排序方式: 共有45条查询结果,搜索用时 171 毫秒
41.
William Thomson 《Economic Theory》2007,31(3):501-521
We consider the problem of dividing a non-homogeneous one-dimensional continuum whose endpoints are topologically identified.
Examples are the division of a birthday cake, the partition of a circular market, the assignment of sentry duty or medical
call. We study the existence of rules satisfying requirements of efficiency, fairness (no-envy), and immunity to misrepresentation
of preferences (strategy-proofness).
This work, supported by NSF under grant SES. 0214691, was presented at Laval University, at the May 2004 Israeli-Turkish Conference
on Economic Design at Bilgi University, at the July 2004 Meeting of the Society for Economic Design at the University of Mallorca,
and at the July 2004 Seventh International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare at Osaka University. I thank
Julius Barbanel, Steven Brams, Youngsub Chun, Bettina Klaus, Toyotaka Sakai, and Chun-Hsien Yeh for their comments. 相似文献
42.
A contract auction establishes a contract between a center and one of the bidders. As contracts may describe many terms, preferences over contracts typically display indifferences. The Qualitative Vickrey Auction (QVA) selects the best contract for the winner that is at least as good for the center as any of the contracts offered by the non-winning players. When each bidder can always offer a contract with higher utility for the center at an arbitrarily small loss of her own utility, the QVA is the only mechanism that is individually rational, strategy-proof, selects stable outcomes, and is Pareto efficient. For general continuous utility functions, a variant of the QVA involving fixed tie-breaking is strategy-proof and also selects stable outcomes. However, there is no mechanism in this setting that in addition also selects Pareto efficient outcomes. 相似文献
43.
A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy-proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity defined on the domain is a random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random dictatorship domain. We ask whether an arbitrary dictatorial domain is a random dictatorship domain and show that the answer is negative by constructing dictatorial domains that admit anonymous, unanimous, strategy-proof random social choice functions which are not random dictatorships. Our result applies to the constrained voting model. Lastly, we show that substantial strengthenings of linked domains (a class of dictatorial domains introduced in Aswal et al., 2003) are needed to restore random dictatorship and such strengthenings are “almost necessary”. 相似文献
44.
Bettina Klaus 《Economic Theory》2001,17(3):675-692
We study two allocation models. In the first model, we consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity
among agents with single-dipped preferences. In the second model, a degenerate case of the first one, we study the allocation
of an indivisible object to a group of agents. We consider rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and in addition either the consistency property separability or the solidarity property population-monotonicity. We show that the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and separability equals the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness. We also provide characterizations of all rules satisfying Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and either separability or population-monotonicity. Since any such rule consists for the largest part of serial-dictatorship components, we can interpret the characterizations
as impossibility results.
Received: September 29, 1999; revised version: March 22, 2000 相似文献
45.
In a general social choice framework where the requirement of strategy-proofness may not be sensible, we call a social choice rule fully sincere if it never gives any individual an incentive to vote for a less-preferred alternative over a more-preferred one and provides an incentive to vote for an alternative if and only if it is preferred to the default option that would result from abstaining. If the social choice rule can depend only on the number of votes that each alternative receives, those rules satisfying full sincerity are convex combinations of the rule that chooses each alternative with probability equal to the proportion of the vote it receives and an arbitrary rule that ignores voters' preferences. We note a sense in which the natural probabilistic analog of approval voting is the fully sincere rule that allows voters maximal flexibility in expressing their preferences and gives these preferences maximal weight. 相似文献