The Effects of Native Ads on Consumer Brand Engagement: The Moderating Role of Website Credibility

Abstract

This research examined the effect of native ads on consumer brand engagement – specifically, how source disclosure of ad sponsors affected consumers’ perceived ad deceptiveness as well as their attitude toward the company and the brand. It also explored the moderating role of website credibility. One hundred and ten college students in South Korea participated in the experimental study, which found that high source disclosure of ad sponsors positively affected perceived deceptiveness. The effect of source disclosure on perceived deceptiveness was moderated by website credibility. Perceived deceptiveness negatively affected consumers’ attitude toward the company and the brand. The mediating role of perceived deceptiveness between source disclosure and consumer brand engagement was confirmed only when website credibility was high. The paper discusses the theoretical and practical implications of the findings as well as suggestions for future research in this area.     

The Relationship Between the Cost of Equity Capital and Corporate Disclosure: The Chilean Case

ABSTRACT

The objective of this research is to determine whether the Chilean investor rewards the corporate disclosure of economic information. The results have been consistent with international findings, since the relationship between the two studied variables was widely negative (the more information, the lower rate demanded by the investor). Also, the study shows that the integration of the capitals markets is improving the minimum standards of disclosure since, when a local company participates in more than one stock market, the strictest corporate disclosure or transparency rule will be applied.

RESUMEN. El objetivo de esta investigación es determinar si el inversionista chileno premia la entrega de información por parte de las empresas. Los resultados han sido consistentes con la evidencia internacional, ya que la relación entre las variables estudiadas fue ampliamente negativa (a mayor información, menor tasa exigida por el inversionista). Además, el estudio evidencia que la integración de los mercados de capitales está mejorando los estándares mínimos de revelación, ya que al participar una firma local en más de una bolsa de valores, se aplicará la normativa más exigente de revelación o transparencia corporativa.

RESUMO. O objetivo desta pesquisa é determinar se o investidor chileno compensa a divulgação das informações econômicas pelas empresas. Os resultados têm sido coerentes com as evidências internacionais, visto que a relação entre as duas variáveis estudadas foi amplamente negativa (quanto mais informação, menor é a taxa exigida pelo investidor). O estudo evidencia, também, que a integração dos mercados de capitais tem melhorado os padrões mínimos de divulgação, já que quando uma empresa local participa em mais de uma bolsa de valores, as normas mais rígidas de divulgação ou de transparência corporativa são aplicadas.     

Explaining the accounting disclosure index of stock exchanges by foreign exchange market activity

In this article, researcher-created accounting disclosure index of 23 stock exchanges for the year 1992 and its relationship with variables including foreign exchange turnover, economic and financial indicators were investigated. The accounting disclosure index of global stock exchanges crafted by Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) was regressed on foreign market turnover which was utilized as a proxy for foreign exchange market activity. The OLS results supported that along with the activity of foreign exchange market; GNI per capita, market capitalization, energy and electric consumption, number of listed companies were significantly related with the accounting disclosure index. The foreign market turnover was found to be positively influencing the accounting disclosure index. The models explained about 73% of the variation in the index with an F-ratio of 26.56 indicating the overall significance of the model.     

