我国创业投资的回报率及其影响因素

基于1999年到2003年间我国56个本土创业投资退出项目的数据,本文对我国创业投资退出项目的投资回报率及其影响因素进行了实证研究。结果表明:(1)国有创业投资机构退出项目的平均投资回报率显著低于非国有创业投资机构;(2)创业投资机构的资本规模与回报率呈显著负相关关系;(3)上海、深圳两地创业投资机构退出项目的回报率显著高于其他地区;(4)本土创业投资机构的从业时间、投资规模、投资周期、退出方式均与回报率没有显著相关关系。本文在此基础上提出了相关的政策建议。     

The long-run determinants of inequality: What can we learn from top income data?

This paper studies determinants of income inequality using a newly assembled panel of 16 countries over the entire twentieth century. We focus on three groups of income earners: the rich (P99–100), the upper middle class (P90–99), and the rest of the population (P0–90). The results show that periods of high economic growth disproportionately increases the top percentile income share at the expense of the rest of the top decile. Financial development is also pro-rich and the outbreak of banking crises is associated with reduced income shares of the rich. Trade openness has no clear distributional impact (if anything openness reduces top shares). Government spending, however, is negative for the upper middle class and positive for the nine lowest deciles but does not seem to affect the rich. Finally, tax progressivity reduces top income shares and when accounting for real dynamic effects the impact can be important over time.     

产业技术创新战略联盟的性质、分类与政府支持

产业技术创新战略联盟是合作研发的组织模式之一,承载着产业发展的目标,通过合作研发取得产业共性技术,并在联盟和全行业中扩散,最终实现产业竞争力的提升。产业共性技术的复杂性和准公共品性质、联盟合作创新的困境,决定了政府支持产业技术创新战略联盟的必要性。产业技术创新战略联盟有多种类型,政府应针对不同类型的联盟提供不同的支持。在明确产业技术创新战略联盟的内涵及性质的基础上,按照3个维度对其进行了分类,并借鉴国外经验给出了当前我国政府提供政策支持的建议。     

工作要求与创新工作行为关系的研究

员工创新工作行为是员工有效完成工作任务和目标,达到组织既定工作标准的有效途径,对组织的生存与发展具有重要作用。本文基于工作要求一工作控制模型与社会交换理论,探讨在中国情号下,工作要求、员工感知的组织支持与创新工作行为的关系。通过296个有效样本,研究结果表明：工作要求与创新工作行为显著正相关;员工感知的组织支持对工作要求与创新工作行为具有正向调节作用,在工作要求压力下,相对于感知到较低组织支持的员工,感知到较高组织支持的员工更容易产生创新工作行为,并基于中国本土文化的角度分析其内在原因。研究告诉企业领导者,提高工作要求可以提高员工创新工作行为,同时要提高员工对组织支持的感知,这样才可能使员工在面临高强度的工作要求时,更积极主动地开展创新工作行为,提高工作效率和工作绩效。     

如何提高公共就业培训服务绩效:多边平台战略的启示

提供公共就业培训服务是政府应对结构性就业矛盾、推动高质量就业的重要举措,当前主要以政府购买的方式提供。政府购买服务是合作治理的一种形态,但现实中依然延续官僚制管控思路,因而培训服务的供需匹配不够好,服务绩效不高。多边平台是一种开放的合作战略,强调治权开放基础上的生态系统价值创造,对提高公共就业培训服务绩效有着重要启示。平台战略启示政府相关部门要开放治权、完善平台规则、防范平台风险,搭建就业培训服务的多边平台以整合生态资源、促进供需匹配,以网络效应为核心机制推动用户规模的扩展,注重提高供需交互质量与用户黏性,以提高就业培训服务绩效。     

Challenging the obsession with local level institutions in country ownership of climate change adaptation

