The rise and fall of the sliding scale, or why wages are no longer indexed to product prices

Though almost no postwar union contracts indexed wage rates to prices of the employer’s products, union agreements linking wage rates to product prices, known as sliding scales, were common in some industries in the United States and Britain from the 1860s through the 1930s. This paper explains why sliding scales disappeared after the 1930s, and examines what practical experience with sliding scales revealed about fundamental constraints on wage indexation. Paradoxically, the history of sliding scales confirms that workers’ information about product prices and materials costs is generally imperfect, in ways that would substantially constrain wage indexation in long-term contracts. Sliding scales were not indexed long-term contracts, but rather devices to forestall costly strikes in the absence of contracts by revealing employers’ private information about product demand. In the postwar US, unions and employers failed to link wage rates to product prices because they had gained the ability to enter binding contracts, which could achieve the benefits of preventing strikes without incurring the extra negotiation costs and information problems associated with product-price indexation. I present a model to show how sliding scales could forestall strikes by revealing information, and how the introduction of binding union contracts reduced incentives to link wages to product prices.     

Upstreamness,exports, and wage inequality: Evidence from Chinese manufacturing data

In this paper we investigate within-firm wage inequality across heterogeneous industries that hold different positions in the domestic value chain, and across heterogeneous firms that have different exposure to trade. We find that the wage inequality problem is more severe in upstream industries than in downstream ones, and among firms with greater exposure to trade (i.e., larger export share of sales). Our findings support both classic and new new trade theories on wage inequality. In downstream industries where Chinese firms are typically engaged in processing and assembly work with intensive use of unskilled labor, trade leads to less wage inequality within firms. However, trade also introduces pro-competitive effects which usually benefit exporters and their skilled labor. The results hold after various checks and controls for robustness.     

International trade and within-sector wage inequality: The case of South Korea

This paper studies which factors contributed to the changes in wage inequality in Korean manufacturing over the last three decades. By adopting Akerman et al. (2013)’s decomposition method, we examine the relative importance of within-sector and between-sector wage variations in Korean manufacturing over the period of 1980–2012. Our analytic results confirm that within-sector wage variation explains the lion’s share of overall wage inequality. Taking this finding into account, we estimate the impacts of international trade, skilled-biased technological change and labor market conditions on within-sector wage inequality in Korea. Our estimation results suggest that there was a structural change in determinants of wage inequality before and after the mid-1990s. The influence of international trade mainly through heightened import competition on wage dispersion became relatively more conspicuous over the last two decades.     

Household search and health insurance coverage

Health insurance in the United States is typically acquired through an employer-sponsored program. Often employees offered employer-provided health insurance have the option to extend coverage to their spouse and dependents. We investigate the implications of the “publicness” of health insurance coverage for the labor market careers of spouses. The theoretical innovations in the paper are to extend the standard partial–partial equilibrium labor market search model to a multiple searcher setting with the inclusion of multi-attribute job offers, with some of the attributes treated as public goods within the household. The model is estimated using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) using a Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) estimator. We demonstrate how previous estimates of the marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for health insurance based on cross-sectional linear regression estimators may be seriously biased due to the presence of dynamic selection effects and misspecification of the decision-making unit.