The impact of earnings expectations on corporate downsizing

Research Summary: We propose that due to financial market pressures, managers are forward‐looking in their search and decision processes and focus on meeting performance targets set by the financial community. Using panel data on S&P 100 companies, we find that pressure felt by management to meet the analyst consensus earnings estimate influences the extent of corporate downsizing. Moreover, our results show that high levels of institutional investor stock ownership and CEO power attenuate managers’ sensitivity to financial market pressures, while high levels of analyst coverage increase their sensitivity. Managerial Summary: In this study we examine how financial market pressures influence managers’ downsizing decisions. We argue that investment analysts’ earnings estimates represent important performance targets to which managers aspire. If firms fail to meet analysts’ expectations, the stock price will suffer. This study shows that managers utilize corporate downsizing to address the potential shortfall between a firm's future performance and the analyst consensus earnings estimate. In addition, we find that managers’ concerns over meeting analysts’ earnings estimates are influenced by various contextual factors such as institutional investor stock ownership, CEO power, and high levels of analyst coverage.     

CEO career horizon,corporate governance,and real options: The role of economic short‐termism

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.     

Activist‐impelled divestitures and shareholder value

Research Summary : This study analyzes how the divestitures that are impelled by activist investors in their campaigns against public corporations affect shareholder value. Using hand‐collected data on the activist campaigns that were launched against and the divestitures that were undertaken by Fortune 500 companies between 2007 and 2015, we find that activist‐impelled divestitures are more positively associated with immediate and longer‐term measures of shareholder value than comparable manager‐led divestitures. These performance differences persist for nearly two years after the completion of these deals. Our results empirically test the idea that firms with agency problems unlock shareholder value when they divest, and support the notion that activist investors fulfill an important external governance function. Our work also opens new research opportunities and offers practical implications as well. Managerial Summary : This study investigates how divestitures that are undertaken at the behest of activist investors affect shareholder value. We find that divestitures that were undertaken under pressure from activist investors are associated with more positive shareholder returns than comparable divestitures that were undertaken voluntarily by managers. These performance differences persist for nearly two years after the completion of these deals, alleviating concerns about the purported short‐termism of activist investors. Our findings suggest that activist investors may fulfill an important governance function by inducing managers to undertake strategies that they might not otherwise pursue, thereby unlocking shareholder value.     

BS in the boardroom: Benevolent sexism and board chair orientations

Research Summary: Though research has focused on the ascent and acceptance of female CEOs, the post‐promotion circumstances female CEOs face remain unclear. In this study, we focus on a critical post‐promotion circumstance: the board chair–CEO relationship. Drawing on the gender stereotype literature, agency theory, and stewardship theory, we posit that firms appointing a female CEO are more likely to adopt a collaboration board chair orientation and less likely to adopt a control orientation. We further predict this effect is attenuated by female board representation. Using a sample of new S&P 1500 CEOs, we find support for our predictions regarding the collaboration orientation but not the control orientation. This research provides some evidence of benevolent sexism in the boardroom, with female directors acting as a countervailing influence. Managerial Summary: Whereas the notion that females encounter a glass ceiling on their path toward CEO is well documented, the conditions female CEOs encounter after promotion are less understood. The relationship between the board chair and the CEO is one important post‐promotion condition. Board chairs can focus on monitoring and/or working together with the CEO. We suggest board chairs are more likely to work in close collaboration with female CEOs than with male CEOs. We attribute this to benevolent sexism, which explains that board chairs are more likely to collaborate with female CEOs because they view females as more conducive to, and in need of, this type of relationship. We also suggest this benevolent sexism is less prevalent when there are more females on the board.     

Do investors actually value sustainability? New evidence from investor reactions to the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI)

Research Summary: Research exploring investor reactions to sustainability has substantial empirical limitations, which we address with a large‐scale longitudinal financial event study of the first global sustainability index, DJSI World. We examine investor reactions to firms from 27 countries over 17 years that are added, deleted, or continue on the index. We find that once relevant controls and comparisons to observationally equivalent firms beyond the index are included, DJSI events have only limited significance and/or materiality. Nonetheless, investors' valuation of sustainability around the world has evolved over time, involving diminishing reactions to U.S. firms and increasing benefits, particularly of continuation on the index, over time. The study highlights the importance of careful analysis and longitudinal global samples in making inferences about the financial effects of social performance. Managerial Summary: The debate about how investors perceive corporate social responsibility (CSR) predates Milton Friedman's famous statement that the only social responsibility of business is to increase profits. Although extensive research has studied whether sustainability contributes to financial performance, we have yet to understand whether investors believe it pays off. This financial event study of reactions to the addition, continuation, and deletion from DJSI World, the first global sustainability index, shows that investors care little about DJSI announcements. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that global assessments of sustainability are converging and that investors may increasingly be valuing continuation on the DJSI, suggesting that firms may gain at least limited benefits from reliable sustainability activities.     

基于西方领导学视角下的权变理论

20世纪60年代以来,西方学者对权变理论进行大量的研究,在领导学的视角下对权变理论进行阐述分析,在对菲德勒的有效领导的权变模型、豪斯的路径-目标理论、赫西和布兰查德的情境领导理论的分析比较基础之上,进一步提出现代领导者在领导活动中应如何树立权变意识、掌握正确的领导方式.     

主流企业理论学者的企业定价理论研究——基于与马克思企业理论的比较视角

马克思最早提出以劳动价值论为基础的企业定价理论;与此同时,主流企业理论的契约理论也不排斥企业定价分析.因此,从一般比较马克思企业理论与科斯主义企业理论入手,剖析当下几个主要的主流企业理论学者企业定价研究流派,可以给出关于企业定价分析的基本框架.这一工作有力启发和佐证了马克思企业理论的"范式重构",既为实现现代契约理论与定价理论的逻辑融合奠定可靠的基础,也进一步为既有马克思企业理论研究及其现代阐释形式的科学扬弃提供有益的思路.     

ANP在价值分析评价中的应用

网络层次分析法(ANP)是在层次分析法(AHP)基础上发展而形成的一种新的实用科学决策分析方法,尤其适合于复杂问题的评价决策。本文介绍了ANP的基本原理和具体步骤,并探讨它在价值分析评价中的应用。     

价值分析:劳动整体创造价值

对人类劳动的认识是经济学认识的基础,我们要站在新的时代高度认识劳动,劳动是劳动主体与劳动客体的对立统一,具有整体性。在确认劳动整体性的前提下,从客观事实出发,以劳动产品为认识起点顺理成章地推论出劳动整体价值论。科学的价值理论是劳动整体价值论。