产业异质性、税收激励与自主创新

以2007-2016年中国战略性新兴产业A股上市公司数据为研究样本,从企业研发投入和专利产出两个维度,考察税收优惠政策与企业技术创新之间的关系。结果发现：①税收优惠政策对于企业自主创新具有激励作用,有效促进了企业研发投入和专利产出;②基于企业所属产业异质性视角发现,税收优惠政策对于八大战略性新兴产业企业的创新作用存在显著差异：对于新一代信息技术、高端装备制造业、节能环保等产业研发投入和专利产出具有激励作用,但对新能源产业的创新投入、生物产业和新能源汽车产业的专利产出具有抑制作用。研究结论在一定程度上解释了现有研究关于税收优惠政策“激励效应”和“抑制效应”的争议,也对完善中国创新税收激励制度具有借鉴意义。     

交互效应视角下政府补助、内部资源与创新绩效关系研究

以我国战略性新兴产业上市企业为研究对象,构建包含政府补助、内部资源和企业创新绩效的创新系统。建立PVAR模型,通过脉冲响应和方差分解等方法分析系统要素间的动态交互作用。研究结果表明：在企业创新系统内,创新资源促进企业创新绩效提升的效果最显著,政府补助次之,政治资源最弱;进一步探究发现,创新绩效能够实现对内部资源的积极反馈,该反馈作用是快速响应的。此外,企业资源和创新绩效冲击对政府补助的影响程度很小,本期政府补助主要受到自身波动的影响。     

Coordination and learning in games with strategic substitutes and complements

This paper experimentally compares the impact of the presence of strategic substitutes (GSS) and complements (GSC) on players’ ability to successfully play equilibrium strategies. By exploiting a simple property of the ordering on strategy spaces, our design allows us to isolate these effects by avoiding other confounding factors that are present in more complex settings, such as market games. We find that the presence of strategic complementarities significantly improves the rate of Nash play, but that this effect is driven mainly by early rounds of play. This suggests that GSS may be more difficult to learn initially, but that given sufficient time, the theoretically supported globally stable equilibrium offers a good prediction in both settings. We also show that increasing the degree of substitutability or complementarity does not significantly improve the rate of Nash play in either setting, which builds on the findings of previous studies.     

Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities

I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out—surprisingly—to be a very restrictive class of games.     

Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games

This paper provides a model for the study of direct, public and strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games. We propose an equilibrium concept which takes into account communication possibilities of exogenously certifiable statements and in which beliefs off the equilibrium path are explicitly deduced from consistent possibility correspondences, without making reference to perturbed games. Properties of such an equilibrium and of revised knowledge are examined. In particular, it is shown that our equilibrium is always a sequential equilibrium of the associated extensive form game with communication. Finally, sufficient conditions for the existence of perfectly revealing or non-revealing equilibria are characterized in some classes of games. Several examples and economic applications are investigated.     

竞争性战略联盟中合作绩效的影响因素分析

提出了风险、信任、合作模式和联盟绩效之间的概念模型,采用方差分析的方法,对概念模型包含的各种假设做实证分析。研究结果表明:我国的竞争对手之间的合作是非理性的,信任不是建立在合作绩效的基础上,合作中往往不考虑风险对绩效的影响,只重视股权合作的方式。     

会计管制与公司治理

本文从企业契约理论出发,在回顾会计管制国际经验的基础上,将会计管制引入对公司治理问题的思考,指出了会计管制目标的实现对解决公司治理问题的重要性。其不仅要求反思会计管制理论与实践,同时要求在具体分析公司治理模式的基础上,重新思考会计管制的目标及其实现问题。提出应从现行公司治理框架下改进会计管制措施,从而实现会计管制与公司治理的良性互动。     

我国中小企业策略联盟动因及绩效研究

策略联盟作为现代企业组织制度创新中的一种,已成为现代企业获取可持续竞争优势的重要手段。对中小企业而言,实施策略联盟可以有效地弥补中小企业在资金、人力、技术和管理等方面的资源缺陷,化竞争为合作,在内化学习中获得经营绩效及竞争优势。本研究探讨并提出了中小企业策略联盟动力因素和策略联盟绩效指标。动力因素包括获取营销资源、提高营销能力、获取技术资源、提高技术能力等八项;策略联盟绩效指标包括对策略联盟的执行过程和执行情况的满意度,对策略联盟目标的达成状况的满意度以及对参与策略联盟后竞争能力的提升状况的满意度。本文运用问卷调查、访谈所获得的统计数据具体分析了我国中小企业现阶段策略联盟主要动力因素排序以及策略联盟绩效状况。