股权结构特征对公司成长影响实证检验

选取股权分置改革完成以后的时间区间,以部分竞争性行业上市公司的数据,实证分析了股权性质、股权集中度和股权制衡度对公司成长的影响。实证结果表明,股权性质与公司成长存在正相关的关系,但是这种关系并不显著;股权集中度与公司成长有较大的关系;股权制衡度对公司成长有显著的影响,与公司成长呈现负相关关系。     

英美文学课堂中英语专业学生思辨能力的培养

在英美文学课堂上,教师应转换角色,从传统教学的知识灌输者转变为问题的提出者与观点的引导者,引导学生基于文本提出自己的见解,培养学生的思辨能力。     

由张爱玲小说的男性形象透视其女性意识

张爱玲作为20世纪40年代初中国文坛的知名女作家,作品具有鲜明的女性主义特征。其小说中的男性形象虽类型各异,但却有着相同的本质：寡于情、陋于质、趋于利、薄于义。分析和探讨张爱玲小说中的男性形象,揭示其男性批判意识的成因,可以从中透视出张爱玲强烈的女性意识。     

论我国现阶段政府间转移支付规模的合理界限

政府间转移支付规模过大或过小都会影响分税制财政管理体制目标的实现。一国政府间转移支付的规模在相当大程度上是由该国的财权集中度与事权重心定位所决定的，可称之为分税制管理模式。该模式的选择需考虑一国的具体情况，包括是否具备实施大规模转移支付的制度条件以及权衡各种分税制管理模式的优势与局限。 鉴于我国目前短期内尚难以制定与实施规范的转移支付制度的情况，作者建议通过调整分税制管理模式适当缩小政府间转移支付的规模，以便提高我国分税制财政管理体制的运行效率。     

我国零售业集中度对阶格影响的实证分析

通过选取我国零售业的相对市场集中度（CR8）指数计算得出我国零售业市场集中度呈现持续上升态势的结论。在此基础上,利用时间序列数据模型,对我国零售商品价格影响因素作了实证分析。研究发现,我国零售业市场集中度对商品价格影响显著,且呈现负相关,从而得出应当提高我国零售业市场集中度的结论,并探讨提高我国零售业集中度的对策。     

Too Dispersed to Monitor? Ownership Dispersion,Monitoring, and the Prediction of Bank Distress

This paper conducts an empirical assessment of the theories stating that ownership concentration improves the quality of shareholders’ monitoring. In contrast with other studies, we do not use regressions of risk/performance on ownership concentration. Instead, we build an early warning model of bank distress that includes a leading indicator derived from banks’ share price, the Merton‐KMV distance to default (DD). The significance of this indicator depends on the efficacy of shareholders’ monitoring. On a sample of European banks, we show that the predictive power of the DD is satisfactory only when banks’ shareholding is characterized by the presence of blockholders.     

Financial centers and ownership concentration: When is ownership concentration value relevant? Evidence from an emerging market

Does the location of a firm’s headquarter effect ownership concentration? Do stock market participants value ownership concentration differently for firms located at different geographic locations? Using data from India, this paper shows that firms headquartered in Mumbai, the main financial center of a country, have lower ownership concentration than firms headquartered elsewhere. We argue that clustering of firms in the financial center reduce information asymmetries and lower the incentives for concentrated ownership. Our results also show that as the extent of analyst following increase, the difference between ownership concentration of firms headquartered in Mumbai and firms headquartered elsewhere goes up. We argue that higher analyst coverage reduces information asymmetries quicker for firms headquartered in the financial center and results in larger difference between the two groups. In addition, we also show that ownership concentration is value relevant only for firms headquartered in the non-financial centers. We show no relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance and valuation in the financial centers. This paper provides evidence that location of a firm’s headquarter in the financial center can significantly alter its information environment. Reduced information asymmetries lower the incentives for concentrated ownership in the financial centers.