Joint implementation under asymmetric information and strategic behavior

Joint Implementation (JI) under the Framework Convention on Climate Change means that countries could partly offset their national abatement commitments by investing in CO₂ abatement projects abroad. JI is introduced as a mechanism for achieving a certain global abatement target less costly by separating the commitments from the implementation of measures. This paper studies the design of a JI contract when the investor has incomplete information about the foreign firm which carries out the JI project (the host). Asymmetric information leads to a decrease in the potential cost savings from JI. Furthermore, private information held by the potential host firm could give the firm a significant positive utility of participating in JI projects. The possibility of being a host for a JI project in the future can prevent potential host firms from investing in profitable abatement projects today. The paper analyzes the impact on emissions of CO₂ of strategic behavior among potential hosts for JI projects.     

Hypocrisy pay

Emotional labor—putting on an act asrequired explicitly orimplicitly in work situations-is very often psychologically, emotionally, and mentally damaging to most employees. As for soldiers in wartime who receive combat pay, it is suggested that such employees be specially compensated for their emotional labor with hypocrisy pay. Another solution is to select only those who are immune to such stress for jobs involving emotional labor—an ideal that probably cannot be achieved in all cases. Another assessment is that such special compensation is unwarranted.     

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank

The first six years of ECB monetary policy are examined using a general framework that allows central bankers to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation, output and the interest rate from their reference values. The empirical analysis on synthetic euro‐area data suggests that the objective of price stability is symmetric, whereas the objectives of real activity and interest‐rate stabilizations are not. Output contractions imply larger policy responses than output expansions of the same size, while movements in the interest rate are larger when the level of the interest rate is relatively high. The hypothesis of M3 growth‐rate targeting is rejected.     

Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden

If a regulator is unable to measure firms’ individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective, firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions. When firms behave strategically with respect to the tax-setting regulator, under plausible circumstances their tax burden is lower under an ambient tax, relative to the tax which charges firms on the basis of individual emissions. Firms may prefer the case where the regulator is unable to observe individual firm emissions, even if this asymmetric information causes the regulator to tax each firm on the basis of aggregate emissions.     

The hydroelectricity consumption and economic growth in Asian countries - evidence using an asymmetric cointegration approach

ABSTRACT

This study examines the four commonly tested hypotheses in hydroelectricity consumption – economic growth literature for 12 Asian countries. Our results from a recently developed hidden cointegration technique uncover rich and significant relationships between negative and positive components of the variables under consideration. In particular, we find evidence to support the neutrality hypothesis in five countries (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, and Thailand), the growth hypothesis in four countries (India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan), and both growth and conservation hypotheses in three countries (China, Malaysia, and New Zealand). These findings suggest that appropriate economic policies should be elaborated on the basis of the country’s specific hydroelectricity consumption–growth nexus. Finally, our new evidence suggests that the lack of stable relationship between hydroelectricity consumption and economic growth documented in previous studies for some of these countries could be due to the failure to properly account for the nonlinearity property in the data.     

Measuring the Impact of Asymmetric Information: An Example from Energy Conservation

Asymmetric information has occupied a central role in theoretical microeconomics for almost two decades, but little has been done to ascertain when it matters in practice. The regulatory problem of promoting energy conservation offers an opportunity to ascertain if asymmetric information mattered and to what extent it altered outcomes. Regulators encouraged utilities to promote conservation, and while the regulators could observe conservation prices, they could not observe utilities' promotional efforts. A theoretical model of the regulatory asymmetric information problem yields propositions about the levels of conservation, prices and utility effort, and simulations with realistic parameters are used to determine asymmetric information's impact on these levels.     

基于不对称需求信息的激励机制模型研究

针对由单制造商和单销售商组成的供应链,提出了供应链双方需求信息对称情况下的激励机制模型,并在此基础上建立了供应链双方在需求信息不对称情况下的运作策略模型。制造商通过折扣,运用激励相容机制使销售商诚实申报需求信息,使得供应链利润最大化的同时供应链成员实现双赢。数字试验结果表明:①所提策略是有效的;②该策略不仅能提高制造商利润,而且也能改善销售商的利润。     

投保人与保险人博弈关系分析

博弈论是研究信息不对称问题的一种有效方法 ,其广泛应用于军事、政治、经济等领域。保险业作为信息不对称最为集中的行业 ,投保人与保险人之间的信息不对称现象尤为突出 ,道德风险也极易发生。如何用博弈理论与方法分析这些信息不对称问题 ,并据此提出切实可行的解决方法 ,已成为保险界日益关注的问题。     

The Capital Tax and Welfare Effects from Asymmetric Information on Equity Markets

This paper explores the implications of informational asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors for optimal capital tax rates and welfare. It adopts a model in which asymmetric information implies a home bias in equity. The paper finds that asymmetric information may raise capital tax rates by reducing the marginal cost of taxation. Furthermore, it shows that investors may gain from informational asymmetries. Although asymmetric information increases the uncertainty as perceived by investors, it may also increase tax rates and allow for a higher consumption of public goods. This reflects that asymmetric information may reduce the distortionary effects of competition among governments.     

论诗歌文本的审美张力及其抗译性

含蓄、音韵、形象和意境是诗歌文本固有的美学特质，也是诗歌文本审美张力的表现形式和表现元素。与此同时，其对诗歌文本的翻译也产生了极大的抗译性。译者必须充分调动译语的各种表达方式，最大限度地克服这种抗译性，努力再现原诗的美学特质。