Asymmetric information and target firm returns

This article examines the relationship between asymmetric information and target firm returns in mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We argue that if managers possess favourable (unfavourable) asymmetric information, they will offer, ceteris paribus, a high (low) premium, affecting target firm returns accordingly. We propose several proxies of asymmetric information. The empirical evidence strongly supports our hypothesis as we find that target firm returns are significantly negatively related to asymmetric information regarding synergy gains. Our results are robust after controlling for several target and deal characteristics.     

沪市主要板块指数市场波动实证分析

GARCH—M模型通常应用于预期收益与预期风险密切相关的领域，根据金融理论股票的风险越大，其收益也就越高，故可认为股票收益的指数变动依赖于一个常数。利用GARCH—M模型和E—GARCH—M模型对沪市主要板块指数进行实证分析。结果显示沪市重要板块指数日收益率存在信息非对称效应、高风险对应高回报。     

Bidding off the wall in common value auctions

This paper examines the practice of phantom bidding in common value auctions with asymmetric information. Unlike in private value auctions it is very difficult to profit from phantom bidding even if the auctioneer observes the number of interested bidders. We find that the auctioneer is worse off submitting low bids or mixing between his participation strategies. Phantom bidding can generate higher revenues if a single bidder with a high value estimate is likely to be present at the auction. Systematic observation of an isolated high estimate requires negative correlation across bidders’ information that is atypical in a common value environment.     

信息不对称下的几个经济学实验

实验方法受到经济学界的重视,不对称信息条件下的实验方法研究具有重要现实意义。笔者探讨了若干在不对称信息条件下的经济学实验,包括名誉的作用、信号传递等重要实验,认为不对称信息下的实验的方法及其研究思路值得我国经济学者借鉴和深入研究。     

Sorry Winners

Bidders who receive both “common-value” and “private-value” signals about the value of an auction prize cannot fully infer their opponents’ information from the bidding. So bidders may overestimate the value of the prize and, subsequently, regret winning. When multiple objects are on sale, bidding in an auction provides information relevant to the other auctions, and sequential auctions are more vulnerable to overpayment and winners’ regret than are simultaneous auctions. With information inequality among bidders, the seller’s revenue is influenced by two contrasting effects. On the one hand, simultaneous auctions reduce the winner’s curse of less informed bidders and allow them to bid more aggressively. On the other hand, sequential auctions induce less informed bidders to bid more aggressively in early auctions to acquire information.      

预应力梁高强、超早强混凝土的配制技术

本文介绍了水泥掺减水剂、减水剂和水泥双掺粉煤灰与减水剂和水泥双掺磨细矿碴的三个配合比设计方案,比较了52.5MPa水泥和42.5MPa的配制效果,同时也比较了各种掺合料在不同掺量时的配制强度,配制出了3天达设计等级强度90%,可同时满足预制梁和连续梁施工技术要求的高强、超早强预应力混凝土配合比设计方案。     

Venture Capital Valuation,Partial Adjustment,and Underpricing: Behavioral Bias or Information Production?

Using a sample of venture capital (VC)‐backed initial public offerings (IPOs), we analyze the role played by perceived valuation changes on IPO underpricing. We find that perceived valuation change from the last pre‐IPO VC round to the IPO affects IPO underpricing in a nonlinear way. Further analysis indicates that information‐based theories, not behavioral biases, explain this nonlinearity. We also find that the previously documented partial adjustment effect and its nonlinear impact on IPO underpricing are related to the trajectory of the perceived valuation changes, which stands in stark contrast to prior evidence of the importance of behavioral biases.     

信息不对称与电子商务的发展

本文认为,信息不对称引致的信用缺失是制约电子商务发展的重要因素,发展我国电子商务除了继续加强基础设施建设外,建立和完善社会信用体系,提高信用度是必不可少的重要方面。文章提出,要建立良好的信息沟通渠道和机制,使信息公众化、公开化;提高企业组织化程度;制定企业信用评价制度:健全法制,约束企业交易行为,提高其信用度;消除信息不对称,促进我国电子商务健康发展。     

关于风险投资内在机理的经济学分析

从经济学的角度对风险投资进行了内部和外部两个方面的具体分析。根据交易成本理论和信息不对称理论分析了风险投资的特点 ,揭示了风险投资迅速发展的内在机理 ;依据科斯定理和“囚徒困境”模型 ,阐明了政府积极参与的必要性