跳跃随机波动的阈值模型风险值的贝叶斯估计

文章基于一类跳跃随机波动的阈值模型风险值估计贝叶斯分析,在给定先验分布下,以马尔科夫链蒙特卡洛方法估计模型中的未知参数,并给出了MCMC模拟算法,进而讨论了风险值的预测。根据模拟结果,我们得知,如果没有考虑金融时间序列的外生冲击导致的跳跃行为,将会高估风险值,因此考虑跳跃行为后,将增加风险值估计的精度。     

省域全要素生产率地区差异的动态演进

笔者在运用索洛余值法对我国各地区全要素生产率进行估算的基础上,利用非参数的核密度函数法和马尔可夫链法对全要素生产率地区差异的动态演进进行了分析。研究结果表明,我国各地区全要素生产率差异较大,从东部往西部呈现逐渐降低的梯度分布格局;各地区之间全要素生产率的绝对差距在20世纪80年代呈现缩小趋势,而从1990年以后呈现加速扩大趋势;同时,核密度函数分布呈现双峰收敛趋势,进一步表明全要素生产率两极分化现象严重;从马尔可夫链的稳态分布来看,各地区的全要素生产率将继续保持较大差异,短期内难以实现均衡发展。     

政府公共工程招投标腐败举报研究

政府公共工程招投标领域内,参与投标人为达到自身的某种目的常常采取行贿等非法手段。这种腐败违法行为不仅严重败坏了社会风气,且给政府公共工程建设带来极大破坏。消除这种行为,除了需要相应的监管部门付出很多努力外,与招投标违法举报人的举报积极性密切相关,举报人提供的线索在查处腐败案件中起关键的作用。充分发挥举报人的积极性,是查处腐败案件的重要突破口,也是做好工程建设预防寻租腐败等发生的重点和难点。该文从政府公共工程招投标腐败举报问题出发。从举报人是否属于当事人的角度进行分类,研究了它们的异同点,并对举报人与被举报人之间利益进行博弈分析,在此基础上提出了完善政府公共工程招投标腐败举报制度的途径。得出结论是,提高举报人积极性的努力方向有两条：其一是降低举报人的举报风险;此外就是增加举报人在举报活动中的预期收益。     

Remittances as a social status signaling device

Like all human beings, migrants may have a concern about their prestige or social status in the eyes of left-home family and friends. They can remit money in order to signal their economic success and increase their status. We show that if migrants’ income is private information, unsuccessful migrants might accept a worsening of their living conditions and send back home large amounts of remittances only in order to make residents believe that they are successful. In some cases, successful migrants can signal their true favorable economic situation by remitting an even larger amount. The game presents various equilibria that differ with respect to the proportion and nature of the migrants who sacrifice consumption opportunities to status revealing actions.     

我国土地承包经营纠纷解决机制之分析

随着经济的发展、人口的膨胀以及城市化的扩张,土地资源越来越显得稀缺,土地承包经营纠纷也越来越多.由于土地承包经营关系到整个农村基层的稳定,因此土地承包经营纠纷的解决也越来越引起人们的关注.本文以我国土地承包经营到纷的解决机制为切入点,结合我国相关的法律法规以及现实情况,对我国的土地承包经营纠纷解决机制进行分析.     

Signaling quality with new product preannouncements: Vaporware and the role of reference quality

This research develops a signaling game that captures the essential dynamics of new product preannouncements (preannouncement/launch/market feedback). New product preannouncements are preannouncing firms' formal efforts to inform their competitors and customers about the future availability, superior quality and introductory price of their upcoming new products. In a market, two firms compete (entrant preannounces and incumbent responds) across two periods. The entrant has private information about the true quality of a new product (the incumbent and customers do not know it), and this informational asymmetry provides the entrant with a preannouncement dilemma. Should the entrant preannounce and, if the entrant does, should the entrant tell the truth about quality? Preannouncements often get customers who might buy now from a competitor to wait for a higher quality to be available. Therefore, the entrant may have an incentive to bluff the quality of a new product in order to enhance the likelihood of customers' waiting. However, because the quality exaggeration is also likely to increase customers' quality expectations, the entrant may suffer a significant sales penalty if the entrant does not deliver the promised quality. Through the signaling game, this paper derives conditions under which such a bluff does/does not put the preannouncing firm at risk (i.e., this paper derives the separating/pooling equilibria that are the focus of signaling games).     

贵州喀斯特地区县域耕地资源安全问题探讨——以仁怀市为例

贵州喀斯特地区是典型的生态环境脆弱地区,人多地少矛盾突出,耕地资源安全问题日益引起学界重视.通过研究分析,剖析了仁怀市耕地资源安全态势.应用马尔科夫链预测方法,对仁怀市土地利用变化未来发展趋势进行了定量预测,结果显示:从2005年到2025年,仁怀市耕地面积共减少17177 hm2,年平均减少约687 hm2.到202...     

Vertical differentiation,product innovation,and dynamic competition

This paper presents an infinite horizon dynamic model in which two firms compete in a market vertically differentiated by the qualities of their products and consumers have heterogeneous preferences for quality. Given the product qualities offered, the firms engage in price competition that segments the market. In each period each firm can spend on product innovation that if successful increases the quality of its product. Three types of Markov perfect equilibria are identified. A running–coasting equilibrium exhibits increasing quality dominance with one firm undertaking innovation and the other coasting to free ride on the innovation by the first firm. The firm that coasts can have the larger dynamic payoff, so quality dominance does not imply payoff dominance. A second is a leap‐frog equilibrium in which the trailing firm undertakes innovation to leap into the lead. The trailing firm never innovates solely to narrow the gap with the leader, so catch up strategies are never used. In the third both firms undertake innovation, but if both have innovation successes, product differentiation remains the same and profits are reduced by the cost of innovation. The rivalry between Intel and AMD in microprocessors for personal computers provides a motivating example.     

随机利率影响下信用风险的Monte—Carlo模拟

在前人利用马尔科夫链表示公司信用等级的基础上,将信用等级和随机利率引入离散时间的信用风险模型中,从而提出随机利率影响下的新的信用风险模型。就上述模型,对不同初始信用等级、初始盈余以及不同时刻的破产概率进行Monte—Carlo模拟,并讨论了相同条件下初始盈余与破产概率、初始信用等级与破产概率以及时间长短与破产概率之间的相互关系。     

Price relationships between qualitatively differentiated agricultural products: organic and conventional wheat in Germany

Organic agriculture, which produces commodities that can be qualitatively differentiated from conventional food products, has grown into an important market in many countries. The dynamics of commodity prices in both sectors are partly interdependent, but are also shaped by independent determinants and have rarely been studied. We analyze organic food markets and their interdependencies with conventional markets in the context of wheat markets in Germany, which have been subject to a number of fundamental changes during the last two decades. Based on institutional market characteristics, we suggest a flexible Markov‐switching asymmetric time series model. We find a pronounced temporal sequence of market phases that differ in their asymmetric dynamics and the extent to which the organic price is influenced by the conventional price. Organic wheat prices tend to be increasingly connected to prices of conventional wheat.