Does reputation of sponsors matter in IPO? Evidence from Hong Kong

Contrary to other markets where underwriters perform a combined role of underwriting and sponsoring in an Initial Public Offering (IPO), IPO issuers in Hong Kong must appoint at least one sponsor in addition to the underwriters. The splitting of the single role of underwriters into two separate ones offers an ideal setting to disentangle the effects of the two roles and to examine which of the two roles—sponsor or underwriter—is more important in explaining IPO underpricing and initial volatility in the Hong Kong equity market. Interestingly, our findings provide supportive evidence that the sponsor reputation does matter in an IPO and it is even more significant than the underwriter reputation in explaining the IPO underpricing phenomenon. Given the recent high-tech fervor, our research goes deeper to examine specifically the role of sponsors on high-tech firms, with results indicating that the reliance on sponsors is higher for traditional issuers than for technology firms. We further discover that sponsors and underwriters are playing substitution roles rather than complementary roles. In order to examine the regulatory policy impact, our research also compares the role of IPO sponsors before and after the launch of the new sponsor regulatory regime in 2013. The empirical findings lend support to our argument that after the launch of the new regulations, public awareness of sponsors is raised, respect towards more reputable sponsor increases, and thus, the role of sponsors becomes more important than before.     

Contagion effects and risk transmission channels in the housing,stock, interest rate and currency markets: An Empirical Study in China and the U.S.

This paper aims to investigate the crisis linkage and transmission channels within the housing, stock, interest rate and the currency markets in the U.S. and China in the past decade since the 2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis. Two hybrid models, namely the SWARCH-EVT-Copula and the Bivariate SWARCH-EVT models, are proposed and applied in order to take into account (A) the high/low volatility regimes, (B) the interdependence structure inherited from the joint tail behaviours, as well as, (C) the risk spillover dynamics among financial sectors during market turmoils. We empirically show that the housing and stock markets share the strongest linkage and play central roles in the spreading of shocks. With a highly integrated system, the American financial sectors are under greater exposure to risk contagion and systemic risk during crises than the Chinese markets. Nevertheless, the exchange rate risk of Renminbi remains at an intensive level since its “crawl-like arrangement” and leads to increasing co-movements in the stock and interest rate markets since 2014.     

Policy uncertainty and overseas property purchases: Evidence from China

A political leadership transition occurs in China every five years. This shift in leadership is accompanied by tremendous uncertainty within Chinese society, particularly for the nation's wealthy people. Examining private residential property transaction data in Singapore, this paper reveals that the number of transactions by Chinese mainland buyers increases by half during political transitions that occurred between 1998 and 2013, in comparison to buyers from Malaysia, the US, and Hong Kong.     

Political stability and trade agreements: Evidence for ‘endgame FTAs’

This paper empirically examines the idea that Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are more likely to be signed by governments playing ‘endgames’; that is, when governments are about to lose power. Two empirical strategies shed light on this hypothesis. One relies on events that increase the probability of political turnover, the other on term limits. I find that countries are more likely to sign FTAs after the unexpected exit of their leaders, when political instability is high. The key finding is partly confirmed in the term-limits strategy as governments are found to form more FTAs during their last term in office.     

流行病应急响应的国际合作——联合国领导下的禽流感防疫机制透析

随着跨国公共卫生安全在全球治理中分量日益加重,流行病应急响应（Epidemic preparedness and response）的国际合作逐步被提上了全球日程。2005年,人感染高致病性禽流感在全球范围内的大规模传播,国际社会尤其是联合国领导下的相关组织如何构建防疫机制来应对这一形势成为焦点。经过多年的努力,联合国领导下的禽流感防疫机制日臻完善,该机制主要包括核心领导机构、法理基础、重要应急措施以及相关国际行为体参与4个方面。同时,该机制的有效性与局限性并存,值得引起人们的注意。     

Globalization,political institutions,financial liberalization,and performance of the insurance industry

This paper investigates the impacts of globalization, political institutions, and financial liberalization on the performance and risk-taking of insurance firms covering 1324 individual firms in 30 selected OECD countries. We find that greater globalization and a stable political institution lead insurance companies to exhibit a better performance—i.e., insurers adjust their strategies while being aware of institutional changes. By contrast, financial liberalization has an inverse impact on insurance company performance. Thus, greater globalization and a stable political environment both drive less risk-taking for insurers. These findings are particularly important to insurance markets’ competitors and national policymakers.     

On the timing of political regime changes in resource-dependent economies

We consider a resource-dependent economy initially ruled by the elite. The transition from the autocratic to a more democratic regime takes place only if the citizens decide to revolt against the elite. The occurrence of a revolution primarily depends on the autocratic regime vulnerability and the level of inequalities, both being driven by the elite׳s redistribution and repression policies. First, we show that when a political transition is inevitable, the elite choose the maximum rate of redistribution to lengthen their period in office. Second, we find that the duration of the autocratic regime is linked to resource abundance, and how it relates to the elite׳s policies. More resources lead to a shorter reign of a redistributive regime, which may not be the case of a repressive regime. Finally, we interpret the Arab spring sequence in light of our findings.     

Politically connected directors and firm value: Evidence from forced resignations in China

The Central Committee of the Communist Party in China issued the No. 18 Document on Oct 30, 2013 to ban government officials from taking any positions in Chinese firms. Using this decision as a unique natural experiment, we examine the causal relation between political connections and firm valuation. We find that the value of firms with politically connected directors drops significantly upon the announcements of the new rule and the resulting director resignations. Furthermore, the decline in valuation is more pronounced when a firm is in a regulated industry, and when a departing director is of vital importance for building and maintaining political connections. Moreover, non-state-owned enterprises suffer more loss of value than their state-owned peers following the resignations of politically-connected directors. Finally, firms exhibit insignificant value loss when their departing directors are of less political importance in allocating resources. These results suggest that hiring politically connected directors has a positive effect on firm valuation in China.     

Credit market frictions and political failure

We study how an excessively favorable regulatory environment for banks could arise even with a perfectly competitive credit market in a median voter world. In our occupational choice model with heterogeneous wealth endowments, market failure due to unobservability of entrepreneurial talent endogenously creates a misalignment between surplus maximizing reforms and reforms that are preferred by the median voter, who is a worker. This is in contrast to the world without market failure where the electorate unanimously vote in favor of surplus maximizing institutional reforms. This paper illustrates how market failure could lead to political failure even in the benchmark political system that is free from capture by interest groups.     

Who cares about the environment? An empirical analysis of the evolution of political parties’ environmental concern in European countries (1970–2008)

Why do parties offer environmental policies in their political programs? While a number of papers examine the determinants of citizens’ pro-environmental behaviour, we know little about the extent to which political parties adjust their platform towards environmentalism. We investigate this process through data provided by the Manifesto Project Dataset (CMP) for 20 European countries over the period 1970-2008. Following the literature on public concern towards environment, we examine economic, environmental and political determinants. Our findings provide evidence that political parties’ environmental concern is strongly correlated with their political ideology and with country-level economic conditions.