成功的市场进驻策略是决定市场地位的关键——宝洁公司在中国的市场进驻成功个案

美国宝洁公司在中国改革开放之际,敏锐地察觉到中国市场的巨大潜力,向中国日用品市场进驻。在多元品牌政策和差异性市场策略的总体策略指引下,宝洁公司充分考虑中国经济,政治,文化背景,以中国东西部经济差距,城乡消费者需求差异,中国消费者对传统文化的要求和可持续发展为基础,开发具有中国传统品味的高科技环保产品,建立特殊的分销体系,建立了在中国市场的首席地位。同时,宝洁公司以遵守中国法律,履行社会责任和道德准则为己任,与当地政府配合,协助开展文化和经济辅导活动,保护生态环境与自然资源,在消费者心目中建立了良好的企业形象,为进一步发展提供了有利基础,达到了双赢的目的。     

Illiquidity Premium in the MILA

This article analyzes the illiquidity premium in the MILA. Using seven proxies for illiquidity, we find a positive and significant illiquidity premium for our sample. A microstructure bias-free portfolio weighting based on past returns is critical in our finding of an illiquidity premium, which is robust to several methodological changes in our portfolio simulations. We also document that the premium is present only in small and high book-to-market stocks. Nonetheless, when we control for size and distress effects, the difference and significance in risk-adjusted returns between portfolios of high and low illiquidity stocks remains.     

城镇就业市场上劳动力工资扭曲程度测度

本文利用CHIPS2007数据库，基于随机前沿模型对我国城镇就业市场上劳动力的工资扭曲程度进行测度。研究结果表明：（1）在城镇就业市场上，由于工资扭曲现象的存在，劳动力实际获得的工资要比他们的边际生产率低45％～60％；（2）已婚、子女个数较少、本地、拥有失业保险、男性、大中型企业的劳动力工资扭曲程度要低于未婚、子女个数较多、外来、没有失业保险、女性、小型企业的劳动力；（3）中低工资水平的劳动力工资扭曲程度要比高工资水平的劳动力严重，且中低工资水平劳动力工资扭曲程度的方差更大。由此，本文提出推进就业市场的市场化改革，完善就业市场信息网络，从而减轻劳动力工资扭曲程度。     

消费者生活方式与物质主义价值观的相关性研究

本文主要研究生活方式与物质主义价值观的相关关系。基于495位消费者的问卷调查数据，借助因子分析方法，探索出11个生活方式因子，利用这11个因子进行聚类分析，将调查样本划分为5个子市场。随后，用方差分析法分析得出结果：5个子市场在物质主义价值观上有显著性差异，并用最小显著差异法进行两两比较，确认了具有不同生活方式的消费者在物质主义价值观上的差别。     

Markets for information: Of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies

In this paper we study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is also useful to potential competitors. Agents may sell, or buy, reports over the information acquired and choose their trades in the market on the basis of what they learnt. Reports are unverifiable – cheap talk messages – hence the quality of the information transmitted depends on the conflicts of interest faced by the senders. We find that, when information has a prevalent horizontal differentiation component, in equilibrium information is acquired when its costs are not too high and in that case it is also sold, though reports are typically noisy. The market for information is in most cases a monopoly, and there is underinvestment in information acquisition. We also show that regulatory interventions, in the form of firewalls, only make the inefficiency worse. Efficiency can be attained with a monopolist selling differentiated information, provided entry is blocked.     

Acceleration effect of intangibles in the recovery of corporate performance after-crisis

This study explores the recovery in the Market Value Added (MVA) of European companies after the recent global economic crisis in 2008–2009. It introduces empirical evidence that intangible-intensive strategy in human and relational capital reinforces speed of the after-crisis correction for companies. Based on a panel dataset of more than 1600 listed corporations this research aims to discover drivers of Market Value Added trends in 2011–2013. The established results contribute to the understanding of the advantages that companies can exploit for the recovery after systematic shocks of markets. Our study demonstrates that intangible-intensive strategy not always enabled faster recovery speed. Meanwhile, it provided year-to-year acceleration of MVA growth after crisis.     

A one-sided many-to-many matching problem

This study discusses a one-sided many-to-many matching model wherein agents may not be divided into two disjoint sets. Moreover, each agent is allowed to have multiple partnerships in our model. We restrict our attention to the case where the preference of each agent is single-peaked over: (i) the total number of partnerships with all other agents, and (ii) the number of partnerships that the agent has with each of the other agents. We represent a matching as a multigraph, and characterize a matching that is stable and constrained efficient. Finally, we show that any direct mechanism for selecting a stable and constrained efficient matching is not strategy-proof.     

Granular institutional investors and global market interdependence

We study the propagation of global investment risk across markets through the granular view of institutional investors. Applying the conditional value-at-risk estimation to micro-level weekly observations of international mutual funds between 2003 and 2011, we find that idiosyncratic shocks to large institutional investors explain both aggregate market risk and cross-market risk interdependence. Conditional on the US capital markets being in financial distress, idiosyncratic shocks to the top 10% largest funds investing in the US explain about 40% of the risk fluctuations in other non-US markets. The findings are also economically and statistically significant for the top largest funds investing in non-US markets, with the effects becoming especially large during the global financial crisis of 2007–09. These results are robust after controlling for common risk factors and applying alternative measures of idiosyncratic shocks.     

Cross-hedging strategies between CDS spreads and option volatility during crises

This paper presents a joint analysis of the term structure of credit default swap (CDS) spreads and the implied volatility surface for five European countries from 2007 to 2012, a sample period covering both the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the European debt crisis. We analyze to which extent effective cross-hedges can be performed between the credit and equity derivatives markets during these two crises. We find that during a global crisis a breakdown of the relationship between credit risk and equity volatility may occur, jeopardizing any cross-hedging strategy, which happened during the GFC. This stands in sharp contrast to the more localized European debt crisis, during which this fundamental relationship was preserved despite turbulent market conditions for both the CDS and volatility markets.     

Politically connected directors and firm value: Evidence from forced resignations in China

The Central Committee of the Communist Party in China issued the No. 18 Document on Oct 30, 2013 to ban government officials from taking any positions in Chinese firms. Using this decision as a unique natural experiment, we examine the causal relation between political connections and firm valuation. We find that the value of firms with politically connected directors drops significantly upon the announcements of the new rule and the resulting director resignations. Furthermore, the decline in valuation is more pronounced when a firm is in a regulated industry, and when a departing director is of vital importance for building and maintaining political connections. Moreover, non-state-owned enterprises suffer more loss of value than their state-owned peers following the resignations of politically-connected directors. Finally, firms exhibit insignificant value loss when their departing directors are of less political importance in allocating resources. These results suggest that hiring politically connected directors has a positive effect on firm valuation in China.