Non-standard methods in the privatization strategies of the Czech Republic,Hungary and Poland1

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland followed different strategies in the use of non-standard methods of privatization. In regard to restitution, the Czech Republic carried out physical return of property, Hungary weakly implemented financial compensation and Poland has not yet approved a programme. Management and employee buyouts were eschewed in the Czech Republic, took the form of employee stock ownership plans in Hungary and were accomplished chiefly by lease-purchase in Poland. The Czech mass privatization programme distributed a considerable amount of joint-stock company shares free through voucher auctions in which citizens participated directly or through financial intermediaries. In contrast, the Polish programme provided citizens free shares in investment trusts that exercise corporate governance over operating companies and restrure them for divestiture. Hungary's programme, which offered people only interest-free loans to buy some shares in intial public offerings, was abandoned soon after its start.     

Equilibrium uniqueness with perfect complements

The present note analyzes the simultaneous ascending-bid auction with arbitrarily many asymmetric bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that the game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficient allocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small. In that unique equilibrium, bidders immediately reduce their demand to the efficient allocation, and the auction ends in the first round of bidding.We would like to thank seminar participants at UC Davis, in particular Klaus Nehring and Louis Makowski for comments. Financial support by the Alexander–von–Humboldt Foundation through a Feodor–Lynen grant and by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB Transregio 15, “Governance and Efficiency of Economic Systems” is gratefully acknowledged.     

Posted Prices and Bid Affiliation: Evidence from Experimental Auctions

In most experimental auctions, researchers ask participants to bid on the same item in multiple potentially binding rounds, posting the price submitted by the top bidder or bidders after each of those rounds. If bids submitted in later rounds are affiliated with posted prices from earlier rounds, this practice could result in biased value estimates. In this article, we discuss the results of an experiment designed explicitly to test whether posted prices affect bidding behavior. We find that for familiar items, high posted prices lead to increased bids in subsequent rounds. Our results have implications for researchers conducting experimental auctions.     

Online reverse auctions and their role in buyer–supplier relationships

Despite the move in recent years towards supplier partnerships, buying firms need at times to make use of competitive procurement strategies for certain purchases. This study examines the impact of reverse auctions on buyer–supplier relationships through six case studies, analysing primarily the supplier perspective through participant interviews. The authors identify that there are potential benefits for both parties in a reverse auction, which can offer tendering and transactional cost advantages. For buyers, it offers a competitive procurement process. The effect on relationships will depend on the extent to which buyers employ the auction as a price weapon, or whether it is used primarily as a process improvement tool.     

Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders

Information aggregation, a key concern for uniform-price, common-value auctions with many bidders, has been characterized in models where bidders know exactly how many rivals they face. A model allowing for uncertainty over the number of bidders is essential for capturing a critical condition for information to aggregate: as the numbers of winning and losing bidders grow large, information aggregates if and only if uncertainty about the fraction of winning bidders vanishes. It may be possible for the seller to impart this information by precommitting to a specified fraction of winning bidders, via a proportional selling policy. Intuitively, this could make the proportion of winners known, and thus provide all the information that bidders need to make winner's curse corrections.     

Deregulated Wholesale Electricity Prices in Italy: An Empirical Analysis

In this paper we analyze a time series of daily average prices in the Italian electricity market, which started to operate as a Pool in April 2004. Our objective is to model the high degree of autocorrelation and the multiple seasonalities in electricity prices. We use periodic time series models with GARCH disturbances and leptokurtic distributions and compare their performance with more classical ARMA-GARCH processes. The within-year seasonal variation is modelled using the low-frequency components of physical quantities, which are very regular throughout the sample. Our results reveal that much of the variability in the price series is explained by the interactions between deterministic multiple seasonalities. Periodic AR-GARCH models seem to perform quite well in mimicking the features of the stochastic part of the price process.

Effect of Buyer and Seller Experience on Buy It Now Pricing

ABSTRACT

Although auctions have been around for centuries, online auctions are still a relatively new phenomenon. This paper examines the phenomenon of online auctions, specifically on a pricing option known as “Buy It Now.” With this option, a buyer can purchase merchandise immediately at a stated price and truncate the auction process. Auction items sold with a Buy It Now price tend to be at a higher price than the high bid price for an identical item sold through an ascending-bid auction. In addition, Buy It Now prices tend to attract risk averse bidders while high bidders of ascending-bid auctions tend to be less risk averse or risk neutral bidders. On the other hand, we found more experienced sellers sell their items with a Buy It Now price while less experienced sellers sell their items through an ascending-bid process. Thus, experience and risk are factors in choosing a Buy It Now price for the seller and buyer.     

Government Liquidation: How Online Auctions Will Replace Bob's Army-Navy Store

ABSTRACT

In the private sector, there is a great deal of interest in the use of forward auctions as a means of increasing recovery rates on surplus or returned items, as part of an overall reverse logistics strategy. Only recently has the public sector realized that it too has the potential to solve its reverse logistics problem and derive revenue at the end of the governmental supply chain. The biggest current experiment in this area involves the Department of Defense. Until recently, American military surplus was sold through physical auctions at 200 facilities worldwide. In mid-2001, the Defense Reutilization and Management Service entered into a unique partnership with Liquidity Services, awarding the firm an exclusive contract to surplus for the armed forces that is not claimed for reuse by other federal, state, and local agencies. Liquidity Services set up a special subsidiary, Government Liquidation, which oversees the storage, display, lotting, and auctioning of military surplus items on its specially-created auction site, www.govliquidation.com. The company's proprietary auction platform provides complete fulfillment solutions, including the handling of payments, shipments, and customer service, and dispute resolutions. This paper is an analysis of this unique partnership and the results produced to date.     

Role of Information on Consumers’ Willingness‐to‐pay for Genetically‐modified Rice with Health Benefits: An Application to China

Despite their potential health benefits, the controversial nature surrounding the use of GM technology in biofortified crops remains a subject of discussion. This paper investigates the role of information on willingness‐to‐pay for folate‐biofortified rice in a Chinese folate‐deficient region. We conducted second price auctions with 252 women of childbearing age, split up into two target groups based on street (n = 132, non‐student sample) or school auctions (n = 120, student sample). Notwithstanding a general positive effect of folate‐related information (i.e. content, benefits and regional situation), evidence reveals that the non‐student sample is less concerned about GM technology. The results also provide insight into serial position effects in conflicting GM information. Whereas participants in the non‐student sample are more prone to a primacy bias when receiving both positive and negative information, an alarmist reaction is observed in the student sample. This study highlights the need for segmented, targeted communication strategies on biofortification.     

Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions

When attempting to design a truthful mechanism for a computationally hard problem such as combinatorial auctions, one is faced with the problem that most efficiently computable heuristics can not be embedded in any truthful mechanism (e.g. VCG-like payment rules will not ensure truthfulness).We develop a set of techniques that allow constructing efficiently computable truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in the special case where each bidder desires a specific known subset of items and only the valuation is unknown by the mechanism (the single parameter case). For this case we extend the work of Lehmann, O'Callaghan, and Shoham, who presented greedy heuristics. We show how to use If-Then-Else constructs, perform a partial search, and use the LP relaxation. We apply these techniques for several canonical types of combinatorial auctions, obtaining truthful mechanisms with provable approximation ratios.