全球经济失衡问题研究的新进展

归纳梳理了国内外对全球经济失衡问题的研究成果.其中美国经常账户赤字最先引起广泛的关注,实体经济和金融制度层面均存在导致本轮全球经济失衡的因素.美国经济的调整将对世界经济产生重要影响,多国协调行动有利于失衡的有序调整.进一步的研究方向包括亚洲地区盈余的可持续性、失衡政策原因的考察等等.     

论制度变迁的成本约束

制度变迁的关键是成本约束，这是制度本身产生的根本性要求。制度变迁是成本和收益相权衡和比较的产物，制度设计和安排必须充分考虑到制度变迁的成本和收益，减少制度变迁的阻力，提高制度运行的效率。     

密封价格拍卖或招标中的有限腐败

本文研究了密封价格拍卖或招投标中的有限腐败问题,探讨了当行贿者通过行贿招标主持人获得多次出标机会,而其他竞标者不知道这种有限腐败行为时,对拍卖结果所产生的影响。在第二价格拍卖机制下,由于竞标者按真实估价报价总是弱占优策略,该有限腐败行为在此拍卖机制下不会产生影响。但对于密封的第一价格拍卖机制来说,由于行贿者的多个标价中的最高标价比其他竞标者的标价更强势(aggressive),导致其他竞标者获胜的概率减少,行贿者获胜的概率增加。而行贿者的其他出标机会所用的出标策略比其他竞标者的出标策略要弱势,所以在保证期望收益增加的情况下所付出的期望支付有可能比在没有腐败情形下的期望支付要低。特别地,当行贿者获得更多的出标机会时所采用的出标策略与我们的直觉是有差异的。有限腐败对于物品所有者来说是不利的,他的期望收益随着行贿者的特权的增强而减少。     

解决农村义务教育投入保障中的制度缺陷——对中央转移支付作用及事权体制调整的思考

财权与事权不匹配的矛盾是解决农村义务教育投入保障中的最大难点,受财力制约和宏观政策引导缺位的影响,地方投入为主的财政制度很难为义务教育发展提供全面、长远的支持。针对学界期望通过创新或完善中央转移支付制度解决农村义务教育投入的观点,本文提出不同看法:单纯依靠转移支付制度的改进来解决农村义务教育的地区差异和保障农村义务教育的公共投入是不可能的,只有在事权体制上做大的调整,将农村义务教育事权上划中央政府和财政,才是解决该问题的最佳选择。本文尝试通过建立计量模型,从保障农村义务教育投入中的制度缺陷的视角构建框架,为农村义务教育事权体制改革寻求另一个解决方案。     

我国省对县(市)一般性转移支付的绩效评价——基于DEA二次相对效益模型的研究

一般性转移支付是我国转移支付制度的重要组成部分,它是中央财政为了平衡地区间财力差异、促进基本公共服务均等化为目的的重要制度安排。然而,中央财政以均等化为目标、以标准财政收支差为依据对省(市、自治区)拨付一般性转移支付资金,以及省对县(市)级政府拨付该项资金时,并没有规定具体用途,因此,县(市)级地方政府拥有对这部分资金完全的自主支配权。在多重目标,尤其是经济增长目标的压力下,一般性转移支付资金可能被挪用和挤占,上级政府实现公共服务均等化的政策意图难以达到预期的效果。本文的目的是:从制度层面论述一般性转移支付政策目标与效率评价的内在联系;探讨DEA二次相对效益模型对一般性转移支付绩效评价的适用性;从基本公共服务资金配置和提升效率两个方面,构建了省对县(市)一般性转移支付绩效评价体系;以云南省的县(市)为样本,对一般性转移支付绩效进行实证模拟评价;提出建立绩效评价是完善省对县(市)一般性转移支付制度的重要内容。     

Exploring technology paths: The development of alternative transport fuels in Sweden 2007-2020

By using socio-technical scenarios, we investigate how present policy choices may affect the development of alternative transport fuels in Sweden. One important choice for policy lies in the balance between general tax exemptions stimulating the market for alternative fuels, and funding of research and development more directly promoting new technology. The implications of this choice are illustrated with four diverging development paths until 2020. In the market-oriented scenarios, we illustrate consequences of breaking the dominance of entrenched technologies and demonstrating a growing market potential for alternatives, but also the risks with a large focus on first generation renewable fuels. In the technology-oriented scenarios, we point out the value of keeping variety among niches in this stage of the transition. In conclusion, if policy is implemented without taking the dynamic forces within the system into account, there is a risk that any measure leads the system into a dead end. But if policy strives to balance the development in different parts of the technological system while making use of various prevailing forces of change, a multitude of different efforts can contribute to the development of a more sustainable transport system.     

