Time heals many wounds – explaining the immediate and delayed effects of message sidedness

This study investigates the immediate and delayed effects of advertising messages including both positive and negative information. A two-sided message has a negative effect on message attitudes due to two mediating variables with trade-off effects: valence and balance. These two variables are also responsible for the alignment of the effect of sidedness on message attitudes and purchase intentions over time: the negative effects of two-sided messages are neutralized over time because negative information is reevaluated, improving the valence of the message. The results explain the negative effects of message sidedness that have been found in prior research and they show that a two-sided message in advertising is not necessarily inferior to a one-sided message despite unfavorable short-term effects.     

FIRE SALES FORENSICS: MEASURING ENDOGENOUS RISK

We propose a tractable framework for quantifying the impact of loss‐triggered fire sales on portfolio risk, in a multi‐asset setting. We derive analytical expressions for the impact of fire sales on the realized volatility and correlations of asset returns in a fire sales scenario and show that our results provide a quantitative explanation for the spikes in volatility and correlations observed during such deleveraging episodes. These results are then used to develop an econometric framework for the forensic analysis of fire sales episodes, using observations of market prices. We give conditions for the identifiability of model parameters from time series of asset prices, propose a statistical test for the presence of fire sales, and an estimator for the magnitude of fire sales in each asset class. Pathwise consistency and large sample properties of the estimator are studied in the high‐frequency asymptotic regime. We illustrate our methodology by applying it to the forensic analysis of two recent deleveraging episodes: the Quant Crash of August 2007 and the Great Deleveraging following the default of Lehman Brothers in Fall 2008.     

Price promotion with reference price effects in supply chain

We consider the price promotion in a supply chain comprising one manufacturer and one retailer, who take into account the reference price effects of consumers. The problem is analyzed as a manufacturer-lead Stackelberg game. The results indicate that reference price effects could mitigate “double marginalization” effects, and improve the channel efficiency. We also show that the optimal price promotion benefits the manufacturer, retailer and consumers in consumer promotion model. Furthermore, we provide the conditions under which the retailer has an interest in offering price promotion to consumers. Finally, we employ numerical analysis to demonstrate more managerial insights.     

Sentiment,mood and outbound tourism demand

We investigate spillover effects from sentiment and mood shocks on US outbound tourism demand from 1996 until 2013. We use the Index of Consumer Sentiment and Economic Policy Uncertainty Index as proxies for sentiment and the S&P500 as a proxy for mood. We find a moderate to high interrelationship among sentiment, mood and outbound tourism demand. More importantly, sentiment and mood indicators are net transmitters of spillover shocks to outbound tourism demand. The magnitude of spillover effects sourced by sentiment and mood is time-varying and depends on certain socio-economic and environmental events. Our results have important implications for policymakers and travel agents in their efforts to predict tourism arrivals from key origin countries and to plan their tourism strategy.     

Mobile technology & resident attitude research

This research note highlights the novelty of integrating location-based services (LBS) available on Smart Phones and Tablets into traditional resident attitude survey methodologies such as door-to-door data collection. It specifically reviews how the LBS technology available on mobile devices can be used to systematically capture GPS coordinates of one's residence and integrate this captured spatial information into software such as ArcGIS and SPSS for further analysis. By having GPS coordinates associated with respondents' answers, researchers have an additional layer of information available for conducting a multitude of tests previously not possible with subjective categorical spatial data. Two research applications using the spatial location of residences are provided as examples of how LBS available on mobile devices can be integrated within resident attitude projects. The use of LBS technology can help researchers better understand how the distance residents live from major tourist attractions influences their attitudes towards tourism.     

Individual Large Shareholders,Earnings Management,and Capital‐Market Consequences

Using a large hand‐collected sample of all blockholders (ownership ≥ 5%) of S&P 1500 firms for the years 2002–2009, we first document significant individual blockholder effects on earnings management (accrual‐based earnings management, real earnings management, and restatements). This association is driven primarily by these large shareholders influencing rather than selecting firms’ financial reporting practices. Second, the market's reaction to earnings announcements suggests that investors recognize the heterogeneity in blockholders’ influence on earnings management. The results highlight the highly individualized effects of blockholders and a mechanism through which shareholders impact reported earnings.     

Wealth effects and agency costs

We analyze how the agent's initial wealth affects the principal's expected profits in the standard principal–agent model with moral hazard.We show that if the principal prefers a poorer agent for all specifications of action sets, probability distributions, and disutility of effort, then the agent's utility of income must exhibit a coefficient of absolute prudence less than three times the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for all levels of income, thus strengthening the sufficiency result of Thiele and Wambach (1999). Also, we prove that there is no condition on the agent's utility of income alone that will make the principal prefer richer agents. Moreover, we show that, for an interesting class of problems, the principal prefers a relatively poorer agent if agent's wealth is sufficiently large. Finally, we discuss how alternative ways of modeling the agent's outside option affects the principal's preferences for agent's wealth.     

Assessing impact of regulatory risk on shareholders’ wealth

Research indicates that regulatory risk increases required return on investment by investors and causes underinvestment in industries with high sunk costs. The effects of regulatory changes may be measured by estimating the abnormal returns associated with the event. The results may suggest to regulators what should be encouraged or avoided. This article utilizes a fixed effects regression to examine abnormal returns from changes in Philippine nationalization regulations. The results are consistent with extant literature. Supreme Court decisions, which increased uncertainty and regulatory risk, produced negative abnormal returns. The initial release of draft implementing rules did not produce statistically significant effects, but a succeeding draft favouring liberalization, produced positive abnormal returns.     

Tracking Can Be More Equitable Than Mixing

Parents and policy‐makers often wonder whether and how the choice of a tracked or mixed educational system affects the equality of opportunity. I answer this question by analyzing the influence of peers on future educational results. I define an equal opportunity policy as one that maximizes the average lifetime income of the worst‐off type of individuals in society (i.e., students from disadvantaged backgrounds). I find that tracking maximizes average lifetime income if the opportunity cost of college attendance is sufficiently high.     

Party Discipline and Environmental Policy: The Role of “Smoke‐filled Back Rooms”*

We adopt the view that greater party discipline induces legislators to commit to promised policies after being elected. We then develop the hypothesis that the effect of party discipline on the stringency of environmental policy is conditional on the degree of government corruption. Our empirical work suggests that greater party discipline results in more stringent environmental policies when the level of corruption is relatively low, but in weaker policies when the level of corruption is comparatively high.