政治伊斯兰的崛起与埃及的世俗化

作为世界三大宗教之一的伊斯兰教在埃及具有深厚的群众基础和广泛的精神认同，但是与其他宗教不同的廷伊斯兰载不仅具有广适的精神认同，同时还对世俗生活产生着巨大的影响。在不断的发展过程中，一些伊斯兰教精英分子开始有意识的将伊斯兰教进行政冶伪撩善，特伊新兰教的教义、传统、责任进行重新解释．基于伊斯兰教义提出政治诉求。政治伊斯兰势力应时而生。作为一种政治化了的宗教，其对社会世俗化的影响值得广泛关注。     

Party Discipline and Environmental Policy: The Role of “Smoke‐filled Back Rooms”*

We adopt the view that greater party discipline induces legislators to commit to promised policies after being elected. We then develop the hypothesis that the effect of party discipline on the stringency of environmental policy is conditional on the degree of government corruption. Our empirical work suggests that greater party discipline results in more stringent environmental policies when the level of corruption is relatively low, but in weaker policies when the level of corruption is comparatively high.     

Technological knowledge as an essential facility

The economics of regulation has articulated the notions of essential facility and mandated interconnection. Their application to the governance of technological knowledge can be fruitful especially when implemented by the adoption of a compensatory liability rule and the parallel reduction in the exclusivity of patents. Because knowledge is at the same time an output and an input in the production of new knowledge, exclusivity, traditionally associated to patents, is the cause of actual knowledge rationing with major drawbacks in terms of both static and dynamic efficiency. This institutional innovation can improve the governance of technological knowledge and increase both its rates of dissemination and generation.

Constitutional coordination in unstable party systems: the Brazilian constitution of 1988

Constitutional assemblies are a common feature of many democratic transitions. However, the goal of coordinating constitutional choice would seem nearly impossible when assemblies are comprised of highly fragmented and volatile political parties. Building on Knight’s bargaining model, this article argues that the main challenge to coordination in unstable party systems is the procedural disequilibrium that results from incomplete information over breakdown payoffs. The likelihood of compromise in such circumstances is a function of the ideologies that frame constitutional choice and inform coalition-building. Thus, unstable party systems are not chaotic, although they may be deeply conflict-laden. These issues are illustrated empirically via the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, which demonstrates the possibilities for a stable constitutional order emerging from a fragmented and volatile party system.

How local leaders matter: Inter-provincial leadership transfers and land transactions in China

We study how local leaders matter for economic growth by examining the impacts of exogenous transfers of leaders across China’s provinces on land transactions in the primary market. We find that new provincial leaders attract investment in industrial land from the provinces of their previous positions. The leaders’ impacts are greater when their freedom to deploy their business connections in the land market is greater. More importantly, we find evidence of positive impacts of land transactions on economic growth, which should bode well for the careers of the local leaders, albeit there is some evidence of rent seeking among officials especially when they are too old for further promotion.     

Ethnic identities,public spending and political regimes

Do democracies discriminate less against minorities as compared to non-democracies? How does the dominance of an ethnic group affect discrimination under various political regimes? We build a theory to analyse such questions. In our model, political leaders (democratically elected or not) decide on the allocation of spending on different types of public goods: a general public good and an ethnically-targetable public good which benefits the majority ethnic group while imposing a cost on the other minorities. We show that, under democracy, lower ethnic dominance leads to greater provision of the general public good while higher dominance implies higher provision of the ethnically-targetable good. Interestingly, the opposite relation obtains under dictatorship. This implies that political regime changes can favour or disfavour minorities based on the ambient level of ethnic dominance. Several historical events involving regime changes can be analysed within our framework and are consistent with our results.     

产业结构调整的政治经济学诠释

本文主要在马克思主义政治经济学的框架下,对产业结构调整进行重新诠释,提出目前我国产业调整过程中出现的问题是由于相关参与主体在调整过程中角色＂易位＂或＂缺位＂造成的,明确指出企业是整个过程中的主体,而市场需求则是结构调整的源泉,产业结构调整是资本在各个部门间流动,追逐利润的结果。     

经济发展中的地方官员行为研究——基于政治晋升、财政分权与腐败的视角

本文同时考虑财政分权、政治晋升和腐败三个因素对地方官员行为的影响,进而构建了理论模型。从中得到的主要结论是,在基本模型中,地方官员对政治晋升的偏好程度越高,则其努力程度越高、腐败程度越低。而财政分权程度越高,官员的努力也越高,但对腐败水平影响却是不确定的。在进一步假设腐败会被惩罚的拓展模型中,基本模型的大部分结论都没有发生太大变化,只是分权程度的对努力的影响也变得不确定了。除此之外,我们进一步研究了,对官员腐败惩罚的力度和对官员腐败的惩罚准确程度的影响,相关命题表明,如果对官员腐败惩罚的越严厉,并且对官员腐败的惩罚越准确,官员努力水平和官员腐败程度都会变低。通过对研究结论的分析,我们还对以往文献的结果进行了重新解释。     

Political trust as rational belief: Evidence from Chinese village elections

Democratic governance is believed to improve government responsiveness to citizens’ demand for public goods. In China, villagers’ committee elections represent a major progress in China’s development toward good governance. We develop a rational model to explain villagers’ participation. Utilizing a national survey of rural residents in 2005, this paper tests the insights of the model. Two findings are of interest to the students of voting and elections. First, there is disagreement over the causal relationship between political trust and voting. This paper offers a rational interpretation of political trust by emphasizing the informational aspect of the concept. Second, voting is generally theorized as a process of overcoming various costs. The prospect of benefits figures more prominently in Chinese village elections. Our findings highlight the pivotal role of township governments in China’s rural politics and reveal the inner dilemma of democratization in China.