Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities

We propose two characteristics of beliefs and study their role in shaping the set of rationalizable strategy profiles in games with incomplete information. The first characteristic, type-sensitivity, is related to how informative a player thinks his type is. The second characteristic, optimism, is related to how “favorable” a player expects the outcome of the game to be. The paper has two main results: the first result provides an upper bound on the size of the set of rationalizable strategy profiles; the second gives a lower bound on the change of location of this set. These bounds are explicit expressions that involve type-sensitivity, optimism, and payoff characteristics. Our results generalize and clarify the well-known uniqueness result of global games (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993). They also imply new uniqueness results and allow us to study rationalizability in new environments. We provide applications to supermodular mechanism design (Mathevet, 2010b) and information processing errors.     

Criteria for the Stochastic Ordering of Random Sums,with Actuarial Applications

It is shown that vectors ( S M 1 , … , S Mn ) and ( S' M'1 , …, S' M'n ) of random sums of positive random variables are stochastically ordered by upper orthant dependence, lower orthant dependence, concordance or by the supermodular ordering whenever their corresponding random numbers of terms ( M 1 , … , M n ) and ( M' 1 , … , M' n ) are themselves ordered in this fashion. Actuarial applications of these results are given to different dependence structures for the collective risk model with several classes of business.     

Learning by Trial and Error: A Case for Moot Courts

This article describes the development of a computer tutorial for use in a history of economic ideas class. An early version of the tutorial contained ten topics, ranging from early Mercantilist thought to Jevons's marginal utility analysis. These concepts were presented in three ways: verbally, graphically, and in summary form. Student critiques were used to extend the content and revise the mode of presentation.     

Strategic behavior in financial markets

We describe a financial market as a noncooperative game in strategic form. Agents may borrow or deposit money at a central bank and use the cash available to them in order to purchase a commodity for immediate consumption. They derive positive utility from consumption and from having cash reserves at the end of the day, whereas being bankrupt entails negative utility. The bank fixes interest rates. The existence of Nash equilibria (both mixed and pure) of the ensuing game is proved under various assumptions. In particular, no agent is bankrupt at equilibrium. Asymptotic behavior of replica markets is discussed, and it is shown that given appropriate assumptions, the difference between a strategic player and a price taker is negligible in a large economy.     

人员工作分配的定量优化方法研究

近年来资源优化问题受到各方面的普遍关注,作为生产要素中最具有活力的人才资源也存在资源优化分配的问题。文章以残奥会工作人员的工作岗位科学分配为例,采用模糊数学方法进行数据处理,运用运筹学方法进行优化,取得了良好的效果,达到了科学优化、节约成本的目的,为组织决策者提供了一种可供参考的方法。     

Strategic complementarities and nested potential games

This paper reports that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game defined by Uno [Uno, H., 2007. Nested potential games. Economics Bulletin 3(17), 1–8] if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one player.     

Solving dynamic public insurance games with endogenous agent distributions: Theory and computational approximation

We make two contributions in this paper. First, we extend the characterization of equilibrium payoff correspondences in history-dependent dynamic policy games to a class with endogenously heterogeneous private agents. In contrast to policy games involving representative agents, this extension has interesting consequences as it implies additional nonlinearity (i.e., bilinearity) between the game states (distributions) and continuation/promised values in the policymaker’s objective and incentive constraints. The second contribution of our paper is in addressing the computational challenges arising from this payoff-relevant nonlinearity. Exploiting the game’s structure, we propose implementable approximate bilinear programming formulations to construct estimates of the equilibrium value correspondence. Our approximation method respects the property of upper hemicontinuity in the target correspondence. We provide small-scale computational examples as proofs of concept.     

A characterization of exact non-atomic market games

Continuous exact non-atomic games are naturally associated to certain operators between Banach spaces. It thus makes sense to study games by means of the corresponding operators. We characterize non-atomic exact market games in terms of the properties of the associated operators. We also prove a separation theorem for weak compact sets of countably additive non-atomic measures, which is of independent interest.     

Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel

This paper studies non-cooperative bargaining with random proposers in apex games. Two different protocols are considered: the egalitarian protocol, which selects each player to be the proposer with equal probability, and the proportional protocol, which selects each player with a probability proportional to his number of votes. Expected equilibrium payoffs coincide with the kernel for the grand coalition regardless of the protocol. The equilibrium is in mixed strategies and the indifference conditions can be reinterpreted in the language of the kernel.