基于GIS的露天煤矿区土地动态变化分析

本文选用1985年和2005年两期土地利用现状图,借助MAPGIS软件,采用单一土地利用动态度和综合土地利用动态度等指数模型,分析了安太堡露天煤矿1985～2005年土地利用类型的数量变化和空间变化特征。结果表明:(1)各类土地利用类型综合动态度为2.07%;(;2)安太堡露天煤矿20年来各类土地利用类型的增减在空间上存在快速的变化,通过统计分析显示,灌木林地、工业用地、裸土地增加迅速,而旱地、未成林地大幅度减少;(3)安太堡露天煤矿空间动态演变特点为空间扰动剧烈、地类变化明显、空间变化持续时间长。     

基于未确知测度理论的多科性医院医疗大数据治理能力成熟度评价

为实现对多科性医院大数据治理水平的分析和评估,在数据管理成熟度模型和能力成熟度模型基础上,构建多科性医院大数据治理能力成熟度评价模型。将医院大数据治理能力成熟度分为初始级、程序级、规范级、管理级和优化级五个等级,基于医院内部大数据治理特征,建立包括三级指标的成熟度评价指标体系。然后,分别用客观赋权法及组合赋权法确定各指标权重,并结合未确知测度理论和评价方法,量化评估两个三甲多科性医院大数据治理能力的成熟度。结果表明,两种赋权方法下两家医院的大数据治理能力水平均处于规范级,与两家医院大数据治理的实际情况相吻合。未确知测度理论与信息熵权相结合,可以平衡指标测量主观性和评价结果稳定性,建立的模型能为多科性医院大数据治理提供具有参考价值的决策信息。     

区域经济差异动态分析与协调发展研究——以湖南西部地区为例

对区域经济相对差异和绝对差异及相关指标进行计算,并从时间特征和空间特征两方面研究湖南西部地区内部经济差异问题,可以发现,该区域内部具有较显著的区域经济差异和圈层结构差异,其经济差异类型界于金字塔型模式和橄榄型模式之间,对此研究对于区域经济协调发展具有较为现实的指导作用。     

不确定性情况下的居民资产组合行为与中国金融结构变迁

转轨经济的一个显著特点是各项制度不断变化,制度变迁带来的不确定性对居民资产选择行为产生重要影响,进而影响和决定了金融结构的形成与变迁.     

企业边界:基于动态效率的分析

企业边界是企业理论关注的一个焦点,不同的理论分支对之有不一样的见解.本文在批判了新制度经济学中用边际交易成本解释企业边界论的基础上,从企业的知识、能力出发,按照动态效率标准对企业边界提出了自己的看法,即企业依据自身情况制定的发展战略是影响企业边界的重要因素.     

组织激励资源运用的效率分析

本文从企业组织整体目标利益角度出发，将组织激励资源作为稀缺性资源，探讨了组织内部员工的激励问题，同时借助经济学关于资源有效配置的理论，以及组织行为学中的公平激励理论，对组织激励经济资源运用的有效性，以及相关的影响因素进行了探讨，并在此基础上提出了组织一定经济激励资源量获得最大组织激励动力的条件，以及组织获得最大经济激励资源运用绩效效率水平的条件或原则。     

Recovering Hicksian Consumer Surplus within a Collective Model: Hausman's Method for the Household

The purpose of this paper is to describe the implications of the collective model of household behavior for the methods used to estimate the economic value of non-marketed environmental resources. After demonstrating how the separability restrictions inherent in the collective model allow individual preference and household income allocation choices to be distinguished, the paper demonstrates how the framework can be used to recover Hicksian consumer surplus. An algebraic example is used to illustrate how the framework can be used in valuing environmental resources.     

Dissertation abstract: “Essays in applied economics on the intervention of a third player in agency relationships”

Agency theory has established that appropriate incentives can reconcile the diverging interests of the principal and the agent. Focusing on three applications, this dissertation evaluates the empirical relevance of these results when a third party interacts with the primary contract. The analyses provided rely on either laboratory or natural experiments. First, corruption is analyzed as a two-contract situation: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. A survey of the recent microeconomic literature on corruption first highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of those two agreements. We thereafter show that the Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two conflicting agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-player experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wages on corruption. Second, health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly concerned with the health provided, whereas containing health care costs is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further insights into the ability of incentives to balance these two competing objectives. In this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis evaluates how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999 as an alternative to fee-for-services, has affected physicians’ practice patterns. Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between physicians. Finally, the demand for underground work departs from the traditional Beckerian approach to illegal behavior, due to the dependence of benefits from illegality on competitors’ behavior. We set up a theoretical model in which the demand for underground work from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability, strictly lower than one. This Bertrand curse could then account for the “tax evasion puzzle” i.e. the overprediction of evasion in models that ignore market interactions. We thereafter show that allowing firms to denounce competitors’ evasion is not likely to solve this curse—by providing a credible threat against price cuts, it fosters illegal work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms these predictions. Without denunciation, experimental firms often choose evasion whereas evasion benefits are canceled out by competition. When introduced, denunciation is rarely used by firms, but the threat makes evasion profitable. JEL Classification K42, I18, D21, C25, C91     

Strategic Firm Behavior Under Average-Revenue-Lagged Regulation

Price caps have been shown to have incentive properties superior to traditional rate of return regulation. Average-revenue-lagged regulation (ARL) is attractive in that steady-state prices are known to be efficient. We show that the ARL scheme can be manipulated by the firm so as to yield the unregulated global profit maximum. While tests exist that can provide the regulator with evidence of this strategic behavior, we also demonstrate that the unregulated global profit maximum will not be attainable if Laspeyres (L) regulation is employed.Jel classification: L43, L51I would like to thank Michael Crew and an anonymous referee for their extremely helpful suggestions.     

Uncertain Climate Change in an Intergenerational Planning Model

A three-generation planning model incorporating uncertain climate change is developed. Each generation features a production activity based on capital and an exhaustible resource. An irreversible climate change may occur in period two or three, reducing the productivity for this and the remaining generation. The model is solved by stochastic dynamic programming. If the climate impact and climate change probability is constant, the optimal period one (and two) resource extraction is larger than for the reference case of climate stability. If, however, climate impact and climate change probability increases with increased aggregate resource use, this result is reversed.