Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation

The finite horizon version of D. P. Baron and J. Ferejohn's [1989, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.83, 1181-1206] legislative bargaining model is investigated. With three or more periods, a continuum of divisions is supportable as subgame perfect equilib- ria. There exist equilibria where coalitions larger than a minimal winning coalition receive strictly positive shares. With sufficiently patient players and a sufficiently long horizon, any interior distribution is supportable as an equilibrium. In contrast, a generic uniqueness result applies when introducing heterogenous time preferences. The unique backwards induction equilibrium in the perturbed game is nonstationary, and neither the original (symmetric) nor the perturbed game provides guidance for equilibrium selection in the infinite game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, C78, D72, D78, H49.     

企业高技能型人才培养机制构建新探

随着科学技术的高速发展,我国工业企业高技能型人才出现了严重的短缺现象,应引起有关部门及企业界人士的高度重视.培养大批高级专业技术人才与高级技工人才有利于增强企业的竞争能力,应针对高技能型人才的目前状况,确定相应的培养途径和措施.     

Efficiency wages and union-firm bargaining with private information

We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We show that an increase in the efficiency wage effects does not necessarily increase the wage level at equilibrium, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the firm is stronger than the union and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then an increase in the efficiency wage effects increases for sure the wage at equilibrium.JEL Classification: J41, J50, J52We thank Juan Dolado and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Vincent Vannetelbosch is Chercheur Qualifié at the Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique. The research of Ana Mauleon has been made possible by a fellowship of the Fonds Européen du Développement Economique Régional (FEDER). Financial support from the Belgian French Communitys program Action de Recherches Concertée 99/04-235 (IRES, Université catholique de Louvain) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Growth,Employment and Taxation with Distortions in the Goods and Labour Market

Abstract. This paper analyses taxation in the presence of distortions in goods and labour markets in an endogenous growth model. The government disposes of capital, labour and consumption taxes. It is shown that the market solution leads to suboptimally low levels of growth and employment. However, available tax instruments are sufficient to attain the first‐best growth path in this economy. The paper further explores the relative distortion of capital and labour taxes. For plausible parametrisations of the model, lowering capital taxes dominate reductions in labour taxes in welfare terms.     

On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set

We introduce an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and construct, by an elaboration on a voting paradox, a superadditive four-person non-transferable utility game whose extended bargaining set is empty. It is shown that this extension constitutes an upper hemicontinuous correspondence. We conclude that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-levelled superadditive NTU game may be empty.     

Nonlinear IV unit root tests in panels with cross-sectional dependency

We propose a unit root test for panels with cross-sectional dependency. We allow general dependency structure among the innovations that generate data for each of the cross-sectional units. Each unit may have different sample size, and therefore unbalanced panels are also permitted in our framework. Yet, the test is asymptotically normal, and does not require any tabulation of the critical values. Our test is based on nonlinear IV estimation of the usual augmented Dickey–Fuller type regression for each cross-sectional unit, using as instruments nonlinear transformations of the lagged levels. The actual test statistic is simply defined as a standardized sum of individual IV t-ratios. We show in the paper that such a standardized sum of individual IV t-ratios has limit normal distribution as long as the panels have large individual time series observations and are asymptotically balanced in a very weak sense. We may have the number of cross-sectional units arbitrarily small or large. In particular, the usual sequential asymptotics, upon which most of the available asymptotic theories for panel unit root models heavily rely, are not required. Finite sample performance of our test is examined via a set of simulations, and compared with those of other commonly used panel unit root tests. Our test generally performs better than the existing tests in terms of both finite sample sizes and powers. We apply our nonlinear IV method to test for the purchasing power parity hypothesis in panels.     

A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements

We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a ‘toughest firm principle’ holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control.     

产业政策目标指向型城市人口规模研究

在分析影响城市人口发展因素的基础上,以义乌市为例,从劳动生产率、产业结构变化、高贡献率行业三方面论证了政策变动因素与城市人口发展的关系,提出产业政策目标指向型城市人口规模计算的研究框架和计算步骤。     

门式刚架端板连接节点在加劲肋作用下的性能研究

目前国内端板连接计算方面还没有设计规范,理论方面仍在探讨研究中。我国现行规程关于端板连接承载力的设计计算方法中还没有考虑端板加劲肋对节点承载力的影响。本文使用通用有限元软件ANSYS 10.0综合考虑了三重非线性的影响,同时考虑了螺栓预拉力的影响,对考虑端板厚度、端板加劲肋的设置、螺栓直径、摩擦系数等参数不同的3个系列28个门式刚架梁柱节点试件进行了有限元数值模拟,对连接节点的性能进行了分析研究,提出了设计建议以供参考。     

New Technology in Unionized Firms: Advantages of Mandatory Bargaining

U.S. Labor Law currently allows employers whose work forces are unionized to introduce new technologies without bargaining over the decision to do so. This forces unions to adopt inefficient strategies when negotiating collective bargaining agreements in an effort to minimize the impact of technological change on their members. Allowing unions to bargain over the decision to introduce new technologies would obviate their having to resort to these inefficient strategies. In addition, it might increase the likelihood of employees suggesting alterations in production processes that would increase the rate of technological change. For these reasons, this article advocates amending U.S. labor law to require employers to bargain over the introduction of new technologies.