multiple years. Results are significant at the 5 % level and suggest that the proposed ratio-based methods are appropriate for airport strategic planning applications.     

金融机构集聚过程的动态博弈分析

在理性行为人收益最大化原则条件下得出了行为人空间博弈的结果——在均衡状态,限制性条件(如运输技术等)能够产生一个收敛的空间区位调整过程,最终实现空间集聚。在这个博弈集聚的过程中,外部因素存在发生作用的空间,从而说明了政策制定者可以通过制定相关的政策来影响金融机构的集聚过程,进而促进金融市场的深化发展和金融中心的形成。这一空间集聚过程也可用于分析城镇化的形成和发展过程。     

Strong Nash equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities

A rather general class of strategic games is described where the coalitional improvements are acyclic and hence strong Nash equilibria exist: The players derive their utilities from the use of certain facilities; all players using a facility extract the same amount of local utility therefrom, which amount depends both on the set of users and on their actions, and is decreasing in the set of users; the ultimate utility of each player is the minimum of the local utilities at all relevant facilities. Two important subclasses are “games with structured utilities,” basic properties of which were discovered in 1970s and 1980s, and “bottleneck congestion games,” which attracted researchers’ attention quite recently. The former games are representative in the sense that every game from the whole class is isomorphic to one of them. The necessity of the minimum aggregation for the existence of strong Nash equilibria, actually, just Pareto optimal Nash equilibria, in all games of this type is established.     

A Tutorial on Palm Distributions for Spatial Point Processes

This tutorial provides an introduction to Palm distributions for spatial point processes. Initially, in the context of finite point processes, we give an explicit definition of Palm distributions in terms of their density functions. Then we review Palm distributions in the general case. Finally, we discuss some examples of Palm distributions for specific models and some applications.     

REAL OPTIONS WITH COMPETITION AND REGIME SWITCHING

In this paper, we examine irreversible investment decisions in duopoly games with a variable economic climate. Integrating timing flexibility, competition, and changes in the economic environment in the form of a cash flow process with regime switching, the problem is formulated as a stopping‐time game under Stackelberg leader‐follower competition, in which both players determine their respective optimal market entry time. By extending the variational inequality approach, we solve for the free boundaries and obtain optimal investment strategies for each player. Despite the lack of regularity in the leader's obstacle and the cash flow regime uncertainty, the regime‐dependent optimal policies for both the leader and the follower are obtained. In addition, we perform comprehensive numerical experiments to demonstrate the properties of solutions and to gain insights into the implications of regime switching.     

Rural development and the role of game farming in the Eastern Cape,South Africa

The analysis of game farming is set in the Eastern Cape, South Africa. Game farming reorders the use, meaning and value of land and animal species. However, what it means for rural development processes in the immediate region and beyond is not well accounted for. We perceive game farming as an assemblage that brings together new actors, new forms of land use and new discourses. We argue that although game farming has generated new opportunities and new forms of added value to the available resources (e.g. eco-tourism, trophy hunting, game-meat production), situated in the history and contemporary context of the Eastern Cape, it is a contested, and from a development point of view, problematic land-use practice. We argue that game farming constrains land and agrarian reforms: the distribution of land and income remains skewed; ‘poaching’ occurs and game farms do not, or only minimally, generate new and badly needed employment opportunities. The game farm has emerged as an exclusive, globally well-connected space. The nature of the relationships this space maintains with the surrounding communities is, however, such that the overall contribution to rural development in South Africa is questionable.     

“Make me feel special”: Are hierarchical loyalty programs a panacea for all brands? The role of brand concept

Despite extant literature, the most effective structure of loyalty programs is still heavily questioned among researchers. Building on the congruence principle, we examine the moderating role of brand concept. Our findings reveal that for symbolic brand concepts, customers perceive hierarchical loyalty program structures (which classify customers into tiers according to spending levels or other purchase activities) to be more congruent; this perception increases firm loyalty intentions. However, for functional brand concepts, customers perceive hierarchical and linear loyalty programs structures as equally congruent. Also for symbolic brand concepts, program structure appears as the most important feature in ensuring perceived congruence between a program and a brand, ahead of program benefits. These findings have important theoretical and managerial implications.     

Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions

This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater than that of the former institution with the same requirement and sanction level. The results of an experiment support this theoretical prediction. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and laboratory observations in that the institution with the theoretically optimal requirement did not yield the highest profit.     

On Some Characteristics of Gaussian Covariance Functions

The concepts of isotropy/anisotropy and separability/non‐separability of a covariance function are strictly related. If a covariance function is separable, it cannot be isotropic or geometrically anisotropic, except for the Gaussian covariance function, which is the only model both separable and isotropic. In this paper, some interesting results concerning the Gaussian covariance model and its properties related to isotropy and separability are given, and moreover, some examples are provided. Finally, a discussion on asymmetric models, with Gaussian marginals, is furnished and the strictly positive definiteness condition is discussed.