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51.
Bank debt guarantees have traditionally been viewed as costless measures to prevent bank runs. However, as recent experiences in some European countries have demonstrated, guarantees may link the coordination problems of bank and sovereign creditors and induce a functional interdependence between the likelihoods of a government default and bank illiquidity. Employing a global-game approach, we model this link, showing the existence and uniqueness of the joint equilibrium and derive its comparative statics properties. In equilibrium, the guarantee reduces the probability of a bank run, while it increases the probability of a sovereign default. The latter erodes the guarantee’s credibility and thus its effectiveness ex ante. By setting the guarantee optimally, the government balances these two effects in order to minimize expected costs of crises. Our results show that the optimal guarantee has clear-cut welfare gains which are enhanced through policies that promote greater balance sheet transparency. 相似文献
52.
Biconcavity is a simple condition on inverse demand that corresponds to the ordinary concept of concavity after simultaneous parameterized transformations of price and quantity. The notion is employed here in the framework of the homogeneous-good Cournot model with potentially heterogeneous firms. The analysis leads to unified conditions, respectively, for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium via nonincreasing best-response selections, for existence via quasiconcavity, and for the uniqueness of the equilibrium. The usefulness of the generalizations is illustrated in cases where inverse demand is either “nearly linear” or isoelastic. It is also shown that commonly made assumptions regarding large outputs are often redundant. 相似文献
53.
We propose the notions of mixed and behavioral Ellsberg strategies for extensive form games and prove that these strategies are outcome-equivalent if and only if mixed Ellsberg strategies satisfy a certain rectangularity condition. In addition, we show that not only the profile of Ellsberg strategies must be appropriately chosen but also the extensive form must satisfy further restrictions beyond those implied by perfect recall in order to ensure that each player will respect his ex ante strategy choice with the evolution of play. 相似文献
54.
We show that every N-player K
1 × ... × K
N
game possesses a correlated equilibrium with at least
zero entries. In particular, the largest N-player K × ... × K games with unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games.
We thank an anonymous referee for most useful comments. The first author acknowledges financial support from Spanish Ministry
of Science and Technology, grant SEJ2004-03619, and in form of a Ramón y Cajal fellowship. The second author acknowledges
support by the PASCAL Network of Excellence under EC grant no.506778, as well as from Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology
and FEDER, grant BMF2003-03324. Both authors also acknowledge financial support from BBVA grant “Aprender a jugar.” 相似文献
55.
Gary Reich 《Constitutional Political Economy》2007,18(3):177-197
Constitutional assemblies are a common feature of many democratic transitions. However, the goal of coordinating constitutional
choice would seem nearly impossible when assemblies are comprised of highly fragmented and volatile political parties. Building
on Knight’s bargaining model, this article argues that the main challenge to coordination in unstable party systems is the
procedural disequilibrium that results from incomplete information over breakdown payoffs. The likelihood of compromise in
such circumstances is a function of the ideologies that frame constitutional choice and inform coalition-building. Thus, unstable
party systems are not chaotic, although they may be deeply conflict-laden. These issues are illustrated empirically via the
Brazilian Constitution of 1988, which demonstrates the possibilities for a stable constitutional order emerging from a fragmented
and volatile party system.
相似文献
Gary ReichEmail: |
56.
57.
房地产市场价格博弈分析 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
我国房地产业发展迅速,房地产市场的发展对促进国民经济发展做出了突出贡献,房地产业已成为我国重要支柱产业之一.我国房地产市场现状是博弈得出结果的一个竞技场.文章从房地产销售过程中主要参与者的价格博弈分析,探究房地产市场交易价格形成的过程,指出中国房地产业的现状是由社会几股力量反复博弈的结果,其实质是不同社会力量之间的利益之争. 相似文献
58.
Subject to a few agri‐environmental restrictions, municipal wastewater can be utilised for agricultural irrigation and river rehabilitation. This paper develops a single‐year Planning Model for a region in Israel which consists of a city and three potential wastewater consumers. The model incorporates, in one endogenous system, the economic, physical and biological relationships in the water–soil–plant–environment system and its objective is to maximise the regional social welfare. The model determines the optimal crop mix and the optimal allocation of the limited water and land resources among all potential users. Then, different allocation approaches from the concept of transferable utility games are applied to determine a reasonable and fair allocation of the additional net benefits which will be acceptable to all the players. The results support the collaboration among the economic entities and indicate economic and environmental advantages which can serve the decision‐makers. 相似文献
59.
本文运用重复博弈理论分析区域产业集群内多企业间合作性交易过程发现,当集群内形成第三方激励组织对企业间不合作行为惩罚大到永誓不会交易,甚至会被赶出集群时,就能激励集群内企业间合作从两企业向多企业合作发展。分析温州产业集群内商会组织发现,该组织能有效地监督集群内交易企业潜在的不诚实行为,为交易方提供一个合作激励机制,激励集群内多企业间的交易从欺骗均衡转到合作均衡,提升了集群的绩效和整体竞争力。 相似文献
60.
景区门票价格偏高的一个博弈论解释 总被引:14,自引:1,他引:14
宋子千 《桂林旅游高等专科学校学报》2004,15(1):31-34
指出景区产品是差别垄断产品,通过引入博弈论的思想,论证差别垄断这一特性可能使得景区自动趋向完全垄断价格,造成社会福利损失。这一模型可以解释我国门票价格偏高以及部分景点还在酝酿提价的现象。 相似文献