Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden

If a regulator is unable to measure firms’ individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective, firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions. When firms behave strategically with respect to the tax-setting regulator, under plausible circumstances their tax burden is lower under an ambient tax, relative to the tax which charges firms on the basis of individual emissions. Firms may prefer the case where the regulator is unable to observe individual firm emissions, even if this asymmetric information causes the regulator to tax each firm on the basis of aggregate emissions.     

Absorbing Team Games

A team is a group of people having the same motives but possibly different available actions. A team game is a game where two teams face each other. An absorbing game is a repeated game where some of the entries are absorbing, in the sense that once they are chosen the play terminates, and all future payoffs are equal to the payoff at the stage of termination. We prove that every absorbing team game has an equilibrium payoff and that there are -equilibrium profiles with cyclic structure. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.     

A theory of sequential reciprocity

Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin [Amer. Econ. Rev. 83 (1993) 1281] develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His theory is developed for normal form games, and he abstracts from information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation. We develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive games in which the sequential structure of a strategic situation is made explicit, and propose a new solution concept—sequential reciprocity equilibrium—for which we prove an equilibrium existence result. The model is applied in several examples, and it is shown that it captures very well the intuitive meaning of reciprocity as well as certain qualitative features of experimental evidence.     

亚丁景区旅游开发SWOT分析及开发模式探析

在西部大开发战略实施过程中，旅游开发被视为第三产业中的支柱产业来发展，而位于四川西南部的“香格里拉之魂”——稻城亚丁景区旅游开发正处于这一轮开发的浪潮之中。作者利用目前国际上流行的战略分析方法——SWOT分析法对亚丁景区旅游开发条件进行了分析，综合当今国内外旅游资源开发的成功经验，试提出一种旅游开发模式，作为学术上的探讨。     

Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities

I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out—surprisingly—to be a very restrictive class of games.     

Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

We characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated matrix-game with imperfect monitoring and complete information. For two-player games, a characterization is provided by Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (Repeated games, Part A (1994) CORE DP 9420), mainly using Lehrer's (Math. Operations Res. (1992) 175) result for correlated equilibria. The main result of this paper is to extend this characterization to the n-player case. The proof of the characterization relies on an analogy with an auxiliary 2-player repeated game with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. We use Kohlberg's (Int. J. Game Theory (1975) 7) result to construct explicitly a canonical communication device for each communication equilibrium payoff.     

制度约束、利益博弈与农村信用社改革

我国农信社体制的变迁与发展，是数十年来各种社会经济问题的集中反映，也是制度约束的必然结果．由此构成了中国农村信用社体制改革问题的艰巨性与复杂性。从利益博弈的角度分析，每一轮农信社体制的改革都将引发一场利益关系的博弈，博弈的均衡点就是此轮改革的结局。希望在农村信用社改革的框架之内解决农村金融服务体系的全部或大部分问题是不切实际的。     

Drama theory and its relation to game theory. Part 2: Formal model of the resolution process

In a drama, characters' preferences and options change under the pressure of pre-play negotiations. Thus they undergo change and development. A formal model of dramatic transformation is presented that shows how the core of a drama is transformed by the interaction among the characters into a strict, strong equilibrium to which they all aspire. The process is seen to be driven by actors' reactions to various paradoxes of rationality.     

Drama theory and its relation to game theory. Part 1: Dramatic resolution vs. Rational solution

Drama theory differs from game theory in that it does not regard actors' preferences and perceived opportunities as fixed, but as capable of being changed by the actors themselves under the pressure of pre-play negotiations. Thus characters in a drama undergo change and development. A manyperson, multiphase theory of dramatic transformation is presented, showing how thecore of a drama (in the sense of game theory) is transformed by the interaction between the characters into a strict, strong equilibrium to which they all aspire. The process of dramatic transformation is shown to be driven by actors' reactions to various paradoxes of rationality; it is proved that when all these paradoxes have been overcome, a full dramatic resolution has been reached, satisfying actors' emotional and moral demands, as well as the demands of rationality.     

Congestion effects in a public-good economy

This paper considers a public-good economy with congestion, where participants jointly produce a public good from input of a private good. This economic model gives rise to a transferable-utility game, the profit game, that depends on consumer preferences and a congestion parameter. The simplicity of the game allows the maximum level of congestion that guarantees the nonemptiness of the core of the economy to be determined. It is known that the sustainability of the Lindahl equilibrium in the core of the economy depends on the distribution of profits. In this paper two distributions of profits are compared: the Lindahl solution and the marginal-contribution solution. The latter is more often in the core than the Lindahl solution which in turn Lorenz-dominates the marginal-contribution solution.