企业技术创新的新趋势——合作创新

文章从技术发展的特征,现代企业生产方式的变革,全球化经济发展趋势,论证了合作创新正成为企业技术创新的新趋势,分析了合作创新的优势。提出了我国企业发展合作创新的策略。     

中国绿色食品物流市场发展与产业竞争力提升

在分析我国绿色食品物流市场发展特点的基础上,指出应从观念转变和发展战略入手,利用合作竞争,发展我国绿色食品物流市场,提升产业竞争力,并从政策导向、物流企业的合作竞争以及盈利模式等方面提出了发展绿色食品物流的对策.     

基于博弈论的建设工程投标报价研究

为使建设工程投标者能够中标并获得较高收益，就要讲究投标报价的策略和技巧。在与传统投标报价模型的比较之下，文章把博弈论运用到投标报价的决策中，建立了非合作性博弈模型和静态贝叶斯博弈模型，提出了投标者应采取的最优报价水平，进而得出了博弈思想的运用使报价更具动态性，更符合招投标实际操作的结论。     

Union games: technological unemployment

Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, C72. Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper.     

The lexicographic composition of abstract games

The lexicographic composition of reflexive and complete binary relations (which are often called abstract games) is studied. The necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained for a lexicographic composition of quasi transitive relations to be quasi transitive.The case of acyclicity of lexicographic composition of two relations is also investigated. Received: September 25, 2000; revised version: November 28, 2000     

Dynamic R&D competition with memory

We consider a differential game of R&D competition and explore the impact of rivalry on the firms' investment behavior over time. Using closed-loop strategies and hence allowing for strategic interactions among rival firms we show that R&D spending by the individual competitor is increased due to competition in the race for priority. This leads us to argue that competitive encounters enhance R&D activities at the same time as increasing efficiency in the race for a technological breakthrough.     

Collusion in one-shot second-price auctions

Summary. Most of the literature on collusive behavior in auctions ignores two important issues that make collusion difficult to sustain at least in one-shot interactions: the detection of cheating and the verification of bids. Colluding bidders may deceive each other by using shill bidders. Also, if the identities of the bidders and their bids are not published then it would be difficult to verify the bid of a colluding bidder. This paper addresses these problems in one shot second price auctions where one bidder offers another bidder a side payment in exchange for not participating in the auction, while the number of other bidders is stochastic. In spite of the barriers to collusion mentioned above, a simple side payment mechanism which depends only on the auction price is introduced. It induces a successful collusion, eliminates the verification problem, provides no incentive for the use of shill bidders and guarantees that the proponent obtains ex-post non-negative payoff. The colluding bidders are ex-ante strictly better off compared with the competitive case, irrespective of their types.Received: 27 November 2002, Revised: 28 January 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D44, D82.Yair Tauman: Correspondence toWe would like to thank an anonymous referee for very valuable comments and suggestions that significantly improved the paper. We thank Shmuel Zamir for a helpful discussion.     

Finding a Nash equilibrium in spatial games is an NP-complete problem

Summary. We consider the class of (finite) spatial games. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player has a payoff of at least k is NP-complete as a function of the number of players.Received: 15 September 2002, Revised: 9 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72.Correspondence to: H. HallerWe thank a referee for helpful comments. The hospitality of the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, and the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, is gratefully acknowledged by the third author.     

产业集群内企业之间合作创新的理论分析

集群有利于降低合作创新的交易成本、获得合作伙伴的隐性知识.企业选择合作创新,其动机主要是解决技术的外部性、分担研究开发成本和风险、获得合作伙伴的缄默性知识、实现技术转移以及获得巨大的国内和国际市场等.对合作创新的博弈分析表明,企业要形成合作创新的联盟,该联盟必须满足超可加性;否则,其成员没有动机形成联盟,已经形成的联盟也将面临解散的威胁.合理的利益分配方案是合作创新的基础.该方案是合作各方讨价还价的结果.     

Trees and decisions

Summary. The traditional model of sequential decision making, for instance, in extensive form games, is a tree. Most texts define a tree as a connected directed graph without loops and a distinguished node, called the root. But an abstract graph is not a domain for decision theory. Decision theory perceives of acts as functions from states to consequences. Sequential decisions, accordingly, get conceptualized by mappings from sets of states to sets of consequences. Thus, the question arises whether a natural definition of a tree can be given, where nodes are sets of states. We show that, indeed, trees can be defined as specific collections of sets. Without loss of generality the elements of these sets can be interpreted as representing plays. Therefore, the elements can serve as states and consequences at the same time.Received: 23 January 2003, Revised: 2 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D70. Correspondence to: Klaus RitzbergerWe are grateful to Larry Blume, Ariel Rubinstein, Jörgen Weibull, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at the universities of Vienna, Salamanca, and Heidelberg for helpful comments. Financial support from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under project P15281 is also gratefully acknowledged.