Convergence in per-capita GDP across European regions: a reappraisal

This paper studies convergence in per-capita GDP across European regions over the period 1980–2000. We use median unbiased estimators of the rate of convergence to the steady-state growth path, while allowing for unrestricted patterns of heterogeneity and spatial correlation across regions. By permitting the model parameters to be completely different across regions, not only we avoid imposing strong a priori assumptions but we are also able to analyze the spatial patterns in the estimated coefficients. Our results differ from those found using conventional estimators. The main differences are: i) the mean rate of convergence is much lower; ii) for most regions this rate is zero; iii) the number of regions for which we reject equality in trend growth rates is substantially lower. We also find significant evidence of correlation of growth rates across neighbor regions and across regions belonging to the same country.     

Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties

John Nash's work laid the foundations for evolutionary game theory as well as the theory of games with rational agents. The Nash bargaining solution emerges as a natural solution concept in both of these settings.     

A tale of two unions: divergent platforms and their constituencies

ABSTRACT

The median voter theorem has regularly been used in economics to represent the behaviour of teachers unions. Little empirical work, however, tests whether this framework is a good fit for teachers unions. We examine voting behaviour in union representative elections between the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers and find evidence of divergent constituencies. We investigate whether the median voter explains the outcomes of elections in 1977–1979. If both teachers unions select the platform desired by the median voter, there should be no systematic differences in voter preferences for unions. We find that these unions were fundamentally different and attracted distinct voting coalitions. The main implication of this study is that researchers should consider these two unions, and their effect on districts, as distinct.     

An Inquiry into the Contemporary Differential between Female and Male Voter Turnouts

This study seeks to identify contemporary factors that systematically explain the difference in the ratio of the female-to-male voter participation rates, FVPR/MVPR, and the difference between the female and male voter participation rate levels, FVPR−MVPR, in the U.S. Using state-level data form the 2004 Presidential election, it is found that both FVPR/MVPR and FVPR−MVPR are an increasing function of the gender-specific unemployment rates, median earnings, educational attainment levels, population age 65 and over, and the presence of a female governor in the state and a decreasing function of the gender-specific divorce rates.      

中美贸易失衡、次贷危机与人民币汇率——基于中间选民模型的政治经济分析

本文基于中间选民模型从政治经济角度分析了中美贸易失衡与人民币汇率问题.中间选民模型认为,贸易政策是由多数人投票决定的.如果中间选民拥有较低的资本劳动比率,资本丰裕国家的中间选民将会支持对进口的(劳动密集型)产品征收关税的贸易政策;这些国家不平等程度的上升将会导致更加严厉的贸易政策.分析表明,次贷危机的爆发,导致大量美国人失业,大部分人收入相对下降,贫富差距拉大,中间选民拥有的资本劳动比率降低,与原本存在的贸易逆差带来的失业问题叠加,导致其选择更加激进的保护贸易政策.选民的经济利益与政客的政治利益在这里找到了契合点,周期性选举造成美国贸易政策的周期性波动,大选来临时中美贸易失衡和人民币汇率往往成为焦点问题.     

Endogenous distribution and equilibrium growth: a note

Does distributive conflict diminish during the course of economic development? This article outlines a model in which distribution, the tax rate and growth evolve endogenously over time. When voting occurs over a tax on capital, we show that the growth rate is maximized at the political equilibrium in the long run. When voting occurs over a general income tax, we show that the growth rate is maximized at the political equilibrium in both the short and long run. These results suggest that the transitional dynamics of growth models with redistributive politics lead to growth‐maximizing outcomes, as distributive conflict diminishes in the course of development. This implies that the democratic process leads to greater consensus over policy choices, with a perfect convergence of interest across individuals with respect to the tax rate.     

Party Control of State Government and the Distribution of Public Expenditures*

This paper examines the effects of party control of state governments on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers across counties from 1957 to 1997. We find that the governing parties skew the distribution of funds in favor of areas that provide them with the strongest electoral support. This is borne out in two ways. (i) Counties that traditionally give the highest vote share to the governing party receive larger shares of state transfers to local governments. (ii) When control of the state government changes, the distribution of funds shifts in the direction of the new governing party. We find only weak evidence that parties reward electorally pivotal counties or counties in electorally pivotal legislative districts. Finally, we find that increased spending in a county increases voter turnout in subsequent elections. This suggests that parties have an electoral incentive to skew the distribution of funds to influence future election results, and the mechanism through which this works is “mobilization” rather than “conversion” of voters in a fixed electorate.     

Temporary grant programmes in Sweden and central government behaviour

The purpose of this paper is to study whether the central government in Sweden approves applications for temporary grants from municipalities according to political objectives. We also study factors that determine the municipal decision to apply for temporary grants. Two hypotheses are tested, that the central government supports municipalities with many swing voters in order to influence voters, and that the central government provides benefits to groups that share its ideology and that provide political support. Data is used from three election years 1982, 1985, and 1988. Under the Socialist governments municipalities with a high share of Socialist voters were more likely to apply for grants. The same pattern does not apply to the 1982 Conservative government. There is evidence that Socialist governments approved temporary grants on the basis of party tactical criteria. However, there is no indication of vote purchasing behaviour by the 1982 Conservative government.     

Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits

We analyze a standard pivotal-voter model under majority rule, with two rival groups of players, each preferring one of two public policies and simultaneously deciding whether to cast a costly vote, as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). We allow the benefit of the favorite public policy to differ across groups and impose an intuitive refinement, namely that voting probabilities are continuous in the cost of voting to pin down a unique equilibrium. The unique cost-continuous equilibrium depends on a key threshold that compares the sizes of the two groups.     

Electoral fraud and voter turnout: An experimental study

In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. The electoral process is illicitly influenced by applying ballot-box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables us to both test the model's predictions and to estimate the framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exacerbated when fraud occurs. Turnout increases as predicted with a moderate level of fraud while, with higher levels of electoral fraud, voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of “agents” voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied.