Codes of Conduct in Subcontracting Networks: A Labour Law Perspective

In the past ten years, many European companies organised into subcontracting networks have decided to adopt codes of conduct to regulate labour relations and to ensure the respect of fundamental social rights. This paper first determines the context and the issues to be addressed by codes of conduct within networks of companies, and second analyses the terms under which they can be implemented. The paper argues that codes of conduct can complement the standards developed by States, the European Union or the social partners, but that steps should be taken in order to avoid that these texts replace the existing labour law.     

企业控制机制:控制权争夺的边界和效应

公司兼并和收购市场中企业控制权机机制、控制权争夺的价值、控制权争夺的福利效应、大股东在公司控制权争夺中对公司政策产生影响。外部性排除了负有义务的股东完全取得接管收益的可能性,无论控制权争夺的结果如何,股东财富在控制权争夺其间是增加的。从股东的福利效应方面来说,控制权争夺的失败也就是股东财富的损失。大股东提高了预期利润,并且他们所占股份越多,则提高越大。董事会的失误导致了敌意接管的出现,可由公司控制的外部市场对董事会的疏忽作用进行弥补。     

"非典"与流动人口管理模式改革路径的选择

从人口迁移规律入手,分析了"非典"流行期间,北京流动人口管理中存在的种种问题,认为这是执行流动人口和户籍人口"分立并行"管理体制的结果;提出了以"居住地人口管理"模式取代"户籍属地管理"模式的改革设想.     

Structuring Corporate Headquarters: An Investigation of Franchising

This article focuses on the structuring of the corporate headquarters in a franchise organization. Four essential issues that are related to franchisors organizational structure are discussed—homogeneity and heterogeneity of franchisors structure, company-owned and franchise arrangement, the dynamics between strategy and structure, and performing innovative and administrative functions simultaneously in the headquarters. Propositions are given for each issue. The results of qualitative analysis associated with each issue are discussed.     

企业契约形式、财权安排与财务治理演进

本文认为,企业契约形式与财权安排及财务治理具有非常密切的内在联系。对我国不同时期企业契约形式的考察,发现财权安排具有内在逻辑,企业财务治理在不同历史时期具有不同的演进特征。     

Trade intensity,country size and corruption

Abstract. Several authors claim to provide evidence that governmental corruption is less severe in countries where trade intensity is higher or populations are smaller. We argue that theory is highly ambiguous on these questions, and demonstrate that empirical links between corruption and trade intensity – or country size, strongly related to trade intensity – are sensitive to sample selection bias. Most available corruption indicators provide ratings only for those countries in which multinational investors have the greatest interest: these tend to include almost all large nations, but among small nations only those that are well-governed. We find that the relationship between corruption and trade intensity disappears, using newer corruption indicators with substantially increased country coverage. Similarly, the relationship between corruption and country size weakens or disappears using samples less subject to selection bias. Received: July 2001 / accepted: April 2002 We thank Anand Swamy and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions, Paul Schorosch for able research assistance, and Ray Fisman, Roberta Gatti, Aart Kraay, and Shang-jin Wei for kindly providing data. The conclusions of this paper are not intended to represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.     

The effect of interfirm dependence structures on governance mechanisms

Despite recent developments regarding the study of interdependence structures, previous research has rarely investigated the simultaneous effect of both interdependence magnitude and interdependence asymmetry on governance mechanisms among exchange parties. A survey of manufacturing companies has been used to test a theory about the interactive effect of buyer dependence and supplier dependence on inter-firm governance. The analysis of the survey supported the proposition that both buyers and suppliers that are highly dependent on each other (high interdependence magnitude and low interdependence asymmetry) may choose to rely on monitoring and the norm of information sharing. However, when a buyer's dependence is low regardless of the supplier's dependence level, the buyer does not rely on the norm of information sharing (buyer's relative interdependence advantage, buyer's relative interdependence disadvantage, and low interdependence magnitude). On the other hand, when the supplier's dependence on the buyer is low, the buyer relies on monitoring regardless of its dependence level (buyer's relative interdependence disadvantage and low interdependence magnitude). However, this study did not empirically measure performance. Further research should be done on the effect of congruence between the governance mechanism and its antecedents on buying performance.     

机构投资者与公司治理

随着机构投资者的发展壮大,人们越来越关注其对公司治理方面的作用。由于机构投资者巨大的股票持有量,他们存在参与公司治理的愿望。但因为经济往来关系、法律法规规定、信息处理障碍导致机构投资者并不能有效地参与公司治理。     

Organizational Culture: A Framework and Strategies for Facilitating Employee Whistleblowing

Seven dimensions of organizational culture that influence the employee reflection process that ultimately leads to whistleblowing behavior are presented. These include 1) vigilance, 2) engagement, 3) credibility, 4) accountability, 5) empowerment, 6) courage, and 7) options. Key considerations within each dimension are discussed and a compliance framework is used to identify strategies for encouraging a culture that supports employee communication, questioning, and reporting of illegal, unethical, and illegitimate practices within organizations.     

企业文化对员工心理契约的影响机制研究——以某高科技上市公司为例

本文的基本观点是,企业文化是通过影响员工心理契约的形成而发挥作用的。本研究发现,企业文化是员工心理契约形成的更一般性的基础,企业文化的特征将决定员工心理契约的性质。我们认为,员工心理契约是一个平衡结构,员工责任和组织责任在内容和强度上都需要平衡。