Drama theory and its relation to game theory. Part 1: Dramatic resolution vs. Rational solution

Drama theory differs from game theory in that it does not regard actors' preferences and perceived opportunities as fixed, but as capable of being changed by the actors themselves under the pressure of pre-play negotiations. Thus characters in a drama undergo change and development. A manyperson, multiphase theory of dramatic transformation is presented, showing how thecore of a drama (in the sense of game theory) is transformed by the interaction between the characters into a strict, strong equilibrium to which they all aspire. The process of dramatic transformation is shown to be driven by actors' reactions to various paradoxes of rationality; it is proved that when all these paradoxes have been overcome, a full dramatic resolution has been reached, satisfying actors' emotional and moral demands, as well as the demands of rationality.     

Congestion effects in a public-good economy

This paper considers a public-good economy with congestion, where participants jointly produce a public good from input of a private good. This economic model gives rise to a transferable-utility game, the profit game, that depends on consumer preferences and a congestion parameter. The simplicity of the game allows the maximum level of congestion that guarantees the nonemptiness of the core of the economy to be determined. It is known that the sustainability of the Lindahl equilibrium in the core of the economy depends on the distribution of profits. In this paper two distributions of profits are compared: the Lindahl solution and the marginal-contribution solution. The latter is more often in the core than the Lindahl solution which in turn Lorenz-dominates the marginal-contribution solution.     

从语用学的角度分析英语广告语言的特点

本文从大量的英语广告实例入手,探讨英语广告语言的词汇、句式和修辞等三大特点,并从语用学的角度对英语广告语言的语用基础进行分析。     

Risk Awareness of Interpersonal Trust and Entrepreneurship in China: Evidence from Survey Data

This paper aims to build a theoretical framework for the influence of risk awareness of interpersonal trust (RAIT) on entrepreneurship, and explores the influence of RAIT on entrepreneurship with the micro survey data from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2010–2013. The study found that, individuals with higher level of RAIT, their probability of starting new business will increase significantly, and with every increase of RAIT level, the probability of business venturing increase almost 4.0%. No mediation effects of information screening and cooperative mechanism are found in the relationship between RAIT and entrepreneurship. Moreover, during the venturing process, risks accompanying interpersonal trust cannot be reduced by social input; the reduction occurs only in eastern China where the economic system and the industrial development standards are more comprehensive and mature. This paper contributes to the literatures in the following two areas: it provides new evidence on how to deal with risks in the entrepreneurship process that accompanying interpersonal trust; meanwhile, it provides an explanatory mechanism on how the risk awareness affects business venturing.     

Good signals gone bad: Dynamic signalling with switched effort levels

This paper examines signalling when the sender exerts effort and receives benefits over time. Receivers only observe a noisy public signal about the effort, which has no intrinsic value.The modelling of signalling in a dynamic context gives rise to novel equilibrium outcomes. In some equilibria, a sender with a higher cost of effort exerts strictly more effort than his low-cost counterpart. The low-cost type can compensate later for initial low effort, but this is not worthwhile for a high-cost type. The interpretation of a given signal switches endogenously over time, depending on which type the receivers expect to send it.     

The geometry of voting power: Weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids

Suppose legislators represent districts of varying population, and their assembly's voting rule is intended to implement the principle of one person, one vote. How should legislators' voting weights appropriately reflect these population differences? An analysis requires an understanding of the relationship between voting weight and some measure of the influence that each legislator has over collective decisions. We provide three new characterizations of weighted voting that embody this relationship. Each is based on the intuition that winning coalitions should be close to one another. The locally minimal and tightly packed characterizations use a weighted Hamming metric. Ellipsoidal separability employs the Euclidean metric: a separating hyper-ellipsoid contains all winning coalitions, and omits losing ones. The ellipsoid's proportions, and the Hamming weights, reflect the ratio of voting weight to influence, measured as Penrose–Banzhaf voting power. In particular, the spherically separable rules are those for which voting powers can serve as voting weights.     

Persuasion with communication costs

This paper studies strategic transmission of verifiable information with reporting costs that continuously increase in the precision of the report. Contrary to previous literature, it is shown that the unraveling result first derived by Milgrom (1981) is relatively robust to costly reporting. A separating equilibrium exists even with arbitrarily high reporting costs. Intuitively, the costs work as a signaling device and a combination of disclosure of information and costly signaling accomplishes full separation. With reporting costs there are typically multiple equilibria. For example, a pooling equilibrium exists if and only if the reporting costs are high. Finally, a separating equilibrium exists when the receiver has to make a costly effort in order to access the information in a report, as long as this cost is not too high.     

完善农村信用社小额信贷市场营销策略的思考

农村信用社作为农村金融改革中推广小额贷款的主力军,对于促进农业结构调整和农民增收,改善农村信用环境,发展地方经济起到了积极的作用。为进一步完善农村信用社小额信贷市场,其营销策略是:加强队伍建设,提升营销水平;强化奖惩激励,促进积极作为;创新服务品牌,赢得客户青睐;细分市场客户,区别贷款价格;实施诚信战略,优化营销环境。     

Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices

An apex game consists of one apex player and a set of minor players. We identify two key properties of apex games and use them to introduce the class of general apex games. We derive players' preferences over winning coalitions by applying strongly monotonic power indices on such a game and all its subgames and investigate whether there are core stable coalitions in the induced hedonic coalition formation game. Besides several general results, in particular, we develop conditions on the game for the Shapley–Shubik index, the Banzhaf index, and the normalized Banzhaf index.     

新型农村金融组织与县域经济协同发展研究

从当前发展现状来看,新型农村金融组织与县域经济未能互生互长,协同发展.在此情形下,建立新型农村金融组织与县域经济协同发展机制对推进两者互动发展有着重要的实践指导意义.在对新型农村金融组织与县域经济协同发展概述的基础上,分析两者协同发展要素,探讨两者协同发展的一般模式,深入研究两者协同的理想模式——门槛条件下新型金融组织深化的内生增长模型,并制定出两者协同发展路径.