Teaching English Grammar with Fun

Grammar should be studied by examining living speech rather than by analyzing written documents.By providing grammar in context,in an implicit manner.     

Can Banks Self‐Regulate? Voluntary Agreements,Intrinsic Motivation and Games

This article argues that lessons on how to achieve a sustainable financial system can be learnt from the work done on sustainable commons (on common‐pool resources – CPRs – where there is no ‘tragedy of the commons’). Existing approaches to financial regulation may not give proper attention to available solutions. The article proposes that innovative solutions could be tested using experimental methods commonly used in CPRs: repeat run, feedback driven games.     

幼儿自我保护能力的调查研究

本文采用结构访谈法,以3-6岁的120名幼儿为研究被试,探讨了幼儿自我保护能力的现状。结果表明,从总体上来看,幼儿自我保护能力良好,从各维度上来看,幼儿的游戏活动自护、意外防护能力较好,生活活动自护能力次之,心理自护能力较差,城乡差异和年级差异在某些维度上也是存在差异的;中班是进行幼儿自我保护教育的关键时期。     

Petty corruption

This paper analyzes a petty corruption model in which the entrepreneur’s type is drawn from an absolutely continuous probability distribution function F over [0, 1], and perfect Bayesian equilibrium is adopted as the solution concept for a one-stage game. In the one-stage game, if there is more than one bureaucrat, no project is approved with a strictly positive probability. For an infinitely repeated game, I show that the single window policy strictly increases the social benefits in a socially optimal equilibrium. I would like to thank Mukul Majumdar for valuable guidance and encouragement. I am also grateful to Kaushik Basu, Fernando Vega-Redondo, an anonymous referee, seminar participants at the international meeting for public economic theory (PET07) and especially Ani Guerdjikova and Roy Radner for helpful comments. Thanks are due to Hideaki Goto and Eunkyeong Lee for useful conversation.     

Efficiency in coalition games with externalities

A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when externalities are present. We provide a condition, analogous to convexity, that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be efficient and show that this also implies that the (appropriately defined) core is nonempty. Moreover, we propose a mechanism which implements the most efficient partition for all coalition formation games and characterizes the resulting payoff division.     

A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information

This paper tests a learning-based model of strategic teaching in repeated games with incomplete information. The repeated game has a long-run player whose type is unknown to a group of short-run players. The proposed model assumes a fraction of ‘short-run’ players follow a one-parameter learning model (self-tuning EWA). In addition, some ‘long-run’ players are myopic while others are sophisticated and rationally anticipate how short-run players adjust their actions over time and “teach” the short-run players to maximize their long-run payoffs. All players optimize noisily. The proposed model nests an agent-based quantal-response equilibrium (AQRE) and the standard equilibrium models as special cases. Using data from 28 experimental sessions of trust and entry repeated games, including 8 previously unpublished sessions, the model fits substantially better than chance and much better than standard equilibrium models. Estimates show that most of the long-run players are sophisticated, and short-run players become more sophisticated with experience.     

International monetary policy cooperation in economies with centralized wage setting

We consider a standard two-country monetary policy game with fixed nominal wage contracts. The policy regime is either non-cooperative or cooperative. We extend conventional analyses by deriving the natural rate of employment endogenously through monopoly union decision-making. As unions attempt to affect the real exchange rate, wages are set inefficiently high. Such attempts are shown to be strongest under monetary cooperation. Therefore, in comparison with non-cooperation, employment is lowest, and, in effect, consumer price inflation is highest, under monetary cooperation, i.e., international monetary cooperation is disadvantageous.     

北京奥运会法制建设的思考

论述法制环境与奥运的密切关系。良好的法制环境能促进奥运会的成功与发展，成功的奥运呼唤法制环境的保护和支持。法制建设是国家政治文明程度的表现，是依法治国的基础。在法制建设中要紧紧围绕“绿色奥运、科技奥运、人文奥运”的三个理念。奥运会是一场大型的体育盛会，同时又是一项庞大的系统工程。通过举办2008年奥运会。增强国人的法制意识，完善中国法律制度，制定与之相配套的法律法规是成功举办奥运会不容回避的问题。法制环境建设既是北京新奥运的有机组成部分，又是北京新奥运的重要保障。     

On the optimal taxation of common-pool resources

Recent research developments in common-pool resource models emphasize the importance of links with ecological systems and the presence of non-linearities, thresholds and multiple steady states. In a recent paper Kossioris et al. (2008) develop a methodology for deriving feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games and apply this methodology to a common-pool resource model of a lake where pollution corresponds to benefits and at the same time affects the ecosystem services. This paper studies the structure of optimal state-dependent taxes that steer the combined economic-ecological system towards the trajectory of optimal management, and provides an algorithm for calculating such taxes.