Slow-moving capital and stock returns

This paper studies the effects that delay in capital allocations in the stock market and high short-term trading incentives have on returns of this market. We report that capital inertia makes the Sharpe ratio and the volatility of the stock returns many times higher than in an economy with no capital delays. Furthermore, in agreement with empirical literature, the stock price displays short-term overreaction and high volatility of the conditional Sharpe ratio.     

交易透明度对证券场外交易信息效率的影响

黑池交易系统(Dark Pools)是美国近年发展较快的非公开交易平台,其信息透明度较低,可提供匿名交易的服务,并由此实现信息的非公开传递。通过扩展后验信念收敛速率的模型来描述不同交易透明度下场外市场的信息显示速率,发现私人信息与公共信息共存有利于信息更快地显示,因而私人信息渠道与公共信息渠道共存有利于提升信息效率,由此解释了非公开交易平台的价值,也为我国场外市场的分层发展提供可行建议.     

Margin practices and requirements during the National Banking Era: An early example of macro‐prudential regulation

The New York stock market was plagued by a series of financial crises during the National Banking Era, culminating in the Panic of 1907. The traditional view holds that the crises were rooted in structural flaws related to trade settlement as well as excessive and indiscriminate margin lending that remained unaddressed until the formation of the Federal Reserve Bank. An examination of the historical record, however, shows that brokers sought to control contagion and spillover effects through reform of the settlement process and by modulating margin lending rates and maintenance requirements according to macroeconomic conditions, counterparty credit‐worthiness and market volatility. Using newly gathered archival data, we show that the New York Stock Exchange enacted macro‐prudential regulations that may have reduced the severity of crises during this period. By providing early evidence of private sector responses to rising systemic risk, the paper addresses an important aspect of early market microstructure.     

资本市场结构性错配根源探究及改善建议

本文总结了资本市场多维度结构所呈现出的特征,得到资金风险偏好与资产实际风险、资产价格与内在风险、资金供需结构三个维度均存在一定程度错配的结论。文章挖掘了三个维度错配背后的成因,并对比了美国、日本资本市场发展历史,发现在狭义资本市场尤其是股票市场的制度建设、资产管理市场的产品运作与考核机制以及财富管理市场的销售模式和投资者保护机制方面都有一定的改进空间。整体结构改善需要以金融供给侧改革的五个目标为出发点,从顶层的法律、监管体制入手,自上而下进行有目标、有逻辑、有顺序的改革。改革的思路也应该从“打补丁式完善”转向“根本性重塑”。     

夜盘交易与中国铁矿石期货国际定价能力探讨

夜盘交易是试图提高中国铁矿石期货国际定价能力的重要举措。基于溢出指数模型,本文计算了中国铁矿石期货的国际定价能力,并采用回归模型实证研究了夜盘交易的实施和交易时间调整对中国铁矿石期货国际定价能力的影响。研究发现:第一,夜盘交易显著降低了中国铁矿石期货的国际定价能力;第二,缩短夜盘交易时间进一步恶化了中国铁矿石期货的国际定价能力;第三,引入境外投资者、控制期货市场的投机程度和波动率、及促进期货市场成交量增加均有利于提高中国铁矿石期货的国际定价能力。     

Trading on inside information when there may be tippees

This paper compares four scenarios of a model in which, for the possible presence of tippees, firm insiders may not be the only persons having inside information. The four scenarios are that of free insider trading, that with a ban on insider trading, that of observable insider trading, and that with full disclosure of information. Each of these scenarios is shown to be strictly more efficient than the one before so long as there is a positive probability that a tippee exists. The paper sheds some light on why and how insider trading should be regulated, and also on the role of the disclosure system in the overall scheme of securities regulation.

A股市场新版停牌制度实施效果的实证研究

本文使用A股市场2008年10月1日至2011年11月1日的停复牌和交易数据,通过构造与“停牌日”样本相对应的“非停牌日”样本,利用多元回归分析了不同类型停牌的异常交易行为,以信息释放和价格发现效率为标准评价新版停牌制度。研究表明：例行停牌阻碍了交易的连续性;异常波动停牌虽放大了复牌日股票的成交量和波动率．但有效地降低了股票的异常收益率,同时坏消息复牌后价格调整速度相对较慢;重大事项停牌存在严重的“消息泄露”,仅能起到事后警示的作用,复牌并没有消除信息的不确定,同时坏消息复牌后的价格发现效率较低。     

内幕交易罪的司法困境及出路研究

近年来内幕交易案件频发,无论是"杭萧钢构案",还是"上海祖龙内幕交易案"都在司法认定方面引起了理论和实务界的较大争议。这充分表明,在认定内幕交易罪的司法实践中仍然存在很多待解的难题。只有在对这些司法难题进行深入剖析的基础上,重构内幕信息的认定标准、改善内幕交易行为的取证路径、强化内幕交易的执法力度、完善机制设计,才能破解司法难题,维护证券市场的公平公正,保障证券法律法规得以遵守和执行。     

2013年银行间市场金融创新产品运行效应评估报告

文章从短期融资券、中期票据、商业银行债券等基础类创新产品,以及人民币利率互换、债券远期等交易类创新产品角度,全面回顾了2013年银行间市场金融创新产品的运行情况;指出金融创新产品运行特点包括企业信用类产品增长势头良好、基础类产品发行利率波幅加大、投资者结构不断优化、交易类产品市场表现冷暧不一等;建议从促进产品创新、完善发行定价机制和收益率估值体系等角度,继续提升银行间市场服务实体经济的能力。     

Ex Post Voluntary Disclosure Strategies for Insiders*

Asymmetric information between corporate insiders and other market participants can lead to large bid‐ask spreads or even a collapse of trade in financial markets. In this paper, we discuss how voluntary disclosure by insiders can remedy this problem. When insiders make disclosure decisions after they become informed, other market participants update their prior beliefs on the basis of both the information disclosed and the information not disclosed. Insiders then give up some or all of their information advantage to weakly increase their profits. These results do not rely on ex ante commitments on the part of the insiders.