中国企业内部资本市场的功能、陷阱及其法律规制

中国现阶段内部资本市场具有优化融资渠道、催化产业整合以及改进公司治理的功能,但由于信息不对称及代理问题而存在利益侵占、过度投资、风险扩散以及低效率补贴等诸多潜在陷阱。完善的法律规制体系将有助于减少机会主义的内部资本市场运作所带来的负面效应。     

EDGAR on the internet: The welfare effects of wider information distribution in an experimental market for risky assets

Policies such as the SEC’s Fair Disclosure Rule, and technologies such as SEC EDGAR, aim to disseminate corporate disclosures to a wider audience of investors in risky assets. In this study, we adopt an experimental approach to measure whether this wider disclosure is beneficial to these investors. Price-clearing equilibrium models based on utility maximization and non-revealing and fully-revealing prices predict that in a pure exchange economy, an arbitrary trader would prefer that no investors are informed rather than all are informed; non-revealing theory further predicts that an arbitrary trader would prefer a situation in which all traders are informed rather than half the traders are informed. These predictions can be summarized as “None > All > Half”. A laboratory study was conducted to test these predictions. Where previous studies have largely focused on information dissemination and its effects on equilibrium price and insider profits, we focus instead on traders’ expected utility, as measured by their preferences for markets in which none, half, or all traders are informed. Our experimental result contradicts the prediction and indicates “Half > None > All”, i.e. subjects favor a situation where a random half is informed. The implication is that in addition to testing predictions of price equilibrium, experiments should also be used to verify analytical welfare predictions of expected utility under different policy choices. JEL Classification D82, D53, G14, L86 This work was largely completed while this author was at The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.     

An Alternative Post-Keynesian Framework for Understanding Capital Flows to Emerging Markets

This article contributes to the establishment of a framework for the analysis of international capital flows, with a specific focus on emerging markets. It is based on a “monetary” analysis of the economy, as well as on the works of Hyman Minsky and Jan Toporowski in particular. The key aspects of such an approach are the following. First, in a monetary economy, capital flows need to be understood as “flows of funds” that pertain to the realm of financial choices, as opposed to the traditional understanding of capital flows as based on “real” variables, such as saving and investment. A consequence of this is the need to focus on gross flows rather than capital flows. Second, liquidity preference considerations also apply at the international level, particularly in relation to the liquidity of emerging-market currencies that, in turn, depends on context-specific “Keynesian fundamentals.” Third, the rise of institutional investors is the key historical development in the financial system, shaping the current reality of cross-border capital flows, including to emerging markets. I argue that institutional investors’ liabilities, in light of the theories of Minsky and Toporowski, are one of the most important variables in determining these investors’ portfolio choices. I synthesize these elements by defining capital flows to emerging markets as the demand for emerging-market assets by institutional investors. I propose a framework to categorize the various channels that guide this demand.     

Bias in estimates of discrimination and default in mortgage lending: The effects of simultaneity and self-selection

The common practices of estimating single-equation models of mortgage rejection to test for discrimination in mortgage markets or single-equation ex ante mortgage default equations to validate underwriting criteria produce biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. This is due to problems of simultaneous equations bias which arise because, in a world of imperfect information, mortgage terms are not exogenous to the rejection or default decision. In addition, mortgage default estimates are also subject to selection bias. Monte Carlo experiments are used to study the nature and extent of likely bias in single-equation estimation results. We find that rejection equation estimates indicate discrimination when none exists and that estimated coefficients of mortgage terms, such as the loan-to-value ratio, are also subject to significant bias in both rejection and default equations.     

Market clearing and derivative pricing

Summary. We develop a method of assigning unique prices to derivative securities, including options, in the continuous-time finance model developed in Raimondo (2001). In contrast with the martingale method of valuing options, which cannot distinguish among infinitely many possible option pricing processes for a given underlying securities price process when markets are dynamically incomplete, our option prices are uniquely determined in equilibrium in closed form as a function of the underlying economic data.Received: 14 April 2003, Revised: 7 January 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: G13, D52.This paper is dedicated to Birgit Grodal, whose strength and character we greatly admire. We are very grateful to Darrell Duffie, Steve Evans, Botond Koszegi, Roger Purves, Jacob Sagi, Chris Shannon, Bill Zame and an anonymous refereee for very helpful discussions and comments. The work of both authors was supported by Grant SES-9710424, and Andersons work was supported by Grant SES-0214164, from the National Science Foundation.     

