Fiscal stimuli in the form of job creation subsidies

This paper examines the effects of fiscal stimuli in the form of job creation subsidies in a DSGE model with search friction and endogenous job separation. We consider two types of job creation subsidies: a subsidy for the cost of posting vacancies and a hiring subsidy. This paper finds that the effects of job creation subsides on unemployment differ between models with and without endogenous job separation. While a positive job creation subsidy shock lowers unemployment in a model without endogenous job separation, it increases unemployment in a model with endogenous job separation. We also find that while qualitatively the effects of a vacancy cost subsidy on the economy are similar to those of a hiring subsidy, quantitatively they are different.     

THE IMPACT OF LABOR MARKET REGULATION ON EMPLOYMENT IN LOW‐INCOME COUNTRIES: A META‐ANALYSIS

Controversy over labor market policy often centers on achieving a balance between preventing worker exploitation, and avoiding loss of productivity or employment through excessive regulation. Although the literature documenting the impact of labor market regulation on employment is extensive, there is a dearth of evidence on the impact of such policies in low‐income countries (LICs). Since it is easier for workers, especially women, to slip into the informal sector in LICs, regulations are likely to have stronger impacts on formal employment in these countries (but lower impacts on unemployment). We systematically reviewed available research from countries that are, or were until recently, LICs. Most studies document that more stringent labor regulations are associated with lower formal sector employment and higher informal sector employment. We also conducted a metaregression analysis of the impact of minimum wages on formal and informal employment. After controlling for publication bias, higher minimum wages are associated with lower formal employment and a higher share of informal workers.     

Endogenous job destructions and the distribution of wages

This paper considers a matching model with both idiosyncratic productivity shocks that hit jobs at random and heterogeneity of workers according to ex ante unobservable abilities. We argue that firms' decisions about reservation productivity can help explain the shape of wage distributions. This is shown from numerical experiments, calibrated to French data, by considering alternative ranges of productivity shocks.     

"交保证金"的报酬政策在中国存在的原因解析--一种扩展的夏皮罗-斯蒂格利茨模型

本文通过建立一种扩展的夏皮罗—斯蒂格利茨模型,解释了“交保证金”的报酬政策在中国存在的原因。当劳动力处于买方市场时,工人在失业和就业两者之间严格偏好于就业,厂商有可能采取“交保证金”的报酬政策,那么,厂商就可以支付较低的实际工资,获得较好的监督效果,使工人努力工作。厂商以较低的工资雇佣工人,可以使劳动力市场的就业人数有所增加,但由于并不是所有工人都能够通过“交保证金”而实现就业,故这一报酬政策不能使市场出清。     

The Last Word on the Wage Curve?

Abstract.  Since 1990, there has been extensive international research on the responsiveness of wages of individuals to changing local labour market conditions. For many countries, an inverse relationship between wages and local unemployment rates has been found. In their book, The Wage Curve , Blanchflower and Oswald argued that the unemployment elasticity of pay is around −0.1 in most countries. In a 1995 literature survey, Card referred to this striking empirical regularity as being close to an 'empirical law of economics'. Nonetheless, reported elasticities do vary, even excluding outliers, between about −0.5 and +0.1. There is also considerable heterogeneity among wage curve studies in terms of data and model specification. This paper carries out meta‐analytic techniques on a sample of 208 elasticities derived from the literature to uncover the reasons for the differences in empirical results across studies. Several causes of variation are identified. There is also clear evidence of downward publication bias. In addition, many reported t ‐statistics are biased upwards due to the use of aggregate unemployment rates. A maximum likelihood method and a trimming procedure are used to correct for these biases. Both methods give similar results for our sample. An unbiased estimate of the wage curve elasticity at the means of study characteristics is about −0.07.     

Trade tariff,wage gap and public spending

This paper studies the interplay between wage gap and government spending in a small open economy facing a shock in trade policy. We consider a specific factor model with an export sector, which uses skilled labour, and an import-competing sector, which uses unskilled labour. We find the conditions under which there exists an inverse (direct) relation between trade liberalization (protection), which increases (decreases) the skilled-unskilled wage gap, and the level of government expenditure. We also show how either an unbalanced distribution of political bargaining power, or tariff revenue co-financing public spending may break this inverse relation. Moreover, the direct relation between tariff protection and public goods provision can be strenghtened by progressive taxation and weakened by regressive taxation.     

When a Door Closes,a Window Opens? Long‐Term Labor Market Effects of Involuntary Separations

This study estimates the earning losses of workers experiencing an involuntary job separation. We employ, for the first time in the earning losses literature, a Poisson pseudo‐maximum‐likelihood estimator with fixed effects that has several advantages with respect to conventional fixed effects models. The Poisson estimator allows considering the full set of involuntary separations, including those with zero labor market earnings because of unemployment. By including individuals with zero earnings and by using our new method, the loss in the year of separation becomes larger than in previous studies. The loss starts with roughly 30% and, although it quickly shrinks, it remains at around 15% in the following years. In addition, we find that compared to other reasons for separation, the earning loss pattern is unique for involuntary separations, because no other type of separation implies such permanent scarring. This latter finding makes us confident that the self‐reported involuntariness of a separation is a reliable source of information.     

反补贴政策实施中补贴幅度确定的决策方法及其实证研究

随着我国对外贸易的迅速发展,贸易摩擦已经由企业的微观层面向政府政策的宏观层面发展,反补贴已经成为国际贸易摩擦的新热点。补贴幅度确定是反补贴政策实施的关键和难点问题。文章基于系统思维,运用管理决策、计量经济等理论与方法,提出了补贴幅度确定的IEC间接弹性系数法,并选取中、美2006年铜版纸案件进行了实证研究并得出相应结论。     

Trade liberalisation,market competition and wage inequality in China's manufacturing sector

Economic reforms of the late 1980s have contributed to rapid economic growth in China. While the overall standard of living has improved, economic growth has also resulted in an increase in income inequality. Rising income inequality can increase social tensions that can impede further economic growth. By making use of firm level panel data, this paper focuses on the impact of increased market competition and trade liberalisation on skilled–unskilled wage inequality in China's manufacturing sector. A theoretical model is used to argue that trade liberalisation and market competition can affect skilled–unskilled wage inequality. Based on this result, an econometric model is specified. The empirical analysis presented in this paper shows that increased trade liberalisation has contributed to an increase in skilled–unskilled wage inequality in China's manufacturing sector. However, increase in market competition has the opposite effect.     

Bidding for Firms with Unknown Characteristics

When a region successfully attracts a firm by offering subsidies, the firm often commits itself to performance targets in terms of employment. In this paper, we interpret these firm‐specific targets as a consequence of incomplete information. We analyze a model of two regions that compete for a firm, assuming that the firm's productivity is ex ante unknown. We show that performance targets often induce overemployment in high‐productivity firms, and that tax credits are often superior to lump‐sum payments. Moreover, when regions differ in wage rates, the low‐wage region wins the bid and has a higher surplus than under complete information. Finally, we show that, under incomplete information, bidding might not lead to efficient firm location.