企业技术创新战略选择机制问题的研究

技术创新战略的选择对企业有着深远影响,甚至关系到企业的生存。如何建立有效的技术创新战略选择机制一直是困扰企业的难题。把企业技术创新战略选择机制的重点放在企业比较容易测度、使用的方法上来,对企业技术创新进行较为细致的风险估计、战略选择的博弈分析,并介绍了Logistic生长模型,为企业选择技术创新战略提供了便利的分析工具。     

Drama theory and its relation to game theory. Part 2: Formal model of the resolution process

In a drama, characters' preferences and options change under the pressure of pre-play negotiations. Thus they undergo change and development. A formal model of dramatic transformation is presented that shows how the core of a drama is transformed by the interaction among the characters into a strict, strong equilibrium to which they all aspire. The process is seen to be driven by actors' reactions to various paradoxes of rationality.     

Drama theory and its relation to game theory. Part 1: Dramatic resolution vs. Rational solution

Drama theory differs from game theory in that it does not regard actors' preferences and perceived opportunities as fixed, but as capable of being changed by the actors themselves under the pressure of pre-play negotiations. Thus characters in a drama undergo change and development. A manyperson, multiphase theory of dramatic transformation is presented, showing how thecore of a drama (in the sense of game theory) is transformed by the interaction between the characters into a strict, strong equilibrium to which they all aspire. The process of dramatic transformation is shown to be driven by actors' reactions to various paradoxes of rationality; it is proved that when all these paradoxes have been overcome, a full dramatic resolution has been reached, satisfying actors' emotional and moral demands, as well as the demands of rationality.     

Congestion effects in a public-good economy

This paper considers a public-good economy with congestion, where participants jointly produce a public good from input of a private good. This economic model gives rise to a transferable-utility game, the profit game, that depends on consumer preferences and a congestion parameter. The simplicity of the game allows the maximum level of congestion that guarantees the nonemptiness of the core of the economy to be determined. It is known that the sustainability of the Lindahl equilibrium in the core of the economy depends on the distribution of profits. In this paper two distributions of profits are compared: the Lindahl solution and the marginal-contribution solution. The latter is more often in the core than the Lindahl solution which in turn Lorenz-dominates the marginal-contribution solution.     

Good signals gone bad: Dynamic signalling with switched effort levels

This paper examines signalling when the sender exerts effort and receives benefits over time. Receivers only observe a noisy public signal about the effort, which has no intrinsic value.The modelling of signalling in a dynamic context gives rise to novel equilibrium outcomes. In some equilibria, a sender with a higher cost of effort exerts strictly more effort than his low-cost counterpart. The low-cost type can compensate later for initial low effort, but this is not worthwhile for a high-cost type. The interpretation of a given signal switches endogenously over time, depending on which type the receivers expect to send it.     

The geometry of voting power: Weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids

Suppose legislators represent districts of varying population, and their assembly's voting rule is intended to implement the principle of one person, one vote. How should legislators' voting weights appropriately reflect these population differences? An analysis requires an understanding of the relationship between voting weight and some measure of the influence that each legislator has over collective decisions. We provide three new characterizations of weighted voting that embody this relationship. Each is based on the intuition that winning coalitions should be close to one another. The locally minimal and tightly packed characterizations use a weighted Hamming metric. Ellipsoidal separability employs the Euclidean metric: a separating hyper-ellipsoid contains all winning coalitions, and omits losing ones. The ellipsoid's proportions, and the Hamming weights, reflect the ratio of voting weight to influence, measured as Penrose–Banzhaf voting power. In particular, the spherically separable rules are those for which voting powers can serve as voting weights.     

Persuasion with communication costs

This paper studies strategic transmission of verifiable information with reporting costs that continuously increase in the precision of the report. Contrary to previous literature, it is shown that the unraveling result first derived by Milgrom (1981) is relatively robust to costly reporting. A separating equilibrium exists even with arbitrarily high reporting costs. Intuitively, the costs work as a signaling device and a combination of disclosure of information and costly signaling accomplishes full separation. With reporting costs there are typically multiple equilibria. For example, a pooling equilibrium exists if and only if the reporting costs are high. Finally, a separating equilibrium exists when the receiver has to make a costly effort in order to access the information in a report, as long as this cost is not too high.     

Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices

An apex game consists of one apex player and a set of minor players. We identify two key properties of apex games and use them to introduce the class of general apex games. We derive players' preferences over winning coalitions by applying strongly monotonic power indices on such a game and all its subgames and investigate whether there are core stable coalitions in the induced hedonic coalition formation game. Besides several general results, in particular, we develop conditions on the game for the Shapley–Shubik index, the Banzhaf index, and the normalized Banzhaf index.     

Promoting Persistent Strategic Reasoning Behavior: An Experimental Approach

The present research is aimed to apply experimental techniques to study strategic behavior in one-shot-hide-and-seek games as a frame to elicit more real and elaborated business situations. To promote strategic thinking and persistence, we conducted treatments with repeated matching games among strangers, and one of them with a fixed endowment (fixed initial payment that decreases each round an amount) with the possibility of abandon in any round, retaining the remaining of endowment. In fact, effortful strategic reasoning is found in deviation of subjects’ random choices along the repetitions and abandon, loss aversion, and cultural differences seem articulate a strategic behavior.     

基于智能手机的互动型英语游戏App应用程序的研发

教育游戏类App在学科教学中应用,虽然早已被提出。但是通过调查发现,已有的一些教育游戏App一般只是起到了丰富学生课外活动的作用,知识很难系统的被学生接受理解运用。因此,本文通过对教育游戏相关理论和实践的研究,尝试通过对初中英语单词互动型游戏App的研发,能为英语游戏App在英语知识技能方面的应用研究提供参考。