Effect of investor fear on Australian financial markets

We examine the relationship between changes in the level of investor fear (proxied by the ASX 200 implied volatility index) and Australian financial market returns. We document a statistically significant relationship, across asset classes, where returns decline as investor fear increases. Returns are more sensitive to changes in the level of investor fear during the financial crisis of 2008–2009, when investor fear spikes sharply. Taken together, the results confirm that Australian financial market returns are closely related to prevailing levels of investor fear.     

Compatibility,interoperability, and market power in upgrade markets

We examine the market power of a seller who repeatedly offers upgraded versions of a product. In the case of pure monopoly, the seller also controls compatibility across versions. In the case of an entrant who offers an upgrade, the incumbent seller also controls subsequent interoperability across versions. We argue that control of compatibility and interoperability does not allow an incumbent seller to charge a price premium relative to when such control is absent and, consequently, neither is a necessary source of market power.     

An Exploratory Study on Nonlinear Causality Among the MILA Markets

According to conventional portfolio theory, an increase in the interconnectedness of international financial markets may reduce the potential for constructing diversified portfolios. This article explores the implications of the creation of the Latin American Integrated Market (MILA)¹ over the dependence structure of its members using correlation and cointegration analysis as well as linear and nonlinear Granger causality tests. The creation of MILA aimed to enhance the integration process that Latin American financial markets “naturally” present while still providing diversification opportunities to investors. The results of our empirical analysis suggest that such objective is being achieved. Evidence of a rise in cross-country linear correlations and their linear causal relationship supports the idea of an increasing financial integration process in the region, while the absence of cointegration and the weakening of the nonlinear causal relationship favors the creation of diversified regional portfolios. These findings provide valuable insights for investment portfolio designers, regulators, and supervisors.     

Incubation of an industry: Heterogeneous knowledge bases and modes of value capture

Research summary : We examine firms' technological investments during an industry's incubation stage—the period between a technological breakthrough and the first instance of its commercialization. Using the agricultural biotechnology context, we develop stylized findings regarding the understudied knowledge evolution preceding product evolution in an industry's life cycle, the trend and diversity of firms undertaking technological investments in anticipation of industry emergence, their leverage of markets for technology and corporate control, and their use of alternative modes of value capture. We juxtapose these stylized findings with existing literature to identify new theoretical insights, and set the stage for future scholarly work to develop and test new theories for the incubation period, examine its existence in other industries, and study its impact on subsequent firm and industry evolution. M anagerial summary : New technological breakthroughs present managers of existing firms and aspiring entrepreneurs with opportunities to create altogether new industries. During the vibrant incubation period, we find that multiple firms capitalize on diverse knowledge bases to shape the industry's knowledge evolution and also capture economic value in diverse ways. Existing firms in the obsolescing industry are more likely to become targets in acquisitions given their complementary knowledge. Science‐based start‐ups are more likely to engage in acquisitions and collaborations with established firms. Diversifying firms are more likely to commercialize products after leveraging of internal development, acquisitions, and alliances. Our study highlights the importance for managers to think about “success” and “failure” across multiple yardsticks of performance, rather than only as product commercialization as the sole goal. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Banks, markets, and efficiency

A competitive financial system can help reduce banks’ monopoly power and the associated inefficiencies. However, according to Diamond (J Polit Econ 105: 928–956, 1997) and Fecht (J Eur Econ Assoc 6(2), 2004) competition with the financial sector may also constrain the amount of liquidity insurance that banks can provide to households affected by unobservable idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. To study this trade-off, we model competition between banks and between banks and financial markets. Our analysis shows that competition between banks and financial markets can constrain the risk-sharing offered by deposit contracts. This effect is the same if competition between banks mainly affects the reallocation of deposits. However, if banking competition primarily affects new deposits, then such competition only limits inefficient monopoly rents without restraining risk-sharing. We would like to thank Diemo Dietrich, Phil Dybvig, Hans Peter Grüner, Martin Hellwig, Elu von Thadden, Uwe Vollmer, Wolf Wagner as well as seminar participants at the Bundesbank, at the University of Mannheim, at the University of Tilburg, at the 3rd Workshop on Monetary and Financial Economics in Halle, at the University of Lausanne, at the First ProBanker Symposium in Maastricht, at the Global Finance Conference 2005 in Dublin, at the European Economic Association Meeting 2005 in Amsterdam, at the International Finance Conference 2005 in Copenhagen, and at the German Economic Association Meeting 2005 in Bonn. We thank Mike Demott for editorial assistance. The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, or the Federal Reserve System.