国有企业思想政治工作创新机制的路径选择——基于企业社会责任视角

《中共中央关于加强和改进企业思政治工作的通知》中阐述了思想政治工作是企业现代化管理不可缺少的重要组成部分。国有企业作为中国国民经济的重要支柱,长期以来非常重视思想政治工作。通过对国有企业思想政治工作发展历程的回顾,发现其思想政治工作亟待创新,并从三个方面分析了其创新的原因。通过辨析企业思想政治工作和社会责任之间的逻辑关系来说明在国有企业思想政治工作中引入社会责任是一个重要创新。最后提出利用企业社会责任来创新国有企业思想政治工作的路径选择。     

Emission taxes and the adoption of cleaner technologies: The case of environmentally conscious consumers

We model a market with environmentally conscious consumers and a duopoly in which firms consider the adoption of a clean technology. We show that as pollution increases, consumers shift more resources to the environmental activities, thereby affecting negatively the demand faced by the duopoly. This effect generates incentives for firms to adopt the clean technology even in the absence of emissions taxes. When such taxes are considered, our results indicate that the benefit of adopting the clean technology is initially increasing and then decreasing in the emission tax. The range of values for which the emission tax increases this benefit becomes narrower when the consumers’ environmental awareness is stronger.     

Host-country policy – commitment or no-commitment: a theoretical analysis

This paper develops a model of foreign entry strategy and examines welfare of the host-country under two situations - (i) where host-country government commits to the tax policy, (ii) where host-country government does not commit to the tax policy. It turns out that under the non-committed government policy the foreign firm does not prefer to hold equity share in the domestic project. The host-country welfare, however, is more under the committed government policy than the non-committed government policy when the foreign firm has sufficiently higher bargaining power. The possibility of technology choice by the foreign firm reduces the range of bargaining power of the foreign firm over which the host-country welfare is more under the committed policy compared to the non-committed policy.     

Cournot Competition and Hit-and-Run Entry and Exit in a Teaching Experiment

Instructors can use a computerized experiment to introduce students to imperfect competition in courses on introductory economics, industrial organization, game theory, and strategy and management. In addition to introducing students to strategic thinking in general, the experiment serves to demonstrate that profits of a firm fall as the number of competitors is increased in a market and that firms enter profitable markets. The authors have used the experiment in undergraduate classes on strategy and management as well as in master of business administration courses with great success.     

A Classroom Tariff-Setting Game

The author outlines a classroom tariff-setting game that allows students to explore the consequences of import tariffs imposed by large countries (countries able to influence world prices). Groups of students represent countries, which are organized into trading pairs. Each group's objective is to maximize welfare by choosing an appropriate ad valorem tariff that may be changed intermittently throughout the game. The game is built on a computable general-equilibrium model, which allows each nation's utility and terms of trade under alternative tariff regimes to be expressed quantitatively. The exercise encourages students to consider terms-of-trade improvements and efficiency losses resulting from large-country tariffs and provides a framework to discuss the Nash equilibrium of a tariff war. The game is a useful supplement to traditional teaching methods.     

Stochastic Route Choice Equilibrium Assignment for Travelers with Heterogeneous Regret Aversions

Most route choice models assume that people are completely rational. Recently, regret theory has attracted researchers’ attentions because of its power to depict real travel behavior. This paper proposes a multiclass stochastic user equilibrium assignment model by using regret theory. All users are differentiated by their own regret aversion. The route travel disutility for users of each class is defined as a linear combination of the travel time and anticipated regret. The proposed model is formulated as a variational inequality problem and solved by using the self-regulated averaging method. The numerical results show that users’ regret aversion indeed influences their route choice behavior and that users with high regret aversion are more inclined to change route choice when the traffic congestion degree varies.     

Altruism and the Economic Values of Environmental and Social Policies

Altruism is a type of non-use value which can have different definitions depending on the type of goods entering the utility function of the altruists and their expectations about the contributions of others. The purpose of this paper is to measure the trade-offs between different types of altruist values originating from social and environmental policies. Environmental policies are concerned with reducing health effects from a power plant while social policies involve both the attainment of public facilities for education and leisure and an increase in the income of the affected population. The empirical application utilizes a choice experiment technique which allows for valuation of multiple goods. Health effects are decomposed into the values of the risk of becoming ill, the duration of the episodes and the limitations imposed by illness. Altruist values are elicited from a population that is not affected by pollution. Results show that altruism is significant for policies directed to reducing health effects and improving the income level of the affected population, whereas there is egoism for a policy aimed at improving public facilities in the polluted suburb. The value of altruism is significantly influenced by the expectations of net benefits to be received by the affected population.     

Joining a Queue or Staying Out: Effects of Information Structure and Service Time on Arrival and Staying Out Decisions

We study a class of single-server queueing systems with a finite population size, FIFO queue discipline, and no balking or reneging. In contrast to the predominant assumptions of queueing theory of exogenously determined arrivals and steady state behavior, we investigate queueing systems with endogenously determined arrival times and focus on transient rather than steady state behavior. When arrival times are endogenous, the resulting interactive decision process is modeled as a non-cooperative n-person game with complete information. Assuming discrete strategy spaces, the mixed-strategy equilibrium solution for groups of n = 20 agents is computed using a Markov chain method. Using a 2 × 2 between-subject design (private vs. public information by short vs. long service time), arrival and staying out decisions are presented and compared to the equilibrium predictions. The results indicate that players generate replicable patterns of behavior that are accounted for remarkably well on the aggregate, but not individual, level by the mixed-strategy equilibrium solution unless congestion is unavoidable and information about group behavior is not provided.JEL Classification: C71, C92, D81     

现代生物技术的特性与企业技术选择

本文从现代生物技术的特性入手,研究企业现代生物技术选择的影响因素和原则,提出了企业现代生物技术选择动态模型,进而对我国企业的现代生物技术选择提出对策建议,对探索现代生物技术管理的规律以及加速我国生物技术产业发展具有指导意义。     

品牌、转化效率与有效率的生产效率

有效率的生产效率,是由厂商外部消费者的选择效率的高低来决定的。如果没有市场中消费者的认可、选择并且购买,厂商的生产效率再高,生产出来的产品不能实现其价值,那么厂商的生产效率也是无效的。提出“有效率的生产效率”（EPE）概念,使用厂商产品转化效率指标衡量厂商有效率的生产效率的高低,并使用BCDE模型详细分析了品牌影响厂商有效率的生产效率的机制。