高校践行代表先进文化的要求之我见

高等院校作为党领导下的传承知识、智慧和文明的园地 ,在践行代表先进文化方面责任重大。高校必须大力弘扬科学精神 ,推进社会主义精神文明建设 ;培养学生的创新精神 ;加强高校的理论研究 ,增强针对性和可行性 ,推进科教兴国。     

审计报告改革对权益资本成本的影响研究

传统审计报告的模式化披露无法满足投资者价值信息获取需求,“审计期望差距”问题日益严重。基于2016年12月颁布的新审计报告准则,选取A+H股上市公司为研究对象,考察审计报告改革对上市公司权益资本成本的影响。结果表明,审计报告改革会显著降低权益资本成本。进一步发现,关键审计事项披露数目越多,权益资本成本越低;审计报告改革降低权益资本成本的效应在信息不对称程度高、内部控制水平低、媒体环境差以及代理冲突高的公司中更为明显。这不仅为审计报告改革的经济后果提供了证据,而且对于提高投资者决策效率以及维护资本市场秩序也具有一定的现实意义。     

考虑社会责任的异质有限理性制造商产量博弈均衡复杂动力学分析

通过考虑消费者剩余,企业利润中引入承担社会责任参数,建立了具有异质性有限理性的古诺寡头博弈竞争模型,分析利润相关参数对系统博弈均衡稳定性的影响,并进行了数值模拟。研究表明单方有限理性系统比双方有限理性系统稳定。产品成本超过一定阈值应避免产量竞争,可以通过承担社会责任,提升产品价格来增加利润,但当企业承担社会责任增加时,系统稳定性降低。此时降低调整产量的速度,观察竞争对手产量调整速度,避免系统进入混沌状态,失去最优产量优势。     

外资进入对本土企业风险承担的影响：资本逐利还是风险规避

外资自由化作为我国资本市场开放的重要内容,在促进境内外资本要素互联互通的同时,也深刻影响着微观企业行为。以我国2007—2017年A股上市公司作为研究样本,实证检验外资进入对我国本土企业风险承担的影响。研究发现：外资进入能够显著提升企业的风险承担水平。进一步地,外资进入对企业风险承担的促进效应在融资约束严重、股权集中度更高和市场化进程缓慢地区的企业中更加显著。此外,在不同资本市场开放水平,外资进入对企业风险承担的作用存在明显差异。     

环境不确定性与企业党员高管的创新“稳定器”效应

本文选取2010—2019年A股上市公司作为研究样本,研究高管党员身份在企业创新面临环境不确定带来冲击时的“稳定器”效应及其内在机制。研究发现：环境不确定性的提升抑制了企业创新,高管党员身份能通过降低研发支出挤出程度和优化融资环境两个渠道有效缓解环境不确定性的创新抑制效应。党员高管的创新“稳定器”效应更多地体现在环境不确定性增加的阶段,在平稳发展时期,应平衡好党组织参与企业治理与企业创新发展自主权的关系。全面从严治党战略的实施使党员高管决策风格更加稳健、保守,降低了企业风险承担,同时强化了面临环境不确定性时高管党员身份的“创新稳定器”作用。在当前企业创新面临高环境不确定性的大背景下,本文研究一方面丰富了党组织参与创新治理的理论依据,另一方面为高不确定性背景下优化企业创新环境提供了可实践路径。     

公司治理思想的历史演变及其经验启示

现代企业之间的竞争,也是治理结构的竞争.在此,以文献梳理的形式,对公司治理的内涵及理论渊源进行阐述,并评析了治理模式、形成原因及趋同表现.在我国治理模式选择的问题上,提出应汲取西方治理经验并结合我国国情,在基于利益相关者的原则下,着力构建内部治理与外部治理相结合,以内部治理为主的中国特色公司治理结构.     

Efficient markets and Bayes’ rule

Summary. A series of financial anomalies motivated the development of new theories that modify the rational expectations ideal. Two possibilities have been systematically explored. The literature on behavioral finance relaxes the assumption that agents form beliefs according to the laws of probability and assume, instead, that simpler heuristic rules are used. Another stream of the literature assumes that agents process information according to Bayes rule, but do not posses sufficient information to know the true data generating process. In this paper, Bayesian and Behavioral agents coexist and trade in a standard dynamic asset pricing model. A long-standing conjecture is demonstrated. It is shown that, under suitable assumptions, Bayesian agents drive Behavioral, non-Bayesian agents out of the market. Hence, asset prices are eventually determined under the Bayesian paradigm.Received: 3 June 2004, Revised: 17 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D83.Preliminary versions have circulated under the titles Markets Favor Bayesian Models and Market Selection of Empirical Models under Limited Information. I thank Larry Blume, David Easley, Larry Epstein, Armando Gomes, Bruce Hansen, Lars Hansen, Richard Kihlstrom, Grace Koo, George Mailath, Werner Ploberger, Andrew Postlewaite and Shakeeb Khan for useful comments. I also thank participants at the NBER GE meetings, Evolutionary Finance conference in Zurich, Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, the Instituto de Matematica Pura e Aplicada, the theory seminar at Brown, Chicago, Harvard-MIT, Minnesota, Penn and Wisconsin. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the National Science Foundation Grant SES 0109650.     

Corporate Lobbying, Regulatory Conduct and the Porter Hypothesis

Michael Porter, the influential Harvard management guru, has promoted the idea that compliance with stricter environmental regulations can afford secondary benefits to firms through improved product design, innovation, corporate morale and in other ways. Once these secondary benefits are factored, the net cost of compliance is argued to be lower than conventionally thought and may even be negative. Whilst environmental economists have rejected the Porter Hypothesis as being based on excessively optimistic expectations of the likely size of such secondary benefits the underlying ideas do enjoy significant credence in the business community. In the context of a lobbying model of regulatory policy-making we argue that the EPA should change the way it conducts regulatory policy to take account of Porter's views – even if it knows those views to be misguided. The model serves to illustrate the more general point that fashions in management thinking can be expected to impact the optimal conduct of regulatory policy.     

Endogenous human capital accumulation, comparative advantage and direct vs. indirect redistribution

Recently, several papers have reexamined the so-called production efficiency theorem and the Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem on commodity taxes in the optimal taxation literature. Naito [J. Public Econ. 71 (1999) 65] showed that indirect redistribution through production distortion or consumption distortion can Pareto-improve welfare and that the two theorems do not necessarily hold when different factors are imperfect substitutes and factor prices are endogenous. On the other hand, Saez J. Public Econ. (2002) forthcoming argued that in the long run, where human capital accumulation is endogenous, the two theorems are still valid. This paper develops reasonable alternative models where individuals accumulate human capital based on their comparative advantage. The present paper shows that the production efficiency theorem is not necessarily valid and that indirect redistribution from the able to the less able such as tariffs and production subsidies can increase efficiency even when skill accumulation is endogenous.     

Ricardo on machinery: an analysis of Ricardo's examples

The examples that are reported in the famous chapter “On Machinery” added by Ricardo in the third edition of his Principles are reconstructed and analyzed. Two sets of assumptions that rationalize the examples presented by Ricardo are identified: a) the innovation concerns an agricultural commodity and does affect neither which land is marginal nor the technology applied on the marginal land; b) the innovation concerns a non-basic commodity. Ricardo was aware of these two facts and he seems to have used them respectively in the first and second of his examples.