中国网络游戏产业发展现状的实证研究

近年来,中国的网游产业迅猛发展,被公认为潜力无限的朝阳产业。文章以实际数据分析了中国网游产业的用户规模、市场状况,发现网游产业发展遵循雁行模式且目前处于成长期,其国产游戏占主流,经营模式以增值收费为主。最后,文章就青少年沉迷、经营模式、游戏同质化、人才匮乏与虚拟财产交易等问题提出了建议。     

行业内不对称地位的外资企业与内资企业的动态博弈及启示

外商直接投资企业在我国一些行业内处于强势地位,这对内资企业提出了严峻的挑战。本文从行业的层面将处于强弱不对称地位的外商直接投资企业与内资企业放在一个相互作用的系统中,采用动态博弈的方法定量研究在我国一些行业的外资企业与内资企业所处地位的不对称性对双方得益的影响,并由此得出结论与启示。     

Game-theoretic foundations of monetary equilibrium

According to theory, money supports trade in a world without enforcement and, in particular, in large societies, where gift-exchange is unsustainable. It is demonstrated that, in fact, monetary equilibrium breaks down in the absence of adequate enforcement institutions and it collapses as societies that lack external enforcement grow large. This unique result is derived by unveiling the existence of a tacit enforcement assumption in the literature that explains the advantages from monetary exchange, and by integrating monetary theory with the theory of repeated games and social norms.     

Guarantees,transparency and the interdependency between sovereign and bank default risk

Bank debt guarantees have traditionally been viewed as costless measures to prevent bank runs. However, as recent experiences in some European countries have demonstrated, guarantees may link the coordination problems of bank and sovereign creditors and induce a functional interdependence between the likelihoods of a government default and bank illiquidity. Employing a global-game approach, we model this link, showing the existence and uniqueness of the joint equilibrium and derive its comparative statics properties. In equilibrium, the guarantee reduces the probability of a bank run, while it increases the probability of a sovereign default. The latter erodes the guarantee’s credibility and thus its effectiveness ex ante. By setting the guarantee optimally, the government balances these two effects in order to minimize expected costs of crises. Our results show that the optimal guarantee has clear-cut welfare gains which are enhanced through policies that promote greater balance sheet transparency.     

新型集体经济的基本理念和改革实践

本文从理论和实际的结合上,对我国发展集体经济的认识与实践进行历史和现实的思考,阐述了以新型集体经济的理念改造传统集体企业,发展多种形式的集体经济,坚持和完善社会主义初级阶段的基本经济制度,推进中国特色社会主义事业发展的理论思路。     

Good signals gone bad: Dynamic signalling with switched effort levels

This paper examines signalling when the sender exerts effort and receives benefits over time. Receivers only observe a noisy public signal about the effort, which has no intrinsic value.The modelling of signalling in a dynamic context gives rise to novel equilibrium outcomes. In some equilibria, a sender with a higher cost of effort exerts strictly more effort than his low-cost counterpart. The low-cost type can compensate later for initial low effort, but this is not worthwhile for a high-cost type. The interpretation of a given signal switches endogenously over time, depending on which type the receivers expect to send it.     

The geometry of voting power: Weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids

Suppose legislators represent districts of varying population, and their assembly's voting rule is intended to implement the principle of one person, one vote. How should legislators' voting weights appropriately reflect these population differences? An analysis requires an understanding of the relationship between voting weight and some measure of the influence that each legislator has over collective decisions. We provide three new characterizations of weighted voting that embody this relationship. Each is based on the intuition that winning coalitions should be close to one another. The locally minimal and tightly packed characterizations use a weighted Hamming metric. Ellipsoidal separability employs the Euclidean metric: a separating hyper-ellipsoid contains all winning coalitions, and omits losing ones. The ellipsoid's proportions, and the Hamming weights, reflect the ratio of voting weight to influence, measured as Penrose–Banzhaf voting power. In particular, the spherically separable rules are those for which voting powers can serve as voting weights.     

Persuasion with communication costs

This paper studies strategic transmission of verifiable information with reporting costs that continuously increase in the precision of the report. Contrary to previous literature, it is shown that the unraveling result first derived by Milgrom (1981) is relatively robust to costly reporting. A separating equilibrium exists even with arbitrarily high reporting costs. Intuitively, the costs work as a signaling device and a combination of disclosure of information and costly signaling accomplishes full separation. With reporting costs there are typically multiple equilibria. For example, a pooling equilibrium exists if and only if the reporting costs are high. Finally, a separating equilibrium exists when the receiver has to make a costly effort in order to access the information in a report, as long as this cost is not too high.     

完善农村信用社小额信贷市场营销策略的思考

农村信用社作为农村金融改革中推广小额贷款的主力军,对于促进农业结构调整和农民增收,改善农村信用环境,发展地方经济起到了积极的作用。为进一步完善农村信用社小额信贷市场,其营销策略是:加强队伍建设,提升营销水平;强化奖惩激励,促进积极作为;创新服务品牌,赢得客户青睐;细分市场客户,区别贷款价格;实施诚信战略,优化营销环境。     

Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices

An apex game consists of one apex player and a set of minor players. We identify two key properties of apex games and use them to introduce the class of general apex games. We derive players' preferences over winning coalitions by applying strongly monotonic power indices on such a game and all its subgames and investigate whether there are core stable coalitions in the induced hedonic coalition formation game. Besides several general results, in particular, we develop conditions on the game for the Shapley–Shubik index, the Banzhaf index, and the normalized Banzhaf index.