MaxVaR for non-normal and heteroskedastic returns¶

In this work we propose Monte Carlo simulation models for dynamically computing MaxVaR for a financial return series. This dynamic MaxVaR takes into account the time-varying volatility as well as non-normality of returns or innovations. We apply this methodology to five stock market indices. To validate the proposed methods we compute the number of MaxVaR violations and compare them with the expected number. We also compute the MaxVaR-to-VaR ratio and find that, on average, dynamic MaxVaR exceeds dynamic VaR by 5–7% at the 1% significance level, and by 12–14% at the 5% significance level for the selected indices.     

Analyst following and count-data econometrics

This paper reexamines the determinants of the number of analysts following a firm using econometric models based on count distributions. We replicate Bhushan's (1989) analyst-following study to demonstrate the effects of using count-data econometrics, in lieu of OLS, in studying phenomena where the dependent variable ranges among nonnegative integers. In contrast with the original paper, our findings indicate the number of institutional investors is inversely related with analyst following. We also provide econometric evidence to support the preferred use of the negative binomial model in estimating cross-sectional, analyst-following regressions.     

Are EU trade preferences really effective? An impact evaluation assessment of the Southern Mediterranean Countries’ case

This work assesses the causal impact of the EU trade preferences granted to the Southern Mediterranean Countries (SMCs) in agriculture and fishery products over the period 2004–2014. It overcomes some of the weaknesses of previous assessments and presents several methodological improvements. Firstly, it relies on a continuous treatment – i.e. preferential margins – to capture the ‘average treatment effect’ of trade preferences, rather than on a binary treatment based on dummy variables. Secondly, it uses highly disaggregated data at sectoral level in order to evaluate properly the preferential treatment. Thirdly, it applies a non-parametric matching technique for continuous treatment – specifically, a generalized propensity score matching. The results show, on the one hand, that the impact of the EU preferences is positive and significant on SMCs trade and is better evaluated using impact evaluation techniques. On the other hand, they demonstrate that the relationship between preferences and trade flows is asymmetric and warn against the risk of providing too much of a good thing. These results raise important issues for policy-making. First, they demonstrate that raising the level of preferences is not the solution to foster the SMCs trade towards EU. Second, that the policy-makers should put more emphasis on complementary factors other than trade barriers.     

Shaken or Stirred? Financial Deregulation and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Norway

Is there a credit channel for monetary policy? Has the deregulation of financial markets had any temporary or permanent effects on the monetary transmission mechanism? We present empirical evidence on these issues for Norway by estimating a dynamic system of money, credit, real income and inflation. We find that the deregulation process has not caused any permanent shifts in the long‐run demand functions. Within a small simultaneous dynamic model, there is some evidence for the credit view of the monetary transmission mechanism, as both credit and money exhibit strong and stable effects on aggregate demand. JEL classification: E50; E44; C51     

On the welfare costs of misspecified monetary policy objectives

This paper quantifies the effects on welfare of misspecified monetary policy objectives in a stylized DSGE model. We show that using inappropriate objectives generates relatively large welfare costs. When expressed in terms of ‘consumption equivalent’ units, these costs correspond to permanent decreases in steady-state consumption of up to two percent. The latter are generated by both the inappropriate choice of weights and the omission of variables. In particular, it is costly to assume an interest-rate smoothing incentive for central bankers when it is not socially optimal to do so. Finally, a parameter uncertainty decomposition indicates that uncertainty about the properties of markup shocks gives rise to the largest welfare costs.