Escalating penalties for repeat offenders: a note on the role of information

The severity of the sanction for a given offense is often determined by the offense history of the offender. We establish that this policy can be welfare-maximizing if individuals are imperfectly informed about the magnitude of the sanction. Imperfect information distorts individuals’ perception of the expected sanction of the first offense. Once detected, individuals learn about the sanction applicable to their act, making this argument less relevant for consecutive offenses.      

Tax reform and collective family decision-making

Traditional analysis of tax reform treats market behaviour as arising out of individual utility maximisation. In this paper, behaviour is modelled as the Pareto-efficient outcome of a family decision process. Conditions for the existence of a feasible, Pareto-improving tax change are presented and contrasted with those that obtain in the individualistic case. The consequences of treating households as a single individual are also discussed.     

The role of externalities and information aggregation in market collapse

We examine the role that belief, network externality, and information aggregation play in inefficient market collapses. After receiving consecutive negative shocks, some ex-ante identical Bayesian agents will be discouraged about the unknown state of the market they invest; therefore, they will stop investing. This decision will have two effects: first, it will cause agents to aggregate information through social/observational learning; second, it will decrease the network externality effect. We show that there might be an inefficient market collapse if the externality effect diminishes too much, and the cost of re-entry to the market is too high. We also analyze the effects of strategic delay and experimentation on the exit decision of the agents. I especially thank Thomas D. Jeitschko, Matthew Mitchell, B. Ravikumar Ted Temzelides. I also thank anonymous referees, an associate editor, John Conlon, Larry Samuelson, Troy Tassier, Stephen Williamson, and seminar participants of the University of Saskatchewan, Georgia Tech, Concordia University, University of Manitoba, Iowa Alumni Workshop, Midwest Economic Theory Conferences held at Indiana Bloomington, and Notre Dame, and 1st International Conference on Business, Management and Economics organized by Yasar University.     

Local asymptotic normality for randomly censored models with applications to rank tests

For randomly right censored models we study the asymptotic behaviour of linear (rank) statistics under local alternatives. The results can be used to evaluate the asymptotic power of the corresponding tests. For instance we treat the question how to choose the best scores in order to derive asymptotically optimal (rank) tests under certain alternatives.     

A note on Deaton's theorem on the undesirability of nonuniform excise taxation

The paper provides an extension and a new proof of Deaton's theorem on the undesirability of nonuniform excise taxation when income taxes are affine and preferences over consumption goods are separable from labour–leisure choices, homothetic, and identical across agents.     

Designing an optimal contest

The paper brings a mechanism design perspective to the study of contests. We consider the problem of selecting a contest success function when the contest designer may also value the prize. We show that any equilibrium outcome that can be achieved by a concave increasing contest success function can be replicated by a linear contest success function. An expected utility maximizing designer should employ a linear homogeneous contest success function. We explicitly derive the optimal contest for a risk-neutral designer and present comparative statics results. Tullock's contest is optimal only when the designer's valuation for the prize is low.     

Optimal Mortgage Refinancing with Regime Switches

A model of rational mortgage refinancing is developed where the drift and volatility of interest rate process switch between two regimes. Because of the possibility of a regime shift, the optimal refinancing policy is characterized by the different threshold of interest differential for each regime. Numerical simulation demonstrates that the optimal refinancing threshold in each regime can be smaller or larger than the threshold under single-regime models. Finally, we evaluate the predictions of the model, based on the estimated parameters for a two-regime model to capture the evolution of the mortgage rates in the US. Our model can produce both late and early refinancing, which is consistent with the observed refinancing behavior. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co., Ltd.     

Economic policy with bounded controls

When investigating optimal policies for macroeconomic models, it is common practice to modify the objective function so that the resulting optimal control trajectories become acceptable from a practical point of view. In this paper we argue that the sole purpose of the objective function should be to express the preference of the decision makers, and that explicit bounds on the controls should be used to ensure that the optimal controls will be practical. Using a piece-wise quadratic objective function involving only the unemployment and inflation rates, which are state (endogenous) variables, we first develop a discrete minimum principle, giving necessary and sufficient optimality conditions. Then we perform various bounded control experiments with the 35-equation quarterly CLEAR model of the Canadian economy, which is very briefly described. The empirical results which were obtained using a version of the GRG algorithm are discussed in view of the conclusions that might be drawn for a real-world practical policy analysis.     

Segmented asset markets and optimal exchange rate regimes

This paper revisits the issue of the optimal exchange rate regime in a flexible price environment. The key innovation is that we analyze this question in the context of environments where only a fraction of agents participate in asset market transactions (i.e., asset markets are segmented). Under this friction alternative exchange rate regimes have different implications for real allocations in the economy. In the context of this environment we show that flexible exchange rates are optimal under monetary shocks and fixed exchange rates are optimal under real shocks.     

Optimal emission-extraction policy in a world of scarcity and irreversibility

This paper extends the classical exhaustible-resource/stock-pollution model with irreversibility of pollution decay, meaning that after reaching some threshold there is no decay of the pollution stock. Within this framework, we answer the question how the potential irreversibility of pollution affects the extraction path. We investigate the conditions under which the economy will optimally adopt a reversible policy, and when it is optimal to enter the irreversible region. In the case of irreversibility it may be optimal to leave a positive amount of resource in the ground forever. As far as the optimal extraction/emission policy is concerned, several types of solutions may arise, including solutions where the economy stays at the threshold for a while. Given that different programs may satisfy the first order conditions for optimality, we further investigate when each of these is optimal. We show that it is never optimal for the economy to stay at the threshold for a while before entering the irreversible region. The optimality analysis is then illustrated by means of a calibrated example. To sum up, for any pollution level, we can identify a critical resource stock such that there exist multiple optima i.e. a reversible and an irreversible policy that yield exactly the same present value. For any resource stock below this critical value, the optimal policy is reversible whereas with large enough resources, irreversible policies outperform reversible programs.