Executive Compensation: A Model of Disclosure Choice

Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensation. However, in practice, many firms are reluctant to disclose the full details of how they link executive compensation to performance. One possible reason for lack of full disclosure is that managers use their power to hide the details of their compensation plan in order to disguise opportunistic rent extraction. If this is the reason for secrecy, then public policy designed to force firms to provide full disclosure is unlikely to be resisted by shareholders. However, another possible explanation for less than full transparency is that some degree of secrecy about executive compensation may be in the interest of the company and its shareholders. If this explanation is correct, then public policy moves to increase transparency may be met by counter moves designed to protect managers and shareholders from such policies. In this paper we investigate if full disclosure of executive compensation arrangements is always optimal for shareholders. We develop a model where optimal executive remuneration solves a moral hazard problem. However, the degree to which the moral hazard problem affects the shareholders depends on hidden information, so that disclosure of the executive compensation scheme will typically reveal the hidden information, which can be harmful to shareholders. The model derives, therefore, the optimal disclosure policy and the optimal remuneration scheme. We find that the shareholders are better off pre‐committing not to disclose the executive compensation scheme whenever possible. Executive directors are shown to be better off too in the absence of disclosure of executive compensation schemes. An argument for mandating disclosure is that it provides better information to shareholders but our analysis demonstrates that disclosure does not necessarily achieve this objective. The results suggest that less than full disclosure can be in the interest of shareholders, the reason for this being that disclosures cannot be made selectively to shareholders but will also be made to strategic opponents. This will be the case if the board of directors and the remuneration committee includes enough independent directors. Whether or not non‐disclosure to shareholders is in their interest is however an empirical matter involving a trade‐off between the proprietary costs associated with disclosure to shareholders and the costs of potential collusion between executive and non‐executive directors associated with non‐disclosure.     

Earnings management and firm valuation under asymmetric information

This paper seeks to provide an explanation for why corporate officers manage the disclosure of accounting information. We show that earnings management affects firm value when value-maximizing managers and investors are asymmetrically informed. In equilibrium, the strategic management of reported earnings influences investors' assessments of the market values of companies' shares.     

Enhancing Bank Transparency: A Re-assessment

Transparency regulation aims at reducing financial fragility by strengthening market discipline. There are, however, two elementary properties of banking that may render such regulation inefficient at best and detrimental at worst. First, an extensive financial safety net may eliminate the disciplinary effect of transparency regulation. Second, achieving transparency is costly for banks, as it dilutes their charter values, and hence also reduces their private costs of risk-taking. We consider both the direct costs of complying with disclosure requirements and the indirect transparency costs stemming from imperfect property rights governing information and particularly infer the conditions under which transparency regulation cannot reduce financial fragility.     

促进我国会展业发展的对策研究

本文提出了在环境保护中“追本清源”的观点 ,重点阐述了加强环境法规 ,强调在实际工作中必须严格执行法规和实行环境监测控制 ,同时讨论了环境会计 (绿色会计 的建立和环境信息披露问题。     

The association between employee stock option disclosures and corporate governance: Evidence from an enhanced disclosure regime

This study examines the role of corporate governance in employee stock option (ESO) disclosures following the revision of AASB 1028 Employee Benefits in 2001. We find that, while firms do not fully comply with AASB 1028 ESO disclosures, they voluntarily provide other ESO disclosures. In relation to corporate governance measures that have a role in the financial reporting process, we find two corporate governance measures dominate our results—the quality of auditor and duality of the role of CEO and Chair of the Board of Directors. We show that, in general, external auditor quality has positive incremental association with both mandatory and voluntary ESO disclosures while the dual role of CEO and chairperson of the board is associated with lower levels of mandatory disclosure.     

Knowledge Disclosure and Transmission in Buyer–Supplier Relationships

A buyer’s technical knowledge may increase the efficiency of its supplier. Suppliers, however, frequently maintain relationships with additional buyers. Knowledge disclosure then bears the risk of benefiting one’s own rival due to opportunistic knowledge transmission through the common supplier. We show that in one-shot relationships no knowledge disclosure takes place because the supplier has an incentive to transmit and, anticipating that, buyers refuse to disclose any of their knowledge. In repeated relationships knowledge disclosure is stabilized by larger technological proximity between buyers and suppliers and destabilized by the absolute value of the knowledge.      

上市公司信息披露质量与证券分析师盈利预测

本文研究了上市公司信息披露状况与分析师预测行为之间的关系，结果发现，分析师的预测准确性总体上显著优于随机游走模型。进一步的研究发现，上市公司信息披露状况会对证券分析师的预测特征产生影响，信息披露透明度越高，分析师预测对会计盈利数据的依赖程度越低，预测准确性也随之提高。