Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis

We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators (the nice(r) people) in an anonymous decision environment involving “connected games.” Participants can condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma and a trust game on past individual (their partner’s donation share to a self-selected charity) and social (whether their partner belongs to a group with high or low average donations) information. Thus, the two measures of niceness are the individual donation share in the donation task, and the cooperativeness of one’s choice in the two games. We find that high donors achieve a higher-than-average expected payoff by cooperating predominantly with other high donors. Group affiliation proved to be irrelevant. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, C72, D3     

A bioeconomic model for estimating the optimal level of deer and tag sales

This paper presents a dynamic model that determines the optimal number of deer hunting permit sales, subject to the objective of maximizing the discounted economic benefits stream from both the consumptive and nonconsumptive uses of deer. This bioeconomic model integrates economic benefits estimated using the dichotomous choice contingent valuation method with biological growth constraints on deer. Using a hunting zone in California as a case study, the model found that the optimal levels of buck hunting permits sold should change on a rotational basis over time and that the current practice of not selling doe hunting permits for that zone is non optimal.     

Estimating Willingness to Pay for Improved Drinking Water Quality Using Averting Behavior Method with Perception Measure

This paper suggests an application of an averting behaviormethod to reconcile inconsistent public activity with objectiveenvironmental risk. In Korea, an historically polluted watersupply has created citizen resistance to using tap water. Koreansperceive low quality levels for tap water, although objectivelymeasured data show that the pollution levels are lower than theacceptable risk. We hypothesized that the irrational aversion tousing tap water is a consequence of inconsistencies between theobjectively measured and perceived pollution levels. We introducethe perception averting behavior method, in which we add aperception measure unit to the conventional averting behaviormethod. We found that the perception measure provided a validexplanation for citizens' aversion to using tap water in Korea.     

员工职业生涯的心理契约的动态管理

员工的职业生涯是一个动态的过程。在这一过程的不同阶段,员工的需求、态度、工作行为都存在着较大的差别,员工与企业之间的心理契约在内容上也会发生变化。而心理契约作为一种隐性契约,具有显著的特殊性,这种特殊性在客观上要求企业对其进行动态管理。本文从职业生涯管理的视角阐述了员工不同职业生涯阶段心理契约的特点以及如何对其进行动态管理。     

基于协同平台的高校教师科研绩效评价体系

在研究组织人员行为绩效评价体系的基础上,分析了传统的KPI(key performance indicator)评价方式所面临的主要问题,提出针对高校教师科研绩效进行分类建模,并设计相应的绩效指标、绩效算法及评价体系来解决问题。最后,用某院教职工2015—2019年在协同信息管理平台上的行为数据,检验了该体系的有效性及合理性,并针对基于协同平台的高校教师科研绩效评价体系的结果分析,提出高校科研管理及绩效激励方案。     

Interbank Relationships and the Credit Channel in Germany

A crucial condition for the existence of a credit channel through bank loansis that monetary policy should be able to change bank loan supply. This papercontributes to the discussion on this issue by presenting empirical evidence fromdynamic panel estimations based on a dataset that comprises individual balancesheet information on all German banks. It shows that the average bank reduces itslending more sharply in reaction to a restrictive monetary policy measure the lowerits ratio of short-term interbank deposits to total assets. A dependence on its size canonly be found if explicitly controlled for this dominating effect. Overall, the evidenceis compatible with the existence of a credit channel but the results indicate that it is weakened by the network structures that exist in the German banking system.     

绿色财务管理的短期均衡分析

当前,生态问题日趋严重,这种状况的形成主要是人类自身行为造成的,人们虽然已经越来越多地认识到其危害性,但是在经济利益的驱使下,人类的这种破坏行为并没有真正停止或减少。作为微观经济主体的企业,它的行为对生态问题的影响非常重要,所以必须改变企业的经济行为。作为经济主体其目标就是为了获取经济利益,只有保证其有一定经济利益的情况下,来改变其行为以利于解决生态问题才是可行的。鉴于此,本文从市场上各类企业的经济行为特点入手,来探讨解决问题的途径。     

Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

We present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with (imperfect) private monitoring. The literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents' actions. Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price-cutting, exchange of goods with uncertain quality, and observation errors, it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players. This is in sharp contrast to the well-explored case of repeated games under public information (with the celebrated Folk Theorems), and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case. However, rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43, D82, L13, L41.     

Does too much government spending depress the economic development of transition economies? Evidences from dynamic panel threshold analysis

This paper investigates the relationship between government size and economic growth and determines the optimal level of government spending to maximize economic growth. The paper applies a dynamic panel data analysis based upon a threshold model to test the threshold effect of government spending in 26 transition economies over the period spanning 1993–2016. According to the analysis results, government expenditures have a threshold effect on economic growth, and there is a non-linear relationship depicted as an Armey curve in these transition economies. The findings indicate that a government size above the threshold government spending level adversely affects economic growth, while a government size below the threshold level has a positive effect. Furthermore, there is a statistically significant relationship between the two variables above and below that optimal level, even if we divide the sample into developed and developing countries. Our findings suggest that governments in transition economies should consider optimal government size at around the estimated threshold level to support sustainable economic growth.     

Partial International Coordination in the Great Fish War

This study extends the great fish war model of Levhari and Mirman [Levhari, D. and Mirman, L. (1980) Bell Journal of Economics 11: 322–344] by incorporating a multiple country context into the model and investigates the existence of a partial coordination Nash equilibrium. First, findings of this paper suggest that a partial coordination scheme is sustainable only in limited cases. Any coalition that has more than two member countries cannot be sustained. Second, the existence and the number of coordinating countries depend critically on the magnitude of the biological and preference parameters. Finally, if the coalition is assumed to be a dominant player, there always exist one or two welfare-improving sustainable coalitions and the size of the sustainable coalitions depends on the parameters of the problem.