Nonresponse in dynamic panel data models

To verify whether data are missing at random (MAR) we need to observe the missing data. There are only two exceptions: when the relationship between the probability of responding and the missing variables is either imposed by introducing untestable assumptions or recovered using additional data sources. In this paper, we briefly review the estimation and test procedures for selectivity in panel data. Furthermore, by extending the MAR definition from a static setting to the case of dynamic panel data models, we prove that some tests for selectivity are not verifying the MAR condition.     

Simple credibility tests of the ERM bands for the pound sterling and the Italian lira

This article presents evidence that the European Monetary System (EMS) bands for the Italian lira and the pound sterling were not credible for most of the period 1990–1992, and especially during the week prior to their withdrawal from the EMS system. Using a simple test, developed by Svensson, domestic interest rates for both Italy and the United Kingdom have been found to be mostly outside the rate-of-return bands implied by the official arrangements of the EMS target zone system. Furthermore, comparing implied forward rates for various maturities with the official EMS bands of both currencies, we again found that the followed monetary policies in both countries were not in general consistent with those needed to maintain an orderly functioning of the (EMS) system. The Svensson test can further be used as an indicator of potential speculative attacks on an EMS currency, and, in turn, as a signal of an emerging need to adjust the corresponding country's monetary policy.     

Executive stock options and IPO underpricing

In about one-third of US IPOs between 1996 and 2000, executives received stock options with an exercise price equal to the IPO offer price rather than a market-determined price. Among firms with such “IPO options”, 58% of top executives realize a net benefit from underpricing: the gain from the options exceeds the loss from the dilution of their pre-IPO shareholdings. If executives can influence either the IPO offer price or the timing and terms of their stock option grants, there should be a positive relation between IPO option grants and underpricing. We find no evidence of such a relation. Our results contrast sharply with the emerging literature on managerial self-dealing at shareholder expense.     

Stock exchange governance initiatives: Evidence from the Italian STARs

Can a stock exchange improve corporate governance and transparency by designating companies that exhibit superior corporate governance? In 2000, the Borsa Italiana created a mid-cap segment with strong listing standards, which is composed of firms (called STARS) that follow stricter standards of transparency, disclosure, monitoring and liquidity. We find that STAR firms exhibit governance characteristics not observed in non-STAR firms, such as a higher incidence of audit and executive committees and higher debt ratios. They experienced a modestly favorable share price response upon the implementation of the STAR initiative. Moreover, they experienced significantly higher buy and hold returns and transparency after the initiative. Several governance characteristics are cross-sectionally associated with performance following the STAR initiative. Overall, the results suggest that firms may be willing to improve governance when they are endorsed by a credible agency for doing so, and such improvements may lead to better performance. The STAR initiative may serve as a model that can be adapted by other stock exchanges to promote transparency and governance.     

The adjustment of credit ratings in advance of defaults

This paper assesses biases in credit ratings and lead–lag relationships for near-to-default issuers with multiple ratings by Moody’s and S&P. Based on defaults from 1997 to 2004, we find evidence that Moody’s seems to adjust its ratings to increasing default risk in a timelier manner than S&P. Second, credit ratings by the two US-based agencies are not subject to any home preference. Third, given a downgrade (upgrade) by the first rating agency, subsequent downgrades (upgrades) by the second rating agency are of greater magnitude in the short term. Fourth, harsher rating changes by one agency are followed by harsher rating changes in the same direction by the second agency. Fifth, rating changes by the second rating agency are significantly more likely after downgrades than after upgrades by the first rating agency. Additionally, we find evidence for serial correlation in rating changes up to 90 days subsequent to the rating change of interest after controlling for rating changes by the second rating agency.     

Valuation of synthetic CDOs

In this paper, we consider the valuation of a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO), a pool of underlying credit risky securities, “partitioned” into several tranches, each of which absorbs losses in accordance with its size and seniority. We derive a closed-form solution for credit spreads of the tranches of homogeneous pools and find an approximation for the credit spreads of inhomogeneous pools. The method leads to an accurate estimation of the credit spreads of synthetic CDOs and can be used in risk management applications.     

Agency costs of vertical integration—the case of family firms,investor‐owned firms and cooperatives in the French wine industry

Vertical integration theory has long suggested internal costs related to changes in incentives due to vertical integration, which means that vertical integration may lead to agency costs. In this work, we specify the notion of agency costs of vertical integration and extend Ang et al. (2000)'s measurement of agency costs to provide an empirical assessment of these costs in the French wine industry. Our econometric analysis finds that the agency costs of vertical integration may reach 2–3% of sales. It also showed that operating expenses of vertical integration are lower for cooperatives than for other firms, while vertical integration is less rewarding for them. This raises questions on the relation between agency costs in cooperatives and their performance.     

Why panel tests of purchasing power parity should allow for heterogeneous mean reversion

Recent studies of purchasing power parity (PPP) use panel tests that fail to take into account heterogeneity in the speed of mean reversion across real exchange rates. In contrast to several other severe restrictions of panel models and tests of PPP, the assumption of homogeneous mean reversion is still widely used and its consequences are virtually unexplored. This paper analyzes the properties of homogeneous and heterogeneous panel unit root testing methodologies. Using Monte Carlo simulation, we uncover important adverse properties of the panel approach that relies on homogeneous estimation and testing. More specifically, power functions are low and assume irregular shapes. Furthermore, homogeneous estimates of the mean reversion parameters exhibit potentially large biases. These properties can lead to misleading inferences on the validity of PPP. Our findings highlight the importance of allowing for heterogeneous estimation when testing for a unit root in panels of real exchange rates.     

Testing for intraday interdependence and volatility spillover among the euro, the pound and the Swiss franc markets

To examine intraday interdependence and volatility spillover among the euro, the pound and the Swiss franc, we employ the varying-correlation model of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. Our main findings are (1) return volatility in the euro spills into the pound and the Swiss franc; and (2) these markets are highly integrated with the euro, and the degree of interdependence is state-dependent: euro news has a simultaneous impact on the pound and the Swiss franc, and co-movements of these currencies and the euro become much higher in proportion to the arrival of news of the euro.     

Political objectives and privatization decisions

In early Romanian privatization a group of firms was explicitly banned from privatization. We use this institutional feature to test which factors contributed to the selection of firms for long‐term state ownership, and find that politicians sheltered from privatization large and inefficient firms which paid low wages and had high overdue payments. These results are consistent with minimization of employment losses, even if efficiency enhancement of privatization had to be sacrificed. We conjecture that the unfavourable economic conditions bringing large employment losses motivated Romanian politicians to fear the possible negative employment effects of privatization.