Strategic Interaction between Governments and Investors under Privatization Programs

This article analyses the strategic moves of governments and investors under privatization programs in a game‐theoretic context. In sequential‐move games of both perfect information and incomplete information, the best response of the strategic investors to observing a slow pace of privatization is to have a low participation in economic activity because of concerns over public policy credibility. This is true even if the government chooses to randomize its action to send mixed signals to the investors while adopting a slow pace of privatization for budgetary reasons. However, the outcome is Pareto inferior to a situation of phased but fast implementation of privatization programs and high private‐sector participation under plausible assumptions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

信息不对称下的几个经济学实验

实验方法受到经济学界的重视,不对称信息条件下的实验方法研究具有重要现实意义。笔者探讨了若干在不对称信息条件下的经济学实验,包括名誉的作用、信号传递等重要实验,认为不对称信息下的实验的方法及其研究思路值得我国经济学者借鉴和深入研究。     

世界大型事件活动对旅游业的影响及对中国的启示——以历届奥运会和韩国世界杯为例

大型事件旅游活动对举办地具有深远的经济意义和社会意义。以历届奥运会和2002年韩国世界杯足球赛为实例,简要分折世界大型事件活动对举办国旅游业发展的影响及对中国的启示。     

Gradualism in free trade agreements: a theoretical justification

A notable feature of many recent trade agreements is the gradual, rather than immediate, reduction of trade barriers. In this paper we model trade liberalization as a cooperative relationship that evolves gradually in a non-cooperative environment. We show that specialization, capacity irreversibility and the development of trade-partner specific capital increase the benefit of continuing the liberalizing relationship and decrease, over time, the lowest obtainable self-enforcing tariff. By increasing the penalty of future defection, sunk costs ensure that the self-enforcing trading relationship starts slowly, but once in progress the level of cooperation continues to improve.     

旅游市场中的逆向选择和重复博弈——以海南旅游业为例

由于旅游服务产品质量的信息在游客和旅游企业之间的分布是不对称的,这就使得劣质旅游企业对优质旅游企业的逆向淘汰成为可能.本文以海南旅游业为例,分阶段对旅游市场中的逆向选择和重复博弈问题进行了探讨,系统论证了劣质市场均衡出现、维护和强化的条件和成因.     

供应链成员竞合博弈分析

根据博弈论原理,分析供应链成员间的竞合关系,认为在构建供应链的过程中,成员是基于合作博弈来选择合作伙伴的;而形成"双赢"的利益机制是供应链结构变迁和优化的动因,由此提出若干供应链成员合作策略。     

Unfolding Social Hierarchies

Consider a large population of finitely-lived agents organized into n different hierarchical levels. Every period, all those placed at each level are randomly matched to play a given symmetric game. Based on the resulting outcome, a ρ-fraction of agents who (within their own level) attain the highest payoffs are promoted upwards. On the other hand, newcomers replacing those who die every period enter at the lowest level and choose irreversibly the strategy to be played for the rest of their life. This choice is made, with some noise, by imitating one of the strategies adopted at the highest level.  In this setup, the unique long-run behavior of the system is fully characterized for the whole class of 2×2 coordination games and two alternative variations of the model. The results crucially depend on the key “institutional” parameters ρ and n. In particular, it is shown that inefficient behavior prevails in the long run (even when risk-dominated) if promotion is only mildly selective—high ρ—and the social system is quite hierarchical—large n. In a stylized manner, these parameter conditions may be viewed as reflecting a sort of institutional deficiency that impairs economic performance. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, C73, D72.     

EQUIVALENCE OF COMPETITION MODE IN A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY WITH DELEGATION

This paper aims to examine the equivalence of competition mode in a vertically differentiated product market with the relative performance delegation. It demonstrates the equivalence of product quality and social welfare in this delegation game, irrespective of modes of product competition. In addition, in a three‐stage game of quality‐delegation‐quantity (or price), it shows that the delegation coefficient is different between high‐quality and low‐quality firms in an asymmetric vertical differentiated model, and a high‐quality firm makes better use of the delegation than a low‐quality firm.     

Teaching English Grammar with Fun

Grammar should be studied by examining living speech rather than by analyzing written documents.By providing grammar in context,in an implicit manner.