Impression management: dual language reporting and voluntary disclosure

The presentation of corporate disclosure may be explained by impression management. The relative extent of corporate disclosure may be related to information costs. This paper links these two theoretical perspectives by comparing the extent of voluntary disclosure in companies that have chosen to present a dual language approach to reporting, relative to the disclosure provided by companies choosing to report only in one language. The analysis shows that voluntary disclosure is higher in companies that have higher visibility through dual language reporting and whose investors face higher information costs. The analysis also shows that voluntary disclosure by companies reporting only in one language is associated with domestic visibility in market listing and type of industry, while that of companies reporting in two languages is associated with responding to market pressures.     

The Association between Disclosure,Distress, and Failure

The quality of corporate disclosures has drawn increasing levels of criticism from Congress and the SEC. A subject of particularly intense scrutiny and action is the Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A). This narrative, intended to provide an inside perspective on the reported results of the firm, is particularly important when attempting to evaluate the investment prospects of the marginal or poorly performing firm. However, managers may restrict the information content of the disclosure, raising potential concerns about ethical behavior. In this study, we employ a proprietary instrument to measure the quality of MD&A disclosures for a sample of firms entering financial distress. We evaluate the disclosure behavior of these firms in an effort to determine whether changes in the disclosure appear to be motivated primarily by economic or ethical concerns. We find, on average, that firms increase disclosure quality in the year of initial distress. However, sustained increases in disclosure quality are limited to firms that subsequently recover from the distress. The results suggest that observed changes in disclosure are driven primarily by economic considerations, rather than ethical ones, especially in good economic times.     

Disclosure as a tool in stakeholder relations management: a longitudinal study on the Port of Rotterdam

This study applies stakeholder management principles to the port domain. We provide a conceptual framework for evaluating the communication strategies a (landlord) Port Authority (PA) relies on in the management of its relevant stakeholders and the adoption of disclosure to critical issues. The theoretical arguments are supported by empirical evidences from the Port of Rotterdam (PoR), i.e. a major port which leverages disclosure to successfully manage stakeholders and support the implementation of corporate strategy. The research questions are addressed using a content analysis on the annual reports (ARs) of PoR in the period 2000–2012. The overall research design enables the investigation of PA disclosure as a tool for managing the evolving interests of stakeholders from a longitudinal perspective. The PoR case shows that the relative importance of topics reported in the ARs change over time, as a result of external pressures and internal key events. The outcomes demonstrate the growing attention of PoR on topics relevant to the broader community (e.g. environment and safety/security) after a period characterised by a prominent focus on financial and governance issues. Besides, key breakthrough forces stimulating the shifts in landlord communication strategies are identified and discussed. Finally, by suggesting an indirect approach to evaluate how PA prioritises its salient stakeholders, the paper adds to extant port literature and brings methodological implications.     

上市公司信息披露违规研究

信息披露制度的完善是资本市场发展和完善的重要标志之一,我国信息披露制度也伴随着资本市场的发展不断得以完善,但与西方国家较为完善的市场监管机制比较而言,我国资本市场的信息披露监管机制尚处在不断补充和完善的起步阶段。因此,对我国上市公司信息披露违规问题进行研究对促进我国资本市场持续稳定的发展有重要的现实意义。文章将以我国上市公司信息披露违规现状为对象,剖析信息披露违规行为的发生特征及规律,并提出相应政策建议。     

政企关系、地方政府环境规制差异与环境信息选择性披露--基于重污染上市公司经验证据

基于部门利益理论与印象管理理论,研究政企关系、地方政府环境规制等因素对环境信息披露的影响。通过对1391家重污染行业上市公司2010—2011年数据实证研究发现,政企关系与环境信息披露成负向相关关系;在政企关系作用下,地方政府环境规制不但没有起到相应的规制作用,反而降低了企业环境信息的披露质量;政企关系削弱了地方政府环境规制对企业环境信息披露的显著性与时间性,但是对于量化性并没有起到削弱作用。     

Taxes and Financial Constraints: Evidence from Linguistic Cues

Using a new measure of financial constraints based on firms’ qualitative disclosures, we find that financially constrained firms—firms that use more negative words in their annual reports—pursue more aggressive tax planning strategies as evidenced by: (1) higher current and future unrecognized tax benefits, (2) lower short‐ and long‐run current and future effective tax rates, (3) increase in tax haven usage for their material operations, and (4) higher proposed audit adjustments from the Internal Revenue Service. We exploit the unexpected closures of local banks as exogenous liquidity shocks to show that firms’ external financial constraints affect their tax avoidance strategies. Overall, the linguistic cues in firms’ qualitative disclosures provide incremental information beyond traditional accounting variables or commonly used effective tax rates to reveal and predict tax aggressiveness, both contemporaneously and in the future.     

A New Measure of Disclosure Quality: The Level of Disaggregation of Accounting Data in Annual Reports

We construct a new, parsimonious, measure of disclosure quality—disaggregation quality (DQ)—and offer validation tests. DQ captures the level of disaggregation of accounting data through a count of nonmissing Compustat line items, and reflects the extent of details in firms’ annual reports. Conceptually, DQ differs from existing disclosure measures in that it captures the “fineness” of data and is based on a comprehensive set of accounting line items in annual reports. Unlike existing measures, which are usually applicable for a subset of firms or are based on a subset of information items, DQ can be generated for the universe of Compustat industrial firms. We conduct three sets of validation tests by examining DQ's association with variables predicted by prior literature to be associated with information quality. DQ is negatively (positively) associated with analyst forecast dispersion (accuracy) and negatively associated with bid‐ask spreads and cost of equity. These associations continue to hold after we control for firm fundamentals. Taken together, results from this battery of validation tests are consistent with our measure capturing disclosure quality.     

Short Selling Pressure,Stock Price Behavior,and Management Forecast Precision: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Using a natural experiment (Regulation SHO), we show that short selling pressure and consequent stock price behavior have a causal effect on managers’ voluntary disclosure choices. Specifically, we find that managers respond to a positive exogenous shock to short selling pressure and price sensitivity to bad news by reducing the precision of bad news forecasts. This finding on management forecasts appears to be generalizable to other corporate disclosures. In particular, we find that, in response to increased short selling pressure, managers also reduce the readability (or increase the fuzziness) of bad news annual reports. Overall, our results suggest that maintaining the current level of stock prices is an important consideration in managers’ strategic disclosure decisions.     

Continuous disclosure compliance: does corporate governance matter?

Our study investigates the quality of firms’ continuous disclosure compliance during mandatory continuous disclosure reform, and whether the compliance quality is impacted by corporate governance, using the New Zealand market as the setting. We use a novel coding of different categories of disclosures (non‐routine, non‐procedural and internal), which represents the extent of proprietary insider information inherent in disclosures, to evaluate firms’ compliance quality. Our findings provide evidence that firms’ compliance quality improved after the reform, and this improvement is inconsistently impacted by corporate governance. Our findings provide important implications for regulators in their quest for a superior disclosure regime.