Regulation and competition in the European mobile communications industry: An examination of the implementation of mobile number portability

Over the past two decades, the mobile communications industry has seen a considerable drop in the consumer switching charges made by service providers in order to promote effective competition and ensure a level playing field for new market entrants. Mobile Number Portability (MNP) is an important regulatory measure taken to reduce switching costs, and it is believed to play an important role in fostering competition in the mobile market. MNP implementation has varied significantly across European Union countries, particularly with respect to porting time and customer fees, both of which are important factors when deciding whether to switch to another provider. The research examines the effects of MNP implementation on competition in the European mobile communications industry. The study findings indicate that subscriber churn rates are negatively affected by both the level of charges levied on subscribers wishing to maintain their current number (porting) when switching mobile providers and the length of time required to switch. The implications of the effectiveness of MNP regulation for competition in the mobile communications industry are discussed.     

Estimating the social cost of pesticide use: An assessment from acute poisoning in Brazil

The intensive use of pesticides in countries like Brazil has ignored structural and institutional shortfalls, such as the lack of workforce training for the new, difficult to implement technologies, and the institutional vulnerability of the environmental protection, health, and safety sectors. As a result we have “invisible” or social, environmental and health costs which end up being socialised with the farmer, in general, having no incentives to recognise and internalise them. This study is intended to review and develop this problem in the light of the Brazilian reality. To this end, we make use of an empirical exercise to illustrate estimation of the social cost associated with acute poisoning by pesticide using the PREVS/IBGE data (Harvest Forecast Research) in the state of Paraná, Brazil. The results suggest that, for maize, the costs of acute poisoning could represent 64% of the benefits of using herbicides and insecticides, and, in the best of hypotheses, when some risk factors are eliminated, they may reach 8% of the benefits of the use of these products. Similarly, when we examine future scenarios for five and ten years, we find less encouraging results, as in ten years the costs of acute poisoning could reach around 85% of the benefit of using insecticides and herbicides for maize. However, there is the encouraging news that, if preventive measures were taken during this time, the gains would be considerable, about 6.5 times greater. We conclude that an assessment of the real benefits involved with pesticides in Brazil is required, principally in regard to the smallholder, where farmers need more training in the use — or even the elimination — of these hazardous substances. There are sustainable technological options available which are economically efficient, especially if we consider the social, environmental and health costs. In this context it is worth highlighting the role of regulatory measures as a mechanism which can reorient generation of negative external costs through the reduction of current incentives in the socialisation of private costs.     

Search, common knowledge, and competition

This paper analyzes the effects of buyer search costs and seller private and common knowledge on seller competition. It shows that lack of common knowledge results in the equilibrium price continuously decreasing to the perfectly competitive one as buyer search costs for price decrease from positive for all buyers to zero for all buyers, even if each market agent's uncertainty (in the private knowledge) is small. At the same time, if the uncertainty of each seller about buyer valuations is small, the effects of a small change in the search costs or of information structure on pricing may be large (but continuous).     

Complementarity, coordination and compatibility: The role of fixed costs in the economics of systems

We analyze industry equilibrium and incentive to compatibility when goods produced by different producers generate utility only when consumed as component parts of a system. We assume the presence of two systems, each composed of some basic component and a set of differentiated complementary products. The combination of complementarity between the two components of the system and of fixed costs in the production of the complementary product results in a form of network effect. We focus on the role played by the size of the fixed costs in the production of the complementary products in determining the size of this system effect and, by this means, the structure and types of equilibria that may be observed: monopolistic or duopolistic, symmetric or asymmetric. We also highlight the consequence of the same fixed costs for the private and social incentives to render the systems compatible.     

The damage costs of climate change toward more comprehensive calculations

It is argued that estimating the damage costs of a certain benchmark climate change is not sufficient. What is needed are cost functions and confidence intervals. Although these are contained in the integrated models and their technical manuals, this paper brings them into the open in order to stimulate discussion. After briefly reviewing the benchmark climate change damage costs, region-specific cost functions are presented which distinguish tangible from intangible losses and the losses due to a changing climate from those due to a changed climate. Furthermore, cost functions are assumed to be quadratic, as an approximation of the unknown but presumably convex functions. Results from the damage module of the integrated climate economy modelFUND are presented. Next, uncertainties are incorporated and expected damages are calculated. It is shown that because of convex loss functions and right-skewed uncertainties, the risk premium is substantial, calling for more action than analysis based on best-guess estimates. The final section explores some needs for further scientific research.     

股权激励与代理成本

传统以管理费用率作为代理成本的替代不能恰当地反映管理者在职消费和职务侵占的真实水平,本文用经过Jones模型纠正的费用率作为代理成本的替代,考察了所有权性质、总经理持股与否及持股比例对代理成本的影响。本文提供了私有制下总经理适当持股有利于降低代理成本的可靠证据,为中国上市公司即将展开的股权激励计划提供证据的支持。     

Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm’s output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm’s output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm’s owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.     

我国最低工资标准的就业效应——基于全国和地区的实证研究

利用1996年～2007年全国27个省、直辖市、自治区的面板数据模型,考察了最低工资标准对就业的影响。实证结果表明,最低工资标准的提高对全国总体就业有负影响,但影响力度很小。进一步的地区分析表明,最低工资标准的提高对东、西部地区的就业有负影响,对中部地区的就业则无显著性影响。最后给出了相关的政策建议。     

THE USE OF CONTRACT BY GOVERNMENT AND ITS AGENTS

Given that the provision of a service is being controlled by the state, the decision whether to contract out that service provision to the private sector is essentially a business decision. A number of economic advantages and disadvantages need to be offset against each other. Governments are poorly placed to make such decisions and it is no surprise that PPPs are often inefficient and steered by political objectives.     

Labour adjustment costs: Estimation of a dynamic discrete choice model using panel data for Greek manufacturing firms

In this paper we estimate a dynamic structural model of employment at firm level. Our dataset consists of a balanced panel of 2790 Greek manufacturing firms. The empirical evidence of this dataset stresses three important stylized facts: (a) there are periods in which firms decide not to change their labour input, (b) there are periods of large employment changes (lumpy nature of labour adjustment) and (c) the commonality is employment spikes to be followed by smooth and low employment growth periods. Following Cooper and Haltiwanger [Cooper, R.W. and Haltiwanger, J. “On the Nature of Capital Adjustment Costs”, Review of Economic Studies, 2006; 73(3); 611–633], we consider a dynamic discrete choice model of a general specification of adjustment costs including convex, non-convex and “disruption of production” components. We use a method of simulated moments procedure to estimate the structural parameters. Our results indicate considerable fixed costs in the Greek employment adjustment.