收入不平等、政策偏向与最优财政再分配政策

本文构建的理论模型探讨了收入不平等、政策偏向与最优财政再分配之间的关系。模型显示:政策偏向是收入不平等与财政再分配恶性循环的决定因素。当政策偏向于穷人时,最优财政再分配系统的选择是提高税率,扩大对穷人的转移支付;当政策偏向于富人时,最优财政再分配系统的选择是降低税率,减少对穷人的转移支付。依据中国数据的实证研究发现:(1)中国收入不平等不断恶化,针对恶化的不平等而采取的财政再分配政策效果差,没能扭转不平等恶化趋势,政策偏向严重。(2)税收再分配政策偏向富人,使富人税负相对轻于穷人,居民收入不平等加剧;偏向于穷人的转移支付多为消费券(物),导致越扶越贫。为此,需要从调整所得税和转移支付政策等方面采取相关对策。     

西方系统系理论初探

系统系是指由独立运行、彼此交互的诸多系统形成的整合网络,以实现单个系统不具备的能力和无法完成的整体目标,甚至全球性目标。系统系是解决复杂问题的新方法。文章介绍了系统系定义、特征及类型,将系统系与系统、系统工程等概念进行了比较,阐述了系统系的社会化趋势。     

Dissertation abstract: “Essays in applied economics on the intervention of a third player in agency relationships”

Agency theory has established that appropriate incentives can reconcile the diverging interests of the principal and the agent. Focusing on three applications, this dissertation evaluates the empirical relevance of these results when a third party interacts with the primary contract. The analyses provided rely on either laboratory or natural experiments. First, corruption is analyzed as a two-contract situation: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. A survey of the recent microeconomic literature on corruption first highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of those two agreements. We thereafter show that the Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two conflicting agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-player experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wages on corruption. Second, health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly concerned with the health provided, whereas containing health care costs is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further insights into the ability of incentives to balance these two competing objectives. In this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis evaluates how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999 as an alternative to fee-for-services, has affected physicians’ practice patterns. Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between physicians. Finally, the demand for underground work departs from the traditional Beckerian approach to illegal behavior, due to the dependence of benefits from illegality on competitors’ behavior. We set up a theoretical model in which the demand for underground work from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability, strictly lower than one. This Bertrand curse could then account for the “tax evasion puzzle” i.e. the overprediction of evasion in models that ignore market interactions. We thereafter show that allowing firms to denounce competitors’ evasion is not likely to solve this curse—by providing a credible threat against price cuts, it fosters illegal work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms these predictions. Without denunciation, experimental firms often choose evasion whereas evasion benefits are canceled out by competition. When introduced, denunciation is rarely used by firms, but the threat makes evasion profitable. JEL Classification K42, I18, D21, C25, C91     

Indigenous livelihoods, slash-and-burn agriculture, and carbon stocks in Eastern Panama

Improved crop–fallow systems in the humid tropics can simultaneously sequester atmospheric carbon emissions and contribute to sustainable livelihoods of rural populations. A study with an indigenous community in eastern Panama revealed a considerable biophysical potential for carbon offsets in small-scale slash-and-burn agriculture through longer fallow periods, improved fallow management, secondary forest development, and agricultural intensification. Based on soil and biomass carbon measurements, estimated annual sequestration rates amount to 0.3−3.7 t C ha^− 1 yr^− 1. Despite such potential, the economic benefits of initiatives aimed at sequestration of carbon in the community are likely to be rather unequally distributed within the community. Heterogeneity in livelihood strategies and uneven asset endowments among households – factors often overlooked in the ongoing carbon and sustainable development debate – are expected to strongly affect household participation. Indeed, only the better-endowed households that have also managed to diversify into more lucrative farm and non-farm activities are likely to be able to participate in and thus benefit from improved crop–fallow systems that capture carbon. Economic, ethical, institutional, and technical concerns need to be taken into account when designing community carbon management and investment plans.