Working with local level actors to enable country ownership is applauded within the multilateral climate finance landscape. However, are emerging adaptation interventions equitable by reflecting the priorities of local level vulnerable populations? This research sought to find out whether the engagement of local institutions in projects that seek to achieve country ownership enabled local level vulnerable groups to participate in and influence adaptation decision-making processes and outcomes, thereby enabling them to have a voice in local level adaptation. It used a case study of a Global Environmental Facility-managed coastal adaptation project in Tanzania, which sought to restore and protect mangroves to enable adaptation to sea level rise. Data was generated from 13 Focus Group Discussions and survey questionnaires administered to 629 individuals in three locations on the mainland of Tanzania and in Zanzibar. The findings indicate that community-based organizations were used to facilitate the implementation of project activities at the community level. However, participation spaces created in the project and facilitated by these local institutions were exclusionary and failed to enable vulnerable community groups to have a voice on mangrove restoration and protection. Use of these local institutions altered local level power relations and disempowered other pre-existing and (in)formal local resource management institutions. Community members questioned legitimacy of actions implemented by these local institutions. These findings suggest that working with local level stakeholders to generate country ownership does not automatically guarantee that actions will address the needs of local vulnerable groups. Multilateral climate finance institutions should acknowledge these risks and implement measures to address them.     

The electoral migration cycle

This paper proposes a new test of Tiebout sorting that relies on the exogenous time structure of recurrent local elections. The test is based on the idea that competitive elections represent periodic perturbations to the Tiebout equilibrium of local public good provision and allocation of households to communities, so that their schedule should affect the timing of households' sorting decisions. On the other hand, internal migration flows that have nothing to do with the demand for public goods over which localities vote recurrently ought to be orthogonal to the timing of elections in a reduced-form migration equation. I exploit the staggered schedule of mayoral elections in Italy to analyze migration, elections, and public budget data across several thousands of municipalities, and find evidence of a systematic influence of the electoral calendar on the timing of sorting decisions.     

Are voters rational?

We test whether a voter's decision to cast a vote depends on its probability of affecting the election outcome. Using exogenous variation arising at population cutoffs determining council sizes in Finnish municipal elections, we show that larger council size increases both pivotal probabilities and turnout. These effects are statistically significant, fairly large and robust. Finally, we use a novel instrumental variables design to show that the jumps in the pivotal probabilities are the likely candidate for explaining the increase in turnout, rather than the other observed simultaneous jumps at the council size cutoffs. Moreover, our results indicate that turnout responds only to within-party pivotal probabilities, perhaps because they are more salient to the voters than the between-party ones.     

Fiscal rules to tame the political budget cycle: Evidence from Italian municipalities

The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It uses data on Italian municipalities during the 2000s and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italian sub-national fiscal rule (Domestic Stability Pact, DSP) introduced in 1999 has been enforced by the central government; 3) municipalities subject to the fiscal rule show more limited political budget cycles than municipalities not subject to the rule. In order to identify the effect, we rely on the fact that the domestic fiscal rule does not apply to municipalities below 5000 inhabitants. We find that the political budget cycle increases real capital spending by about 10–20 percent on average in the years prior to municipal elections and that municipalities subject to the DSP show a pre-electoral increase in capital spending which is only a quarter of the one of municipalities not subject to the rule.     

Political competition,tax salience and accountability. Theory and evidence from Italy

This paper argues that electoral competition may hinder rather than foster political accountability, especially when elected officers can choose among a number of tax instruments. We develop a political agency model showing that politicians in more competitive jurisdictions use less salient tax instruments more intensely. Defining salience as visibility or, analogously, as voters' awareness of the costs associated with specific government revenue sources, we argue that voters are less likely to hold politicians to account for the associated tax burden of a less salient instrument. This in turn implies that strategic politicians will more heavily rely on less salient revenue sources when electoral competition is stronger. Using data on Italian municipal elections and taxes over a 10-year period, we determine the degree of salience of various tax instruments, including property taxes (high salience) and government fees for official documents (low salience). We then show that mayors facing stronger competition for re-election use less salient tax instruments more intensely.