Domestic entry, optimum-welfare and maximum-revenue tariffs

In this paper, we examine the ranking of the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff under a linear Cournot oligopoly model without and with free entry of domestic firms. We demonstrate that in a regulated entry oligopoly with asymmetric costs, when the marginal cost of the domestic firms exceeds a critical value, the maximum-revenue tariff is higher than the optimum-welfare tariff. We then show that under free entry of domestic firms with asymmetric costs, when the fixed cost gets larger and the domestic firms become fewer, the difference between the optimum-welfare tariff and the maximum-revenue tariff becomes larger.     

Ambiguous Social Welfare Effects of Price Regulation Under Imperfect Competition

Conventional wisdom is that a binding price ceiling increases output and so increases social welfare if imposed on an imperfectly competitive market. However, this paper shows that a price ceiling can be harmful to social welfare even though it increases industry output and consumer surplus. This model can be applied to the pharmaceutical industry under price control in many countries, e.g., U.K., Canada, Germany and Japan.     

Winner-take-all price competition

Summary. We analyze an oligopoly model of homogeneous product price competition that allows for discontinuities in demand and/or costs. Conditions under which only zero profit equilibrium outcomes obtain in such settings are provided. We then illustrate through a series of examples that the conditions provided are “tight” in the sense that their relaxation leads to positive profit outcomes. Received: April 7, 2000; revised version: September 14, 2000     

Can Federal Grants Mitigate Social Competition?

The European economic integration leads to increasing mobilityof factors, thereby threatening the stability of social transferprograms. This article investigates the possibility to achieveby means of voluntary matching grants both the optimal allocationof factors and the optimal level of redistribution in the presenceof factor mobility. We use a fiscal competition model a la Wildasin(1991) in which states differ in their technologies and preferencesfor redistribution. We first investigate a simple process inwhich the federal authority progressively raises the matchinggrants to the district choosing the lowest transfer and alldistricts respond optimally to the resulting change in transfersall around. This process is shown to increase efficiency ofboth production and redistribution. However, it does not guaranteethat all districts gain, nor that an efficient level of redistributionis attained. Assuming complete information among districts,we derive the willingness of each district to match the contributionof other districts and we show that the aggregate willingnessto pay for matching rates converges to zero when both the efficientlevel of redistribution and the efficient allocation of factorsare achieved. We then describe an adjustment process for thematching rates that will lead districts to the efficient outcomeand guarantee that everyone will gain. (JEL Classification:H23, H70)     

Competition to international satellite communications services

Rapid construction of transoceanic fiber optic cables and the successful establishment of private satellite companies with inter-regional or global coverage have fundamentally altered the environment in which international telecommunications capacity is provided. This article presents industry data and discusses market developments which document substantial competition that has emerged in international facilities-based telecommunications. Intelsat, historically the largest provider of international telecommunications capacity, has seen its market position decline rapidly for all services and all major geographic market areas worldwide.     

The Czechoslovak Reform Movement, 1963–1968, A Study in the Theory of Socialism

This paper examines a fundamental issue in the theory of economic organization: the optimal level of market competition. Answers in neoclassical and new institutional economics are identified and critiqued. The analysis shows that selective assumptions in both fields produce distinctly market-favoring and "more competition is better than less" conclusions. The paper generalizes these assumptions and demonstrates organization-favoring and "less competition is better" positions are equally plausible. The paper also argues that part of the market-favoring bias in these fields stems from failure to distinguish between conditions of market failure and organizational success. Given these problems in extant theory, this paper develops an alternative institutional theory of economic organization, drawing principally on ideas of Walton Hamilton and John Commons. This proposed alternative shows that the optimal level of competition occurs at an intermediate level in the competition/cooperation spectrum (a mixed economy) and varies with five key determinants of the economic order.     

The price normalization problem in imperfect competition and the objective of the firm

Summary. General equilibrium models of oligopolistic competition give rise to relative prices only without determining the price level. It is well known that the choice of a numéraire or, more generally, of a normalization rule converting relative prices into absolute prices entails drastic consequences for the resulting set of Nash equilibria when firms are assumed to maximize profits. This is due to the fact that changing the price normalization amounts to altering the objective functions of the firms. Clearly, the objective of a firm must not be based on price normalization rules void of any economic content. In this paper we propose a definition of the objective of a firm, called maximization of shareholders' real wealth, which takes shareholders' demand explicitly into account. This objective depends on relative prices only. Real wealth maxima are shown to exist under certain conditions. Moreover, we consider an oligopolistic market and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in which each firm maximizes the real wealth of its shareholders. Received: July 10, 1997; revised version: July 27, 1998     

Examining technological competition between BMW and Hyundai in the Korean car market

The Korean car market has increased in size. BMW and Hyundai are the top-ranked imported and domestic vehicle brands in Korea, respectively. Thus, it is important to understand these companies and the Korean car market, because technology is most significant in the vehicle industry. In this paper, we compare BMW with Hyundai from the technological perspective. Our research is focused on an analysis of the technological competition between BMW and Hyundai based on their developed technologies. We use all BMW and Hyundai patents from worldwide patent databases to analyse the two companies’ technologies. In addition, we apply statistical methods and machine learning algorithms to the patent analysis. In our conclusion, we show the technological differences and competition between BMW and Hyundai, and find their relative strengths and weaknesses.