The option of joint purchase in vertically differentiated markets

Summary. Within the framework proposed by Mussa and Rosen (1978) for modelling quality differentiation, consumers are assumed to make mutually exclusive purchases. A unique pure strategy equilibrium exists in this case. In this note, we allow consumers to buy simultaneously different variants of the differentiated good. We call this the “joint purchase option”. The paper proposes a detailed analysis of price competition when this option is opened: first, we show that either uniqueness, or multiplicity, or absence of price equilibrium arise, depending on the utility derived from joint purchase relative to exclusive purchase. Second, we characterize these equilibria, whenever they exist. Received: July 25, 2001; revised version: October 21, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The second author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from Interuniversity Attraction Pole Program- Belgian State- Federal Office for Scientific, Technical and Cultural Affairs under contract PAI 5/26. Correspondence to: X.Y. Wauthy     

Joint outputs and real wage rates

The magnification effect in standard international trade theory asserts that if the relative price of the labor-intensive commodity increases, the real wage will also increase, as will the wage/rental ratio. This result depends upon the assumption that both activities are nonjoint—each combining labor and capital to produce a single output, so that if activities are joint instead, the results are in jeopardy. It is shown that if the difference between the share of commodity one produced in the first activity and in the second activity exceeds the difference between the labor distributive shares in the first activity and the second, an increase in commodity 1's relative price raises the wage/rental ratio. The real wage unambiguously rises in this case if and only if the ratio of the commodity output shares in the two activities exceeds the ratio of labor shares.     

The choice and timing of foreign direct investment under uncertainty

This paper sheds new light on why timing and entry mode should be considered simultaneously in the international investment literature. We derive the profit levels at which it is optimal to switch from exporting to setting up a wholly owned subsidiary, creating a joint venture, or licensing production to a local firm. The preferred entry mode depends on uncertainty about future profits, tax differentials between the home and the foreign country, the cost advantages of local firms, institutional requirements, and the degree of cooperation between partners in a joint venture.     

基于联合研究实体的国家实验室网络化规律研究

对基于联合研究实体CMI的埃姆斯国家实验室网络化案例分析后发现,拉力（国家战略需求、问题综合复杂）和推力（自身发展追求、自我能力局限）共同驱动国家实验室网络化。强实力、精专业的优质网络节点、相似-差异-分散-役使四重属性叠加的网络关系以及星形网络结构,基于点、线、面三维视角形成了国家实验室网络化基本相态。在国家实验室需求的基础上,网络化规则体系通过实践探索自发生成,且反作用于网络化实践,为网络化文化形成提供了必要条件,成为实验室网络化持续演进的文化根基。最后,从网络化方式、依靠力量、相态、规则、嵌入情景与自主发展5个方面,总结出国家实验室网络化规律对我国国家实验室网络化发展的主要启示。     

Termination clauses in partnerships

We show that when designing a partnership agreement partner firms may prefer not to specify how to allocate the commonly owned assets should there be an early termination of the contract. By not including such a clause, firms induce litigation before a Court with positive probability. Firms create this ex-post inefficiency in order to increase the levels of non-contractible investments, i.e. increase the ex-ante efficiency. The absence of an asset allocation clause works as a “discipline device” that mitigates the hold-up problem within the partnership. In our set-up, no other contract but that without an asset allocation clause can credibly create an ex-post inefficiency.     

Cultural differences,insecure property rights and the mode of entry decision

We develop a theory of a multinational corporation’s optimal mode of entry in a new market. The foreign firm can choose between a licensing agreement, a wholly owned subsidiary or shared control (joint venture). In an environment in which property rights are insecure, opportunism is possible, and the identification of new business opportunities is costly, we show that the relationship between the quality of the institutional environment and the mode of entry decision is non-monotonic. Licensing is preferred if property rights are strictly enforced, while a joint venture is chosen when property rights are poorly enforced. For intermediate situations, the better use of local knowledge made possible by shared control under a joint venture works as a double edged sword. On the one hand, it makes the monitoring activity of the multinational more credible, on the other it offers insurance to both parties, potentially compromising the incentives faced by the local partner. We are grateful to the Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano for providing financial support. For useful comments we would like to thank Klaus Desmet, Cecilia Testa, Henry Wan and Gerald Willmann and seminar participants at Cornell, Ente Luigi Einaudi, Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Kiel, Milano, Universidad de Sao Paolo, the Midwest International Economics Meetings in Indianapolis, SAET VI conference in Rhodes, and the City University of Hong Kong Conference on Intellectual Property Rights.     

The impact of coercive and non-coercive forms of influence on trust, commitment, and compliance in supply chains

A major premise in managing channel relationships is encouraging cooperation to achieve the aims of the relational partners. This often requires a balancing act between utilization of influence across the supply chain to motivate decisions, while employing tactics that do not damage the future of the relationship. This paper builds and tests a model of how influence strategies affect relational elements, specifically trust and commitment, which both promote strong inter-firm relationships and act as mediators of joint action, specifically cooperation and compliance across channel partners. Results suggest that coercive strategies are counterproductive in encouraging cooperation and compliance either directly or through relational intermediaries, while non-coercive influence produces positive outcomes and effects on intermediaries. Low levels of coercive influence do appear to generate positive outcomes. Managerial implications and future research based on these results conclude the paper.     

单位运输成本变化的供应链模型分析

在需求信息不确定情况下，由一个供应商和一个经销商构成两级供应链系统，考虑谊系统在商品边际运输费用随订货量增加而递减的情况，分析经销商采集需求不确定信息的必要备件，指出供销双方共享需求不确定信息的条件，以厦供应链系统中多个经销商联合订货的优势。     

联产品协同生产的成本驱动实证研究

实证研究证明，联产品生产的协同作用也是产品成本的驱动因素。协同成本的动因在于联产品的组成变量。在联产品协同生产过程中，所采取的基于非线性成本函数的边际成本计算法，应该是数理依据严谨、实务应用可行的方法。     

中韩合资南京LG同创企业的发展及其启示

近几年来,随着中韩两国经贸易关系的发展,韩国对我国投资持续增长。由韩国LG与南京同创集团建立的南京LG企业经过短短几年的发展,已成为我国显示器生产的重要基地,实现了跨越式增长,其经营理念里所包含的“人本”意识和对于社会的责任感是值得认真总结和学习的。