Strategic behavior in financial markets

We describe a financial market as a noncooperative game in strategic form. Agents may borrow or deposit money at a central bank and use the cash available to them in order to purchase a commodity for immediate consumption. They derive positive utility from consumption and from having cash reserves at the end of the day, whereas being bankrupt entails negative utility. The bank fixes interest rates. The existence of Nash equilibria (both mixed and pure) of the ensuing game is proved under various assumptions. In particular, no agent is bankrupt at equilibrium. Asymptotic behavior of replica markets is discussed, and it is shown that given appropriate assumptions, the difference between a strategic player and a price taker is negligible in a large economy.     

Research Possibilities in Private Club Management

Abstract

This research project proposes a process that studies the service quality trade-offs that restaurant managers worldwide are willing to make in order to maximize their customers' satisfaction level. The project uses traditional conjoint techniques to determine which service attributes managers are willing to trade so that customer satisfaction is maximized.     

Strategic complementarities and nested potential games

This paper reports that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game defined by Uno [Uno, H., 2007. Nested potential games. Economics Bulletin 3(17), 1–8] if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one player.     

Strategic Alliances in the Aviation Industry: An Analysis of Turkish Airlines Experience

SUMMARY

This paper investigates antecedents of success/failure in strategic alliances, which is implemented by airline companies as a response to globalization and liberal government policies. The relationship between Turkish Airlines and Qualiflyer Group, the largest airline alliance in Europe until its collapse in 2001, has been taken as a case study to present the question in terms of matching the goals, partner selection, alliance management, and areas of cooperation. Two factors at the macro-level and four factors at the micro-level are found to be important to succeed in strategic airline alliances.     

Building up a B2B e-commerce strategic alliance model under an uncertain environment for Taiwan's travel agencies

E-travel agencies adopt B2B strategic alliances in order to strengthen their competitive advantages in the e-commerce travel market and because they are an effective tool to gain wider sustainable gains. External environmental and internal organizational factors impacting the success of strategic alliances model are themselves a crucial issue. This study uses multiple methods to collect data from multiple sources and uses qualitative and quantitative surveys. A two-stage research design is adopted to explore the present strategic alliances between Taiwan's wholesaler e-travel agencies and retailer sub-agencies. The results provide an in-depth understanding into the B2B e-commerce strategic alliance model. According to this research, Taiwanese e-travel agencies consider three external environment uncertainties, five internal organization motivations, five partner selection criteria, and two performance measurements of alliance strategies. Finally, the paper proposes an optimal B2B e-commerce strategic alliance model that matches the essential development needs of B2B e-commerce and overcomes the environmental uncertainties.     

以外向型经济带动南贵昆区域农业产业化发展模式研究

论文以外向型经济作为切入口,在分析南贵昆区域特点及农业产业化发展现状的基础上,研究以外向型经济带动南贵昆区域农业产业化发展的使命和战略模式:以沿海港口、外资以及国际市场为联结,组建区域农业产业化肌体、构建农业产业化发展的区域经济网络和协作战略模式。     

企业策略性捐赠行为研究:慈善投入的视角

策略性慈善捐赠能兼容企业和相关利益者的利益,它将企业的捐赠引向既有利于其商业利益又服务于受益组织或个人的慈善行为。波特以来的学者研究的重点集中于企业如何通过慈善捐赠项目获得收益这一问题,而本文在分析了影响企业“慈善投入”的各种因素后,对企业如何选择最优化的慈善捐赠行为作了深入研究,进而得出了企业慈善捐赠行为选择的相关路径。     

Cascading contingent protection and vertical market structure

Cascading contingent protection may occur when protection of an upstream industry transfers injury to the downstream industry and increases the likelihood that this industry asks and receives protection. This paper examines cascading protection within a sequential petitioning model where the upstream industry acts as leader. The analysis identifies market structure and the vertical linkage between the upstream and the downstream industry as important determinants of the occurrence of cascading protection. It is shown that the circumstances which make cascading protection more likely to occur also make it more likely that this protection has serious negative welfare consequences.