浅析防止会计信息失真

文章针对我国当前普遍存在的会计信息失真问题,分析了会计信息失真的原因,并深入研究和探讨了防止会计信息失真的对策。     

要素价格扭曲与经济失衡之间的互动关系研究

劳动力、资本、能源三种生产要素价格扭曲与宏观经济失衡之间存在互动关系。通过建立超越对数生产函数,估算改革开放以来中国劳动力、资本、能源三种生产要素价格的绝对和相对扭曲程度,继而建立VAR模型,考察各内生变量之间的脉冲响应关系。研究表明,要素价格扭曲和宏观经济失衡之间存在相互强化的互动关系。应从调整供给结构、增加政府民生支出、改革要素价格形成机制、提高生产效率等多方面着手,实现宏观经济再平衡。     

会计信息失真的成因及解决对策

会计信息是管理者、投资者、社会公众及政府管理部门改善经营管理、评价财务状况、做出投资决策的重要依据,在微观管理、宏观调控、促进现代经济发展等方面都发挥着巨大的作用。会计信息的真实与否,直接关系到使用者的经济决策是否合理有效,因此,必须通过分析研究会计信息失真的表现形式及其成因,从而找出有效的解决办法,以便提高会计信息质量和规范会计市场。     

利率管制、金融扭曲与投资效率

本文认为我国存在正规与非正规的二元金融体系,二者的利率水平不同,央行的利率管制是导致这种金融扭曲的一个主要原因。通过构建两个部门、两种金融资本的经济模型,得出正规金融市场中利率水平的提高有助于改善这种扭曲的金融结构,减少非正规金融,并且提高投资效率的结论。我国1986年到2008年的时间序列模型和1995到2008年的省际面板数据模型证实了此观点,说明利率市场化是我国深化金融改革的必然选择。     

Investment dynamics and capital distortion: State and non-state firms in China

This paper studies investment dynamics in Chinese manufacturing firms. The analysis estimates capital adjustment costs and uncovers capital distortion in state and non-state firms. There is strong evidence of quadratic adjustment cost and distortion in capital price for both types of firms. The capital distortion is a major source of capital misallocation in Chinese firms. Completely removing the distortion would increase aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) by 18–29%.     

How do managerial techniques evolve over time? The distortion of “facilitation” in healthcare service improvement

When applied to solving real-world problems in the public sector, managerial techniques are likely to evolve over time in response to the context of their implementation. The temporal dynamics of this evolution and its underlying processes, however, remain under-researched. To address this gap, we present a qualitative longitudinal case study of a UK-based knowledge mobilization programme utilizing “facilitation” as a service improvement approach. We describe the processes underpinning the distortion of facilitation over time and argue that an uncritical and uncontrolled adaptation of managerial techniques may mask the unsustainable nature of the resulting improvement outcomes captured by conventional performance measurement.     

Optimal insurance in the presence of reinsurance

This paper studies an optimal insurance and reinsurance design problem among three agents: policyholder, insurer, and reinsurer. We assume that the preferences of the parties are given by distortion risk measures, which are equivalent to dual utilities. By maximizing the dual utility of the insurer and jointly solving the optimal insurance and reinsurance contracts, it is found that a layering insurance is optimal, with every layer being borne by one of the three agents. We also show that reinsurance encourages more insurance, and is welfare improving for the economy. Furthermore, it is optimal for the insurer to charge the maximum acceptable insurance premium to the policyholder. This paper also considers three other variants of the optimal insurance/reinsurance models. The first two variants impose a limit on the reinsurance premium so as to prevent insurer to reinsure all its risk. An optimal solution is still layering insurance, though the insurer will have to retain higher risk. Finally, we study the effect of competition by permitting the policyholder to insure its risk with an insurer, a reinsurer, or both. The competition from the reinsurer dampens the price at which an insurer could charge to the policyholder, although the optimal indemnities remain the same as the baseline model. The reinsurer will however not trade with the policyholder in this optimal solution.     

Statistical inference on restricted partial linear regression models with partial distortion measurement errors

We consider the estimation and hypothesis testing problems for the partial linear regression models when some variables are distorted with errors by some unknown functions of commonly observable confounding variable. The proposed estimation procedure is designed to accommodate undistorted as well as distorted variables. To test a hypothesis on the parametric components, a restricted least squares estimator is proposed under the null hypothesis. Asymptotic properties for the estimators are established. A test statistic based on the difference between the residual sums of squares under the null and alternative hypotheses is proposed, and we also obtain the asymptotic properties of the test statistic. A wild bootstrap procedure is proposed to calculate critical values. Simulation studies are conducted to demonstrate the performance of the proposed procedure, and a real example is analyzed for an illustration.     

博弈论对会计信息失真治理的启示

本文通过对博弈论中小偷与守卫模型进行分析得到启示,提出治理会计信息失真的重要举措是加大对审计部门及人员的惩处力度,并对当前我国惩处不力的现状、原因进行阐述,就如何加强对审计部门及人员的惩处力度也提出了一些参考性建议。     

会计信息违规性失真的治理机制研究

现代企业所有权合约安排决定了经营者分享企业剩余索取权.现代企业会计规则合约安排是政府享有一般通用会计规则制定权、经营者享有剩余会计规则制定权和会计规则执行权、注册会计师享有会计规则监督权;在会计规则监督权弱化条件下,经营者控制了企业剩余的计量.经营者既分享剩余又控制剩余计量导致了会计信息违规性失真.会计信息违规性失真是程序理性观下的信息失真.治理此问题,不能破坏现行的制度均衡,博弈论分析表明,政府加重对注册会计师偷懒(而不是对经营者舞弊)的处罚在长期中可以达到遏制会计信息违规性失真的目的.